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Criminal Procedure
Criminal Procedure; admissibility of voluntary intoxication
Penal Code § 22 (amended).
SB 121 (Thompson); 1995 STAT. Ch. 793
Existing law provides that when a specific intent crime' is charged, evidence
of voluntary intoxication2 will be admissible to negate the formation of the
required intent? However, when a general intent crime4 is charged, existing law
does not allow the admission of voluntary intoxication to negate the formation of
the required intent.5 Existing law further provides that voluntary intoxication is
not admissible to negate a defendant's capacity to form any requisite mental
state.6 Under prior law, voluntary intoxication would be admissible as to whether
1. See People v. Hood, I Cal. 3d 444,457,462 P.2d 370,378, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618,626 (1969) (stating
the general rule that a crime is one of specific intent if the definition of the crime requires that the defendant
intend to do a further act or achieve an additional result); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 20 (West 1988)
(requiring a union between the act and the required intent to institute a crime); JOSHUA DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDING CRImINAL LAW 109 (1993) (discussing the requirement that a defendant committing a
specific intent crime possess one of the following mental states: (1) intent to commit a future act not included
in the crime's actus reus, (2) distinctive motive leading to the commission of the crime's actus reus, or (3)
awareness of an attendant circumstance to the crime); id. (noting also that the mental state of intent or
knowledge generally characterizes specific intent); cf MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1974) (dispensing with the
distinction between specific intent and general intent). See generally B.E. WrrKN & NoRAN L. EPSTEIN,
CALIFORNIA CRIMINALLAw, Elements of Crime § 101 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1995) (illustrating certain specific
intent crimes).
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 22(c) (amended by Chapter 793) (defining "voluntary intoxication" as the
voluntary introduction by any means of an intoxicating substance into one's body); cf. ALA. CODE § 13A-3-
2(e)(2) (1994) (defining "voluntary intoxication" as intoxication resulting from substances knowingly
introduced into the body).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 22(b) (amended by Chapter 793).
4. See Hood, 1 Cal. 3d at 456-57,462 P.2d at 378, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 626 (defining a "general intent
crime' as a crime consisting of only the description of the particular act constituting the crime); see also
DRESSLER, supra note 1 (defining "general intent" as the mental state included within the definition of the
crime relating to the actions that constitute the actus reus of the crime); id. (noting also that the mental states
of negligence and recklessness are applicable to general intent); cf MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1974)
(showing that the Model Penal Code does not distinguish between the common law concepts of specific intent
and general intent).
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 22(b) (amended by Chapter 793).
6. Id. § 22(a) (amended by Chapter 793); see id. § 28(b) (West 1988) (establishing that evidence of
mental disease shall not be admissible to negate the capacity of a defendant to form any requisite mental state
but shall be admissible on the issue of whether plaintiff formed specific intent, if a specific intent crime is
charged); see also People v. Whitfield, 7 Cal. 4th 437, 447, 868 P.2d 272, 276, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 858, 862
(1994) (commenting that the Legislature's abandonment of the diminished capacity defense via the enactment
of Chapter 404 in 1981 allowed the retention of the general rule that evidence of voluntary intoxication is
admissible to whether the defendant actually formed the required mental state). See generally 1982 Cal. Stat.
ch. 893, sec. 5, at 3318 (amending CAL PENAL CODE §§ 21, 22, 28, 188) (clarifying that the 1981 enactments
were applicable only to crimes in which a specific intent was required); 1981 Cal. Stat. ch. 404, sec. 4, at 1592
(enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 28) (abandoning the common law diminished capacity defense).
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or not a defendant actually harbored malice aforethought?, under either an
express' or implied9 malice aforethought theory, when murder 0 was charged."
Chapter 793 provides that when murder is charged, voluntary intoxication is
admissible only as to whether or not the defendant actually harbored express
malice aforethought.'
2
7. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1988) (requiring malice aforethought as an element of
murder); id. § 188 (West 1988) (providing that malice aforethought may be categorized as either express or
implied); see also DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 449 (laying out the four common law mental states constituting
malice aforethought: (1) intention to kill a human being, (2) intention to cause serious bodily injury to another
person, (3) extreme reckless disregard for human life, and (4) intent to commit a felony and a subsequent death
occurs); cf. CAL. PENAL CODE § 7(4) (West 1988) (defining "malice" as an intent to do a wrongful act). See
generally VlrrxN & EPsTIN, supra note 1, § 107 (stating that although there is no unanimity as to a precise
definition, malice does not require premeditation, nor does it require hatred or the intent to injure).
8. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (West 1988) (defining "express malice" as a deliberate intention to
unlawfully take away the life of another human being); see also People v. Bobo, 229 Cal. App. 3d 1417, 1433,
271 Cal. Rptr. 277, 286 (1990) (stating that the intention to unlawfully kill will satisfy the requirements of
express malice). See generally DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 449 (defining "express malice" as the intent to kill
another human being).
9. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (West 1988) (stating that implied malice is present when (1) no
considerable provocation has occurred, or (2) the situation evidences an abandoned and malignant heart); see
also People v. Benitez, 4 Cal. 4th 91, 104, 840 P.2d 969,976, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864, 871 (1992) (holding that
malice will be implied when an act endangering the life of another is committed by a person with conscious
disregard); People v. Contreras, 26 Cal. App. 4th 944, 954, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 757, 762 (1994) (requiring that
implied malice involve not only a conscious disregard for human life, but also an element of wantonness absent
in gross negligence). See generally DRESSLER, supra note I, at 449 (defining "implied malice" as an
indifference to human life).
10. See CAL PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1988) (defining "murder" as the unlawful killing of a human
or fetus with malice aforethought); id. § 188 (West 1988) (defining "malice" in the context of murder); see also
People v. Alvarado, 232 Cal. App. 3d 501, 505, 283 Cal. Rptr. 479, 481 (1991) (explaining the relationship
between specific intent and murder. (1) specific intent to kill is a requisite of first-degree murder, and (2)
express malice requires the establishment of a specific intent to kill).
11. 1981 Cal. Stat. ch. 404, sec. 4, at 1592 (enacting CAL PENAL CODE § 28); see 11'hitrfeld, 7 Cal. 4th
at 447,868 P.2d at 276,27 Cal: Rptr.2d at 862 (announcing that the Legislature's failure to distinguish between
express and implied malice aforethought in the 1981 amendment is consistent with the general rule that
evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible to negate the formation of either express or implied malice
aforethought). See generally People v. Ray, 14 Cal. 3d 20, 30 n.9, 533 P.2d 1017, 1023 n.9, 120 Cal. Rptr. 377,
383 n.9 (1975) (establishing that the defendant was entitled to jury instructions regarding voluntary intoxication
regardless of whether malice was implied or express).
12. CAL. PENAL CODE § 22(b) (amended by Chapter 793); cf. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-5(b) (West
1986) (allowing voluntary intoxication as a defense only when the phrases "with intent to" or "with an
intention to" are elements of the crime); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-503(a) (1991) (establishing that
intoxication, whether voluntary or involuntary, is admissible if relevant to negate a culpable mental state);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-306 (1995) (providing that voluntary intoxication is immaterial if recklessness or
criminal negligence constitutes an element of the crime). Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 22(b) (amendcd by
Chapter 793) (limiting the admissibility of voluntary intoxication solely as to whether or not a defendant
formed the requisite specific intent) with ALA. CODE § 13A-3-2(a) (1994) (allowing the admission of voluntary
intoxication whenever required to negate an element of the charged offense), NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193.220
(Michie 1992) (allowing voluntary intoxication to be considered when determining purpose, motive, or intent),
and N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.25 (McKinney's 1987) (providing that intoxication is only a defense if it is relevant
to disprove an element of the charged violation). See generally SENATE COtmtrrTEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
COsi1rrrmE ANALYSiS OF SB 121, at I (Mar. 28, 1995) (explaining when evidence of voluntary intoxication
was admissible prior to the enactment of Chapter 793).
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COMMENT
The purpose of Chapter 793 is to differentiate between express malice afore-
thought and implied malice aforethought when a defendant is charged with
murder and evidence of voluntary intoxication is being offered for admittance.' 3
Chapter 793 is in direct response to People v. Whifield,4 which held that evi-
dence of voluntary intoxication was admissible as to whether or not the defendant
actually harbored malice aforethought when the prosecution sought to establish
implied malice aforethought.' 5 In Whitfield, the defendant claimed that he did not
possess the requisite implied malice because he was unconscious at the time of
the accident.' 6
In the immediate aftermath of Whitfield, evidence of voluntary intoxication
had the contradictory effect of both aggravating and mitigating the defendant's
liability. 7 Prior to Chapter 793, a murder charge rebuked by a successful
invocation of the voluntary intoxication defense would generally yield a man-
slaughter 8 conviction. t9 Under Chapter 793, when a defendant is charged with
murder, a successful application of the voluntary intoxication defense will most
13. SENATEFLOOR, COMMITEE ANALYSIS OFSB 121, at 2 (May 23, 1995); see ASSEiBLY COMMITTEE
ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMtTrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 121, at 4 (July 11, 1995) (stating that the court in People v.
Whitfield emphasized that because the Legislature did not distinguish between express and implied malice
aforethought, it may be presumed that voluntary intoxication is admissible to demonstrate whether or not the
defendant actually harbored either type of malice).
14. 7 Cal. 4th 437, 868 P.2d 272,27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 858 (1994).
15. Whitfield, 7 Cal. 4th at 441,868 P.2d at 272-73,27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 859; see id. (holding also that
the trial court did not err by refusing to grant the defendant's request to provide additional jury instructions
concerning whether or not the defendant was unconscious when the killing occurred).
16. Id. at 444,868 P.2d at 273,27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 860; see id. (noting that the defendant had a 0.24%
blood-alcohol content); ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFErY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 121, at 2
(July 11, 1995) (providing that as a result of the decision in Whitfield, a defendant charged with second-degree
murder can now utilize his or her own voluntary intoxication by making claims that "I was too high on heroin"
or "I was too drunk" to disprove culpability).
17. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 121, at 4 (July 11,
1995) (asserting that this effect is known as the Whifield Dilemma, because Whitfield provided that voluntary
intoxication evidence may be used to mitigate a defendant's liability to involuntary or vehicular manslaughter,
but California law allows an increase in the defendant's liability from vehicular manslaughter to second-degree
murder in aggravated drunk driving cases).
18. See CAL- PENAL CODE § 192(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1995) (establishing three types of manslaughter,
each of which are characterized by the killing of a human being without malice as: (1) voluntary, (2)
involuntary, and (3) vehicular); see also People v. Coad, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1094, 1106,226 Cal. Rptr. 386, 392
(1986) (providing that the absence of malice distinguishes voluntary manslaughter from murder).
19. SENATE COMMINMON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OFSB 121, at I (Apr. 24, 1995);
see People v. Saille, 54 Cal. 3d 1103, 1117, 820 P.2d 588, 596, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 372 (1991) (establishing
that evidence of voluntary intoxication giving rise to reasonable doubt will support only an involuntary
manslaughter conviction); see also SENATE FLOOR, COMMrrTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 121, at 2 (May 23, 1995)
(stating that the proponents of SB 121 believe that a defendant charged with second-degree murder should not
be entitled to mitigate the charge to voluntary manslaughter). But see Ramon Coronado, Jury Opts for Verdict
of Murder in Shooting, SACRAMiENTO BEE, Mar. 25, 1995, at BI (discussing the failure of a jury to return an
involuntary manslaughter verdict against a defendant claiming that he was too intoxicated to realize the extent
of his conduct where the prosecution charge was second-degree murder).
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likely result in a second-degree murder2° conviction.2
J. Scott Alexander
Criminal Procedure; arraignments-use of audiovideo communications
Penal Code § 977.2 (new).
SB'840 (Beverly); 1995 STAT. Ch. 367
Existing law provides that where a court, with a defendant's consent,' allows
the initial court appearance or arraignment2 of the defendant to be conducted by
two-way audiovideo communication, the defendant's attorney is required to be
present with the defendant if the defendant is represented by counsel.3 Existing
law also allows the judge to accept a guilty or no contest plea from a defendant
who is not actually in the court room.4
20. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West Supp. 1995) (defining "second-degree murder" as any kind of
murder that does not constitute first-degree murder).
21. SENATE FLOOR, COMrrTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 121, at I (Apr. 24, 1995); see id. (arguing that the
application of the voluntary intoxication defense under existing law is rare; therefore the enactment of a
narrower defense would entail only a nominal increase in prison population); SENATE RULES COMMinrEV,
CoMMrTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 121, at 2 (May 23, 1995) (providing that opponents to SB 121 argued the
enactment of SB 121 is juxtaposed to the traditional rule that a defendant can only be convicted of murder if
he or she actually harbored either express or implied malice aforethought).
1. See CAL PENALCODE § 977(c) (West Supp. 1995) (requiring that the defendant's consent must be
given by written waiver); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (explaining that a "waiver" is "an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege"); see also CAL. PENAL CODE §
977(b)(2) (West Supp. 1995) (providing the recommended form for a waiver of the defendant's right to be
present).
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 988 (West 1985) (stating that an arraignment includes a reading of the
accusatory pleading and a plea by the defendant); see also id. § 977(a)(1) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that
a defendant may appear by counsel for a misdemeanor); id. § 977(b)(1) (West Supp. 1995) (allowing a
defendant charged with a felony to waive the right to be present at his or her criminal procecdings).
3. Id. § 977(a)(1) (west Supp. 1995); cf. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3205(b) (Supp. 1994) (permitting
audiovideo arraignments at the discretion of the court); LA. CODE CLs. PRoc. ANN. art. 551 (B) (West Supp.
1995) (allowing for a defendant to be arraigned by simultaneous audiovideo transmission); MICH. COMip. LAWS
ANN. § 767.37a(l), (2) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that a court may conduct an arraignment by closed-circuit
television unless the defendant requests physical presence and if the system allows for communication between
the judge, defendant, and opposing counsel); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-12-201 (1993) (setting forth the
procedures for an audiovideo arraignment); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-941(b) (Supp. 1994) (permitting
audiovideo arraignments in noncapital cases); N.M. RULES OFPROC. MUN. CT. 8-501(E) (Michie Supp, 1990)
(permitting the use of audiovideo communication for the first court appearance of the defendant where the
defendant and the defendant's counsel are together in one room, and the judge, counsel, and defendant can
communicate with each other while being heard and viewed in the courtroom by members of the public).
4. CAL PENAL CODE § 977(c) (West Supp. 1995); see id. (allowing the court to accept a guilty or no
contest plea to a misdemeanor charge without the defendant's presence); id. (providing that a guilty or no
contest plea to a felony can only be accepted in the defendant's absence if the parties agree to it); see also id.
§ 1043(d) (West 1985) (requiring the defendant's presence in a felony case during trial unless he or she has
waived this right); People v. Johnson, 6 Cal. 4th 1, 18, 859 P.2d 673, 679, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 593, 599 (1993)
Pacific Law Journal/Vol. 27
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Chapter 367 authorizes the Department of Corrections to establish a three-
year pilot project permitting initial court appearances and arraignments for new
charges7 brought against defendants incarcerated in a state prison, to be conducted
by two-way audiovideo communication without requiring the defendant's
consent.8
COMMENT
Chapter 367 is the progeny of a similar 1983 program conducted in Sacra-
mento and San Diego Counties.9 These audiovideo arraignment programs' ° were
designed to reduce the costs and security risks involved in transporting prisoners
to in-court appearances as well as to diminish prisoner discomfort from pre-
arraignment detention in holding cells." Chapter 367 ensures the cost-
(stating that there are situations when a defendant's absence from a hearing, even without a waiver, will not
be prejudicial to his or her case), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 133 (1994); People v. Grant, 45 Cal. 3d 829, 845, 755
P.2d 894, 903, 248 Cal. Rptr. 444, 453 (1988) (declaring that a state may permit a defendant to waive the right
to be present at a criminal proceeding without constituting a denial of due process), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1050
(1989).
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 5001 (West Supp. 1995) (stating that the Director of Corrections and the
Prison Industry Authority compose the Department of Corrections); see also id. § 5000 (West Supp. 1995)
(providing that the Department of Corrections is included in the Youth and Adult Correctional Agency); id.
§ 5002 (West Supp. 1995) (setting forth the powers and duties of the Department of Corrections).
6. See idU § 977.2(b) (enacted by Chapter 367) (providing that the project is limited to five institutions
including one maximum and minimum security institution, one Imperial County institution, and one female
institution); see also id. § 977.2(d) (enacted by Chapter 367) (requiring the Department of Corrections to assess
the program's costs and benefits and to recommend whether to expand the project in a report to the legislature
before June 30, 1999); id. § 977.2(e) (enacted by Chapter 367) (proclaiming that this section will be repealed
on January 1, 2000).
7. See id. § 977.2(a)(1) (enacted by Chapter 367) (providing that this section applies to both felony
and misdemeanor charges).
8. lid § 977.2(a) (enacted by Chapter 367); see id. § 977.2(a)(1) (enacted by Chapter 367) (giving the
court the authority to require the defendant's presence in the courtroom if the circumstances require); id. §
977.2(c) (enacted by Chapter 367) (providing that a defendant, who has committed a new charge at an
institution not participating in the project, may be excused from having to undergo an audiovideo hearing at
the director's discretion).
9. SENATE COMMiirn ON CmINAL PROCEDURE, ComfirI'EE ANALYSIS OF SB 840, at 2 (Apr. 25,
1995); see id. (explaining that this 1983 project was limited to felony arraignments in municipal court and
prohibited pleas of guilty or no contest).
10. See SENATE FLOOR, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS oFSB 840, at 2 (May 18, 1995) (describing how the
original program was expanded to include: municipal and superior courts in 1984, guilty pleas to misdemeanors
in 1990, and guilty pleas to felonies in 1991, as well as an increase in the number of participating counties).
11. SENATEFLOOR, COMMrrTEE ANALYSiS oFSB 840, at 2 (July 20, 1995); see ASSEMBLY CoMMrrrEE
ON PUBuC SAFETY, COMMrrrEE ANALYSTS OF SB 840, at 3 (June 20, 1995) (indicating that the use of video-
arraignments will prevent inmates who belong to gangs from communicating with other gang members,
recruiting new ones or planning an escape, while temporarily housed at the county jail awaiting their
arraignments); SENATE FLOOR, CoMMrrrEE ANALYSis OF SB 840, at 3 (May 18, 1995) (describing a video-
arraignment project conducted at Pelican Bay State Prison which showed that one prisoner's arraignment by
audiovideo communication cost only $67 and 3 staff hours, compared to $6815 and 242 staff hours for 38 in-
person arraignments); Frederic 1. Lederer, Technology Comes to the Courtroom, and.... 43 EMORY L.J. 1095,
1105 (1994) (stating that there is near-unanimous agreement that electronically remote arraignments are very
cost effective); Kelly Pearce, Video Arraignments a Hit in Justice-Court Innovation Cuts Cost, Pretrial Jail
Stays, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Dec. 5, 1994, at B1 (discussing how video arraignments will relieve counties of the
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effectiveness of audiovideo arraignment programs by removing the requirement
that the prisoner consent to the program.'
2
Chapter 367 was criticized as infringing on the prisoner's right to be present
in the courtroom.' 3 Opponents also expressed concern that prisoners might not be
able to confer adequately with their counsel during these hearings. 4
A. James Kachmar
Criminal Procedure; arrest warrants
Penal Code § 817 (new); §§ 813, 826 (amended).
SB 33 (Peace); 1995 STAT. Ch. 563
financial burden of transporting prisoners to court); Paul Schneider, Video Links Proposed for Court Systems
Face Budget, Constitutional Hurdles, ARiZ. BUS. GAzETTE, Oct. 6, 1994, at Al (predicting that video-
arraignments will probably eliminate the considerable costs of arraigning defendants); id. (noting that video-
arraignments make proceedings safer because suspects are kept separated); Dean Takahashi, Video-Link System
Would Allow Courts to Arraign by Phone, L.A. TIMES, May 7, 1992, at D5 (arguing that video-arraignment
systems are critical in emergency situations, such as riots, where large numbers of defendants must be arraigned
quickly to meet the 48-hour deadline for charging them); see also Patricia Rabum.Remfry, Due Process
Concerns in Video Production of Defendants, 23 STETSON L. REv. 305, 806-07 (1994) (describing the time-
consuming and uncomfortable procedure involved in preparing prisoners for transportation to their hearings
on a typical morning in the Los Angeles County Jail).
12. SENATE COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, COMMITfEE ANALYSIS OF SB 840, at 3 (Apr. 18,
1995); see ASSEMBLY COMMTE oN APPROPRIATIONS, CoMMirrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 840, at 2 (July 5, 1995)
(reporting that only four inmates out of 24 agreed to participate in a video arraignment test at Corcoran State
Prison); SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 840, at 3 (May 18, 1995) (stating that only one inmate
at Pelican Bay State Prison consented to the video arraignment project).
13. SENATE COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAl. PROCEDURE, COMnrTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 840, at 4 (Apr. 18,
1995); see U.S. CONST. amend. VI (granting the defendant in a criminal trial the right to be informed of the
nature of the charges as well as the opportunity to challenge witnesses and retain counsel); SENATE CONrmr=E
ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, COMMITTEE ANALYSTS OF SB 840, at 4 (Apr. 18, 1995) (quoting opposition to SB
840 put forth by California Attorneys for Criminal Justice); see also Valenzuela-Gonzalez v. United States,
915 F.2d 1276, 1280 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require the physical
presence of the defendant at the arraignment); Patricia Nealon, Public CounselAgency Opposes 'Video' Court,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 20, 1993, at 24 (discussing a public defender group's opposition to video-arraignments),
See generally Raburn-Remfly, supra note 11 (discussing the minimum standards that video production of the
defendant must meet to pass constitutional muster).
14. SENATE CO1MrrEE ON CRIINAL PROCEDURE, COMiTnE ANALYsIs OF SB 840, at 3 (Apr. 25,
1995); see also Lederer, supra note 11, at 1106-07 (expressing concern as to whether an attorney can zealously
defend a client if the attorney must decide between being present in the courtroom and separated from the
client, or present with the client and absent from the courtroom where bargaining may take place). But see
Saundra Tony, Courtrooms Boost Use of Video Camera Technology, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 1993, at F7
(discussing how Dade County, Florida requires two attorneys: one present with the defendant and the other
present in the courtroom).
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Existing law mandates that a magistrate shall issue a warrant or summons 1 for
the arrest of a defendant upon the filing of a complaint, provided that two
conditions are met.' First, the complaint must indicate that the alleged offense has
been committed. Second, the circumstances must provide a reasonable basis for
believing that the defendant has committed the offense! Chapter 563 amends
existing law by providing that a magistrate shall issue an arrest warrant only ifthe
magistrate is satisfied that the two conditions exist.5
Chapter 563 adds to existing law by enabling a magistrate to issue a warrant
of probable cause for the arrest of the defendant upon a declaration of probable
cause, rather than upon the filing of a criminal complaint. 6Moreover, Chapter 563
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 813(a) (amended by Chapter 563) (providing for the issuance of a
summons, in lieu of an arrest warrant, upon the request of the prosecutor); see also id. § 813(b) (amended by
Chapter 563) (requiring that a summons be similar in form to an arrest warrant and must contain specified
elements, including but not limited to, the name of the defendant, the date and time the summons was issued,
the offense(s) charged, and the time and place for appearance); id. § 813(c) (amended by Chapter 563)
(declaring that if a defendant has been properly served with a summons and fails to comply with its provisions,
a bench warrant for arrest shall be issued); id. § 813(d) (amended by Chapter 563) (requiring that the defendant
complete the booking process if he has not already done so); id. § 813(e) (amended by Chapter 563)
(mandating that a summons may not be issued, if any of the following apply: (1) the offense charged involves
violence, (2) the offense charged involves a firearm, (3) the offense charged involves resisting arrest; (4) there
are one or more outstanding arrest warrants for the person; (5) the prosecution of the offense or offenses with
which the person is charged, or the prosecution of any other offense would be jeopardized; (6) there is the
possibility of continuing violations or that persons or property would be exposed to immminent danger, or (7)
it is likely that the person would fail to comply with the provisions of the summons).
2. Id. § 813(a) (amended by Chapter 563); see People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263, 265-66, 545 P.2d
1333, 1340-41, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629, 636-637 (1976) (holding that an arrest warrant must be obtained before the
police may enter a suspect's home for the purpose of effecting an arrest); cf. ALA. CODE § 15-7-3 (1982)
(stating that ajudge may issue an arrest warrant if he is reasonably certain, upon examination of depositions
taken at the time the complaint was filed, that the alleged offense has been committed by the named defendant);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-81-104 (Michie 1987) (stating that if a magistrate believes that an offense has been
commmitted, he may interview anyone he believes to have information regarding the offense, and subsequently
issue an arrest warrant for the alleged offender); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, para. 5/107-9 (Smith-Hurd 1992)
(providing for the issuance of an arrest warrant, upon the filing of a written complaint, as long as there exists
probable cause to believe that an offense was committed by the named offender); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-2-1
(West 1986) (stating that a magistrate may not issue an arrest warrant unless an indictment has been found
charging the suspect with the commission of an offense, or a judge determines that probable cause exists and
an indictment is filed charging him with an offense); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2302 (1988) (stating that an arrest
warrant may be issued if the magistrate finds from the complaint, or from affidavits filed from the complaint,
or from other evidence, that there exists probable cause that the particular crime was committed by the
particular defendant); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-201 (1993) (stating that an arrest warrant shall be issued if
there appears from the contents of the complaint and the examination of witnesses, that a crime has been
committed by the person designated in the complaint).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 813(a) (amended by Chapter 563).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. § 817(a)(1) (enacted by Chapter 563); see id. (providing that an arrest warrant shall be issued
if, and only if, the magistrate is convinced that the stated offense was committed by the named defendant); see
also id. § 817(a)(2) (enacted by Chapter 563) (stating that the complaint process set forth in California Penal
Code § 813 may not be initiated by the issuance of a warrant of probable cause for arrest); id. (stating that the
warrant of probable cause for arrest shall be bound by the same requirements that are applied to an arrest
warrant issued pursuant to California Penal Code § 813, with respect to authority of service and time
limitations); id. § 817(d) (enacted by Chapter 563) (permitting the magistrate to question, under oath, the
person seeking the warrant and any available witnesses); id. (enabling the magistrate to obtain the written
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requires that the declaration in support of the warrant of probable cause for arrest
consist of a written, sworn statement.7 Alternatively, Chapter 563 permits an oral
statement made under oath to substitute for a written declaration, if either of the
following conditions exist: (1) The oath is taken under penalty of perjury,
recorded, and transcribed; or (2) the oath is transmitted through telephone and
facsimile equipment and such transmission conforms to specified requirements.8
COMMENT
Under the provisions of the California Penal Code, a complaint may be used
either to intitiate criminal proceedings, or to demonstrate probable cause for
arrest. 9 Consequently, California courts have held that an arrest warrant can be
declaration of the declarant or witness and providing for that party's acknowledgment of the declaration); id.
§ 817(e) (enacted by Chapter 563) (stating that the information contained in the warrant for probable cause for
arrest must conform with the guidelines set forth within California Penal Code §§ 815 and 815a); id. § 817(f)
(enacted by Chapter 563) (providing an example of an acceptable form for a warrant of probable cause for
arrest may take); id. § 817(g) (enacted by Chapter 563) (stating that a defendant may be booked into custody,
upon the receipt of an original or duplicate warrant of probable cause for arrest); id. § 817(h) (enacted by
Chapter 563) (requiring that a "certificate of service" be filed with the clerk of the issuing court, upon receipt
of the appropriate defendant into custody); id. (declaring that the "certificate of service" must contain all of
the following: (1) the date and time of service; (2) the name of the defendant arrested; (3) the location of the
arrest; and (4) the location of the defendant's incarceration).
7. Id. § 817(b) (enacted by Chapter 563).
8. Id. § 817(c) (enacted by Chapter 563); see id. § 817(c)(1) (enacted by Chapter 563) (requiring the
certification of the sworn oral statement or transcribed certification by the magistrate and mandating that it be
filed with the clerk of the court); id. (stating that a certified court reporter may record the oral statement and
certify the transcript of the statement, which must then be given to the magistrate to certify and file with the
clerk of the court); id. § 817(c)(2) (enacted by Chapter 563) (isting the following requirements in order to
utilize telephone and facsimile equipment: (1) the oath is made during a telephone conversation with the
magistrate, after which the declarant signs a declaration in support of the warrant of probable cause for arrest
and utilizes facsimile equipment to transmit the proposed warrant and all supplementary material to the
magistrate; (2) the magistrate confirms receipt of the warrant and supporting declarations and attachments,
verifying that all pages are received, that the documents were legible, and that the declarant's signature was
genuine; (3) upon issuance of the warrant, the magistrate signs it, affixing the exact date and time the warrant
was issued, and indicates that the oath of the declarant was received orally over the phone; and 14) the
magistrate utilizes facsimile equipmant to transmit the signed warrant to the declarant, who is telephonically
given permission by the magistrate to attach the words "duplicate original" on the copy of the completed
warrant, thereby making it a duplicate original warrant); id. § 826 (amended by Chapter 563) (stating that if
a defendant is brought before a magistrate other than the magistrate responsible for issuing the arrest warrant
pursuant to §§ 813 or 817 of the California Penal Code, the complaint on which the warrant was issued must
be sent to that magistrate or, if the original complaint cannot be obtained, a new one may be filed before that
magistrate); cf. S.D. CODnImD LAWS ANN. § 23A-2-2 (1995) (permitting the issuance of an arrest warant, upon
sworn oral testimony of a person who is not in the physical presence of the magistrate, provided that probable
cause for issuing the warrant exists); id. (setting forth the procedure for issuance of a telephonic arrest warrant).
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 806 (West 1985); id. § 813 (amended by Chapter 563); see People v. Bittaker,
48 Cal. 3d 1046, 1071, 774 P.2d 659, 671,259 Cal. Rptr. 630, 642 (1989) (stating that a complaint can be used
to institute criminal proceedings or to demonstrate probable cause); see also 4 B.E. Wrrmw & NOnRMAN L.
EPSTEIN, SutI.SARY oF CALORNA CMINAL LAW, Statutory Provisions § 1915 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1995)
(declaring that a felony complaint serves to establish probable cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant).
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issued if a complaint furnishes probable cause for arrest, even if that complaint
is not used to institute criminal proceedings.' °
Chapter 563 was enacted to codify the doctrine established by California
courts that allows an arrest warrant to be issued without instituting a criminal
action." Moreover, Chapter 563 ensures that the relevant provisions of the Penal
Code conform with constitutional standards by explicitly requiring that pro-
bable cause exist before an arrest warrant may be issued.
2
Laura K. O'Connor
Criminal Procedure; criminal actions-pre-trial information
Penal Code § 1204.5 (amended).
AB 130 (Rainey); 1995 STAT. Ch. 86
Existing law, subject to certain exceptions, prohibits judges from reviewing
the criminal record of a defendant, or any written reports concerning the offense
of which the defendant is charged, before a plea has been entered.' Moreover,
10. Bittaker, 48 Cal. 3d at 1071,774 P.2d at 671, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 642; see id. (holding that as long
as a complaint furnishes probable cause for arrest, the fact that a different document is used to initiate criminal
proceedings is irrelevant); cf. People v. Johnson, 544 N.E.2d 35, 38 (1ii. 1989) (holding that under Illinois law,
there is no requirement that the complaint for arrest be filed in open court, or that an information be filed in
open court, prior to the issuance of an arrest warrant).
11. SENATE CoMMrrTEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, COMMrrTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 33, at 4 (Mar. 28,
1995); see id. (stating that SB 33 provides a statutory basis for allowing an arrest warrant to be issued on the
basis of a complaint that shows probable cause but does not initiate criminal proceedings).
12. 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 563, sec. 4, at 3449 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 817 and amending
Cal. Penal Code §§ 813, 826); see People v. Sesslin, 68 Cal. 2d 418,421,439 P.2d 321,323, 67 Cal. Rptr. 409,
411 (1968) (holding that an arrest warrant may not be issued solely on the basis of a complaint, unless facts
are presented that would independently give a magistrate probable cause to arrest the defendant); see also
Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480,486 (1958) (requiring that a complaint contain more than mere
suspicions, conclusions, or beliefs, in order to meet the probable cause requirement). See generally Geoffrey
A. Gaither, The Two-Prong Aguilar-Spinelli Test Used in Probable Cause Determinations is Abandoned in
Favor of the Totality of the Circumstances Approach: Illinois v. Gates, 27 HOW. L. J. 1031 (1984) (discussing
the history and analysis involved in the Supreme Court's "totality of the circumstances" approach used in
determining whether probable cause to issue a warrant exists); Francis Polito, District of Columbia Court of
Appeals Project on Criminal Procedure, 28 How. L. J. 1, 23 (1985) (analyzing cases that discuss the problems
of establishing probable cause to issue a search or arrest warrant based upon an informant's tip); Sheldon R.
Shapiro, Annotation, What Constitutes Probable Cause for Arrest-Supreme Court Cases, 28 L. Ed. 2d 978,
978-1004 (1995) (examining Supreme Court cases which determine whether probable cause for an arrest
exists).
I. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1204.5 (amended by Chapter 86); see id. § 1204.5(a) (amended by Chapter 86)
(stating that no judge may read the pre-sentence report before defendant has been found guilty or pled guilty
except as provided in the rules of evidence applicable at trial, or with the defendant's consent, or affidavits in
connection with the issuance of a warrant or the hearing of any law and motion matter, or any matter relating
to bail, or a petition for a writ); see also Gregg v. United States, 394 U.S. 489, 492 (1969) (concluding that to
allow the judge, who will pronounce the defendant's guilt or innocence or who will preside over the jury trial,
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existing law lists well-defined exceptions to the prohibition on the use of the
specified information, including, but not limited to, matters provided for in the
rules of evidence applicable at trial and those pertaining to a proper pre-trial
issue.2
Chapter 86 expands existing law by permitting a judge, who is not the
preliminary hearing or trial judge in the case, to consider any information about
the defendant for the purpose of that judge adopting a pre-trial sentencing position
or disapproving a guilty plea entered pursuant to section 1192.5 of the California
Penal Code,3 if certain conditions are met.4 First, Chapter 86 requires that the
defendant be represented by counsel, unless he or she expressly waives the right
to counsel.5 Second, Chapter 86 mandates that any information provided to the
to consider the presentence report before a verdict is rendered would seriously contravene the rule's purpose
of preventing possible prejudice); CeLillianne Green, District of Columbia Court of Appeals Project on
Criminal Procedure: XI. Presentence Investigation, Sentencing, and Multiple Sentences, 26 How. L.J. 1168,
1170 (1933) (stating that the utility of the presentence report to the court is weighed against its utility to the
defendant, thereby prohibiting ajudge from reviewing the report before a guilty plea is entered or the defendant
is convicted); cf. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(b)(1) (West 1993) (requiring that a judge who has personal knowledge
of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding must disqualify himself or herself); FED. R. CRIM. P.
32(b)(3) (stating that a presentence report must not be submitted to the court unless the defendant has
consented in writing, has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere, or has been found guilty); id. 32(b)(4)(A)
(mandating that a presentence report must contain information about a defendant's history and characteristics,
including any prior criminal record). See generally John E. Gillick, Jr. & Robert E. Scott, Jr., The Presentence
Report: An Empirical Study of lts Use in The Criminal Process, 58 GEo. LJ. 451 (1970) (discussing the role
of the presentence report in federal criminal procedure).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1204.5 (amended by Chapter 86); sce also In re Walters, 15 Cal. 3d 738, 752
n.7, 543 P.2d 607, 617 n.7, 126 Cal. Rptr. 239, 249 n.7 (1975) (holding that a probable cause determination
is in the nature of a "law and motion" matter within the meaning of California Penal Code § 1204.5); O'Neal
v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 185 Cal. App. 3d 1086, 1094, 230 Cal. Rptr. 257, 262 (1986)
(holding that the legislative history of California Penal Code § 1204.5 reveals that the section is intended to
apply to magistrates as well as judges); id. at 1095, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 262 (holding that a judge who properly
reviews a defendant's record pursuant to a bail hearing is not thereafter disqualified from the case). But see
Breedlove v. Municipal Court, 27 Cal. App. 4th 60, 64,32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 400,402 (1994) (construing California
Penal Code § 1204.5 strictly to contain no implied exception that would allow a judge to consider pre-plea
probation reports in forming a pre-trial position on a case at the pre-preliminary hearing conference, even when
that judge would not be the trial judge).
3. See CAL PENAL CODE § 1192.5 (West Supp. 1995) (outlining the specification of punishment and
exercise of judicial powers available to the court, upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, as well as the
relevant procedures concerning the approval and withdrawal of the plea).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1204.5(b) (amended by Chapter 86); see CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.5 (West
Supp. 1995); see also United States v. Gallington, 488 F.2d 637, 640 (8th Cir. 1973) (holding that a judge who
has rejected a guilty plea from an accused person after having read the presentence investigation report may
preside over a criminal trial, before a jury, against that person), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 907 (1973). See
generally Annotation, Propriety of Judge Presiding in Federal Criminal Case After Rejecting Accused's Guilty
Plea, 27 A.L.R. FED. 589 (1976 & Supp. 1994) (analyzing the federal cases in which a judge has presid:!d over
a criminal case after he has rejected a guilty plea from the accused in the same case).
5. CAL- PENAL CODE § 1204.5(b)(1) (amended by Chapter 86); see AsssEmLy CoNmrrrEE ON PUmC
SAF=Y, CoNgstrrrm ANALYSiS OF AB 130, at 2 (May 9, 1995) (stating that Chapter 86 avoids a potential
constitutional conflict in that it allows a defendant who wishes to defend himself to avail himself of the pre-
plea report if he expressly waives his right to counsel); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing a
criminal defendant the assistance of counsel for his defense); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (providing that no state
may deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806, 819-20 (1975) (holding that the defendant's right to self-representation is implied by the structure of the
6th amendment).
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judge must be provided to the prosecution and to the defense counsel five days
prior to the hearing for the purpose of considering a proposed guilty plea or pro-
posed sentence. Finally, Chapter 86 states that both defense counsel and the
prosecution must be accorded the opportunity to provide information, either on
or off the record, to supplement or rebut the information presented at the hearing.7
COMMENT
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 86, judges in the criminal calendar
departments regularly utilized pre-plea probation reports in order to garner
information about the defendant and the circumstances of the crime; this helped
to ensure a fair pre-trial disposition offer.' This practice fostered the resolution
of cases at the earliest possible opportunity, thereby speeding up the flow of cases
through the criminal justice system Chapter 86 was enacted after the Public
Defender's office successfully challenged the calendarjudges' use of the pre-plea
probation reports on the grounds that such a practice violated the express
provisions of section 1204.5 of the California Penal Code.10 By creating a new
exception to the provisions of California Penal Code section 1204.5, the
Legislature hopes to encourage the efficient resolution of criminal cases, while
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1204.5(bX2) (amended by Chapter 86); see ASSEMBLY COMMrrrEE ON PUBLIC
SAFETY, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OFAB 130, at 2 (May 9, 1995) (suggesting that the additional judicial week
added to the pre-plea report process may prejudice the prosecution by allowing more time for a case to become
"cold" and by increasing the likelihood that witnesses will disappear before trial preparation begins).
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1204.5(b)(3) (amended by Chapter 86).
8. ASSEMBLY COMMIIEON PUBIC SAFETY, COMMITEE ANALYSIS OFAB 130, at I (May 9, 1995);
see id. (stating that pre-sentencing reports enable calendar department judges to make a meaningful disposition
offer); see also Letter from Douglas E. Swager, Judge, Superior Court of the State of California, to
Assemblymember Richard Ralney (June 10, 1994) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (declaring that
Contra Costa County judges have utilized pre-plea probation reports in order to make an informed disposition
offer).
9. ASSEMBLY COMM1T'EEON PUBLIC SAFEIY, COMMITfEE ANALYSIS OFAB 130, at 1 (May 9, 1995);
see id. (stating that pre-sentence reports have become an essential part of trial court coordination plans); see
also Letter from Douglas E. Swager, supra note 8 (declaring that the use of pre-plea probation reports furthers
the efficient resolution of criminal cases).
10. ASSEMBLY COMMrrEE ON PUBuc SAFETY, COMMrITEE ANALYSIS OFAB 130, at 2 (Mar. 7, 1995);
see Breedlove v. Municipal Court, 27 Cal. App. 4th 60, 65, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 400, 403 (1994) (striking down
the use of pre-plea probation reports in pre-preliminary hearing conferences); see also id. (refusing to recognize
an implied exception to the provisions of California Penal Code § 1204.5 for non-trial judges and declaring
that any alteration to the section must be made by the Legislature).
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preserving the section's purpose of protecting criminal defendants from possible
prejudice."
Laura K. O'Connor
Criminal Procedure; electronic surveillance
Penal Code §§ 629.50, 629.51, 629.52, 629.54, 629.56, 629.58, 629.60,
629.62,629.64,629.66,629.68,629.70,629.72,629.74,629.76,629.78,
629.80,629.82,629.84,629.86,629.88, 629.89,629.90,629.91,629.92,
629.94, 629.96, 629.98 (new and repealed); §§ 629, 629.02, 629.06,
629.08, 629.10, 629.32, 629.38, 629.44, 629.48 (amended).
SB 1016 (Boatwright); 1995 STAT. Ch. 971
Existing law requires applications for orders permitting the interception of
wire communications to be submitted in writing to a judge upon the personal oath
or affirmation of the Attorney General, Chief Assistant Attorney, Criminal Law
Division, or district attorney.' Chapter 971 provides that such applications may
also be submitted upon the personal oath or affirmation of the Chief Deputy
Attorney General.2
Existing law provides that upon an application for an order permitting the
interception of wire communications, a judge may enter an ex parte order auth-
orizing such interception within the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which
the judge is sitting when, among other things, probable cause exists to support the
belief that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit one
of the specified offenses involving controlled substances, or is conspiring to
commit such an offense.3 Chapter 971 expands the classification of offenses for
11. ASSEmLYCoMrEEONPUBLICSAFETYCO.mI1EEANALYSISOF AB 130. at I (Nay 9, 1995);
see Letter from Douglas E. Swager, supra note 8 (stating that California Penal Code § 1204.5 was never
intended to apply to judges who would be the trier of fact); see also Letter from Harold F. Bradford, Assistant
Legislative Representative, to Governor Ronald Reagan (Aug. 3, 1968) (copy on file with the Pacific Law
Journal) (stating that the purpose of California Penal Code § 1204.5 was to prevent the trial judge from
considering information regarding the accused's prior criminal record that could possibly prejudice the judge's
views during the course of the trial).
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 629 (amended by Chapter 971); see id. (specifying that the application must
be made to the presiding judge of the superior court or one other judge designated by the presiding judge); id.
(requiring applications to include specified information, such as the identity of the law enforcement officer
making the application, and stating that the judge may require the applicant to furnish testimony or
documentary evidence in addition to the listed requirements).
2. Id.
3. Id. § 629.02(a) (amended by Chapter 971); see id. (specifying that a judge, entering an cx parte
order authorizing the interception of wire communications, may enter the order as requested or may modify
it); id. (stating that ajudge may authorize the interception of wire communications only if the judge determincs,
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which an order authorizing the interception of wire communications may be
obtained.4 If all of the conditions of California Penal Code section 629.02 are met,
such an order may now be issued when there is probable cause to support the
belief that a person is committing, has committed, or is about to commit murder,
solicitation to commit murder, a crime involving the bombing of public or private
property, aggravated kidnaping, or conspiracy to commit any these crimes.5
Chapter 971 emphasizes that an order to intercept wire communications may be
entered where all of the specified conditions are met, and there is probable cause
to believe that the communications to be intercepted may be used for locating or
rescuing a kidnap victim.6
Under existing law, a judge may grant oral approval of an informal appli-
cation, by the Attorney General, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Law
Division, or a district attorney, for the interception of wire communications
without entering an order, if the judge determines that all of the conditions
specified by statute are met.7 Chapter 971 adds that a judge may also grant oral
on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant, that all of the requirements specified in California Penal
Code § 629.02(a)-(d) are present); see also id. § 629.02(a) (amended by Chapter 971) (stating that the judge
must determine that there is probable cause to support the belief that an individual is committing, has
committed, or is about to commit one of the following offenses: (1) importation, possession for sale,
transportation, manufacture, or sale of controlled substances in violation of Health and Safety Code §§ 11351,
11351.5, 11352, 11378, 11378.5, 11379, 11379.5, or 11379.6 with respect to a substance containing heroin,
cocaine, PCP, methamphetamine, or their analogs where the substance exceeds 10 gallons by liquid volume
or three pounds of solid substance by weight; or (2) conspiracy to commit any of the aforementioned crimes);
id. § 629.02(b) (amended by Chapter 971) (stating that in order to authorize an interception of wire
communications, the judge must find that probable cause exists to support the belief that particular
communications concerning the illegal activities will be obtained through that interception); id. § 629.02(c)
(amended by Chapter 971) (directing that the judge must find probable cause to believe that the facilities which
are subject to interception of wire communications: (1) are being used, or are about to be used in connection
with the commission of the offense; or (2) are leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by the person
making such communications); id. § 629.02(d) (amended by Chapter 971) (requiring the judge entering the
order to determine that normal investigative procedures have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to
succeed or too dangerous).
4. Id. § 629.02(a)(2), (3), (c) (amended by Chapter 971).
5. Id. § 629.02(a)(2), (3) (amended by Chapter 971).
6. Id. § 629.02(c) (amended by Chapter 971); see infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (noting
that Penal Code § 629.02(c), as amended by Chapter 971, emphasizes that orders may be entered to intercept
communications if there is probable cause to believe the communications may be used for locating or rescuing
a kidnap victim, but that § 629.52(c), as enacted by Chapter 971, does not provide this emphasis).
7. Id. § 629.06(a) (amended by Chapter 971); see id. (stating that oral approval for an interception,
may be granted without an order, if there is a determination of the following: (1) There are grounds upon which
an order could be issued under California Penal Code §§ 629-629.48, (2) there is probable cause to believe that
an emergency situation exists with respect to the investigation of an offense enumerated in California Penal
Code §§ 629-629.48, and (3) there is probable cause to believe that a substantial danger to life or limb exists
justifying the authorization for immediate interception of a private wire communication before an application
for an order could be submitted and acted upon with due diligence); see also id. § 629.06(b) (amended by
Chapter 971) (requiring that approval for an informal application for a wire interception be conditioned upon
filing with the judge, within 48 hours of the oral approval, a written application for an order which must also
recite the oral approval and be retroactive to the time of the oral approval).
Selected 1995 Legislation
Criminal Procedure
approval of such an application when made by the Chief Deputy Attorney
General, subject to all of the same conditions.8
Under existing law, each order that authorizes the interception of a wire
communication may provide such authorization for a period only as long as is
necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization, and that time period may
not in any event exceed 30 days.9 Extensions may be granted only in specified
circumstances.' Additionally, existing law provides that each order or extension
issued must contain provisions stating that the authorization to intercept com-
munications must be executed as soon as practicable, that interception of com-
munications that are not authorized to be intercepted must be minimized, and that
the authorization terminates upon attainment of the authorized objective, or at the
time for termination designated in the order or any extensions." Chapter 971
provides that when an intercepted communication is in a foreign language, an
interpreter of that foreign language may assist peace officers in intercepting the
communication, as long as the interpreter has the same training as other persons
authorized to intercept communications under Penal Code sections 629 through
629.48, and the interception of communications that are not authorized to be
intercepted are minimized.'
2
Existing law requires that reports be made to the judge who issued the order
for the wire interception.' 3 The reports must indicate the progress that has been
made toward the attainment of the authorized objective of the order permitting the
interception, or they must evince a satisfactory excuse for the lack of progress and
must state the need for continued authorization for interception. 4 The reports
must be made in conformance with any intervals that the judge may specify, but,
at a minimum, they must be made at least every 72 hours.' 5
Existing law provides guidelines regulating the use and disclosure of inter-
cepted communications relating to crimes that are not specifically mentioned in
the order of authorization.' 6 Under existing law, if an officer intercepts communi-
cations relating to a crime that is not specified in the order of authorization, but
the crime is one of the designated crimes for which an order authorizing inter-
8. Id. § 629.06(a) (amended by Chapter 971).
9. Id. § 629.08 (amended by Chapter 971).
10. Id.; see id. (specifying that extensions may be granted only upon an application made in accordance
with Penal Code § 629, and upon the court making findings as required therein); id. (stating that the period of
extension may be no longer than the authorizing judge deems necessary to achieve the purposes for which it
was granted, and in no event may the time be any longer than 30 days).
11. Id. § 629.08 (amended by Chapter 971).
12. Id.
13. Id. § 629.10 (amended by Chapter 971); see id. (allowing the report to be in writing or by any
reasonable or reliable means).
14. Id.; see id. (requiring ajudge to terminate the order allowing interception of wire communications
if the judge finds that progress has not been made, that there is no satisfactory explanation for the lkck of
progress, or no need exists for continuing the interception).
15. Id.
16. Id. § 629.32 (amended by Chapter 971).
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ceptions may be obtained,17 the contents of the interception, and any evidence
derived therefrom, may be used or disclosed as provided in California Penal Code
sections 629.24 and 629.26, and as provided in section 629.28 when authorized
by a judge. 18
Under prior law, if the intercepted communications related to a crime that was
not specified in the order of authorization, and the crime was not one for which
an order authorizing the interception of communications could not be obtained,
the contents of the interception, and any evidence derived therefrom, could not
be used or disclosed pursuant to Penal Code sections 629.24 or 629.26, except to
prevent the commission of a public offense, and could not be used or disclosed
pursuant to section 629.28 unless certain conditions had been met. 9
Chapter 971 leaves section 629.32(a) intact, but amends section 629.32(b) to
provide that if intercepted communications relate to crimes that are not specified
in the order of authorization, they may not be used or disclosed pursuant to Penal
Code sections 629.24 or 629.26, except to prevent the commission of a public
offense, and may not be used or disclosed pursuant to section 629.28 unless
certain conditions have been met2
The amendment causes uncertainty in the application of sections 629.32(a)
and 629.32(b). For example, if an officer were to intercept communications
relating to an offense that is not specified in the order of authorization, but which
is a crime for which orders authorizing the interception of communications may
be obtained, it is unclear under Chapter 971 whether section 629.32(a) or section
629.32(b) should be applied. Both sections state that they should be applied to
situations in which the communications relate to an offense not specified in the
court order.2 If section 629.32(b) is applied, the contents of the communication,
and any evidence derived therefrom, may not be used or disclosed.22 If section
629.32(a) is applied, the contents of the communication, and any evidence
17. Orders authcrizing the interception of communications may be obtained for only those crimes
specified in California Penal Code § 629.02(a).
18. CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.32(a) (amended by Chapter 971).
19. 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 1373, sec. 1, at 4614 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.32(b)); see id. (allowing
use or disclosure as provided in California Penal Code §§ 629.24 and 629.26, and as provided in California
Penal Code § 629.28 when authorized by ajudge).
20. Compare 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 1373, sec. 1, at 4614 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.32(b))
(providing that if the intercepted communications relate to a crime not specified in the authorization order, and
the crime they relate to is not one for which an order to intercept communications may be obtained, the
contents may not be used or disclosed except as provided) with CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.32 (amended by
Chapter 971) (providing that if the intercepted communications relate to a crime that is not specified in the
order, the contents may not be used except as provided).
21. CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.32(a), (b) (amended by Chapter 921).
22. Id. § 629.32(b) (amended by Chapter 971); see id. (specifying the circumstances under which the
contents of the communications that are intercepted, and evidence derived therefrom, may and may not be
used); see also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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derived therefrom, may be used or disclosed.23 This inconsistency created by
Chapter 971 can be resolved only by reading in the language that it deleted.24
Existing law provides protection for communications traveling via wire, line,
cable, or instrument2O Under existing law, this protection may not be construed
so as to prohibit peace officers from intercepting wire communications pursuant
to a court-authorized order, nor may it be construed as rendering inadmissible
evidence obtained pursuant to a properly authorized court order.26 Under existing
law, protection is also provided for communications by cellular and cordless
phones, and provided to prohibit eavesdropping on, or the recording of, con-
fidential communications.2 7 Chapter 971 places the same limits on protection for
these types of communications as those limits existing law already places on the
protection for wire communications?'
Existing law requires the Attorney General to set certification standards for
investigative or law enforcement officers.29 Upon meeting the minimum
standards, the officers become eligible to apply for an order authorizing the
interception of wire communications, to conduct the interceptions, and to use the
23. CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.32(a) (amended by Chapter 971); see id. (specifying the circum;tances
under which the contents of the communications that are intercepted, and the evidence derived therefrom, may
be used); see also supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
24. In reading in the deleted language, it becomes clear that when the intercepted communications relate
to crimes for which orders authorizing the interception of communications may be obtained, section 629.32(a)
should be applied, and when the communications relate to crimes for which orders authorizing the interception
of communications may not be obtained, section 629.32(b) should be applied. See Telephone Interview with
Gene Wong, Chief Council, Senate Judiciary Committee (Nov. 21, 1995) (notes on file with the Pacific Law
Journal) (commenting that the change to California Penal Code § 629.32 is only a technical amendment which
is not likely to cause any problems); id. (explaining that the statute should be read as a whole; "subsection (b)
cannot be read without reading subsection (a)").
25. CAL. PENAL. CODE § 631 (West Supp. 1995); see id. (listing prohibited acts, prescribing punishment,
addressing recidivists, providing exceptions, and regulating admissibility of evidence); see also Id. § 630 (West
1988) (declaring that the Legislature intends for California Penal Code §§ 630-637.6 to protect the tight of
privacy of the people of the State of California).
26. Id. § 629.38 (amended by Chapter 971).
27. Id. §§ 632,632.5,632.6,632.7 (West Supp. 1995); see id. § 632(a) (West Supp. 1995) (providing
punishment for every person who, intentionally and without the consent of all parties to a confidential
communication, by means of any electronic amplifying or recording device, eavesdrops upon or records the
confidential communication, whether the communication is carried on among the parties in the presence of one
another or by means of a telegraph, telephone, or other device, except a radio); id. § 632.5(a) (West Supp.
1990) (providing punishment for every person who, maliciously and without the consent of all parties to the
communication, intercepts, receives, or assists in intercepting or receiving a communication transmitted
between cellular radio telephones or between any cellular radio telephone and a landline telephone); id. §
632.6(a) (West Supp. 1995) (providing punishment for every person who, maliciously and without the consent
of all parties to the communication, intercepts or receives, or assists in intercepting or receiving a
communication transmitted between cordless telephones, between any cordless telephone and a landline
telephone, or between a cordless telephone and a cellular telephone); id. § 632.7(a) (West Supp. 1995)
(providing punishment for every person who, without the consent of all parties to a communication, intercepts
or receives and intentionally records, or assists in the interception or reception and intentional recordatlion of,
a communication transmitted between two cellular radio telephones, a cellular radio telephone and a landline
telephone, two cordless telephones, a cordless telephone and a landline telephone, or a cordless telephone and
a cellular radio telephone).
28. Id. § 629.38 (amended by Chapter 971); see supra note 25-27 and accompanying text.
29. CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.44(b)(1) (amended by Chapter 971).
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communications, or evidence derived therefrom, in official proceedings.3
Chapter 971 requires that the Attorney General is to set certification standards for
other persons when it is necessary to provide linguistic interpretation of
communication interceptions?' The interpreters may be designated by the
Attorney General, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Criminal Law Division, or the district attorney, and they are to be
supervised by an investigative or law enforcement officer?2
Chapter 971 suspends the operation of Penal Code sections 629 through
629.48 for a two-year period, beginning on January 1, 1996 and ending on
December 31, 1997.?3 During the time when these provisions are suspended,
Chapter 971 enacts a new chapter, which will instead be operative. 4 On January
1, 1998, this new chapter will be repealed, and sections 629 through 629.48 will
again become operative3 5 Existing law provides that California Penal Code
sections 629 through 629.48 will sunset on January 1, 1999, at which time they
are repealed.36
The description of the changes made by Chapter 971 up until this point has
described the changes that Chapter 971 makes to Penal Code sections 629 through
629.48, which are to be suspended for two years before becoming operative again
in 1998. The new sections enacted by Chapter 971 contain exactly the same
provisions, with the same amendments, as those sections which Chapter 971
suspends, with four exceptions.
First, instead of applying only to wire communications, Penal Code sections
629.50 through 629.98 apply to electronic digital pager, electronic cellular
telephone, and wire communications.37 Second, definitions are provided for terms
that appear in Penal Code sections 629.50 through 629.98, but not in sections 629
through 629.48.31 Third, Chapter 971 includes a sentence in Penal Code section
629.02(c) emphasizing that communications may be intercepted if used for
locating or rescuing a kidnap victim? 9 Although it may be only a technical
difference, this sentence was not included in Penal Code section 629.52.40Finally,
section 629.38 was amended to include Penal Code sections 632, 632.5, 632.6,
30. Id.
31. Id. § 629.44(b)(2) (amended by Chapter 971).
32. Id.
33. Id. § 629A8(b) (amended by Chapter 971).
34. Id.; see id. (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 629.50-629.98).
35. Id. § 629A8(c) (amended by Chapter 971).
36. Id. § 629A8(a) (amended by Chapter 971).
37. Id. §§ 629.50-629.98 (enacted by Chapter 971).
38. Id. § 629.51 (enacted by Chapter 971); see id. § 629.51(a) (enacted by Chapter 971) (defining
"electronic digital pager communication" as any tone or digital display or tone and voice pager
communication); id. § 629.51(b) (enacted by Chapter 971) (defining "electronic cellular telephone
communication" as any cellular or cordless radio telephone communication).
39. Id. § 629.02(c) (amended by Chapter 971).
40. See id. § 629.52(c) (enacted by Chapter 971).
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and 632.7.41 Section 629.88, as enacted, includes only sections 631, 632.5,632.6,
and 632.7.42
COMMENT
The California Attorney General sponsored Chapter 971.' The Attorney
General's office asserts that digital pagers are the most common form of
electronic communication and that their use is prevalent among drug dealers."
The provisions of Chapter 971 will help narcotics officers enforce the law, as
criminals will no longer have a technological advantage over law enforcement
officials 5 Additionally, in expanding California's wiretap law to include crimes
other than drug related offenses, Chapter 971 will better enable law enforcement
officials to protect citizens4 Supporters of Chapter 971 assert that the inter-
ception of digital pagers is less of an intrusion than a wiretap because only tele-
phone numbers are intercepted and not statements.4 7
Opponents of Chapter 971 argue against the expansion of the wiretap laws,
asserting that the new law gives law enforcement officers expanded authority to
intrude into peoples' private lives.48 Opponents protest both the expansion to
cover additional crimes and the expansion to cover additional forms of com-
munications.49
In enacting title H of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act."
Congress did not intend to preempt the field of wiretap legislation, but rather, it
41. Id. § 629.38 (amended by Chapter 971); see supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text (describing
protections provided to citizens of California, and limits on those protections).
42. CAL. PiAL CODE § 629.88 (enacted by Chapter 971); see supra notes 25-28 and accompanying
text (describing protections provided to citizens of California, and the limits on the protections), Compare CAL
PENAL CODE § 629.38 (amended by Chapter 971) (applying to wire communications and specifying that the
protections provided for in California Penal Code §§ 632, 632.5, 632.6, and 632.7 may not be construed so as
to prohibit any peace officer from intercepting any wire communications pursuant to an authorized court order,
and may not be construed so as to render inadmissible any evidence obtained pursuant to an authorized court
order) with id. § 629.88 (enacted by Chapter 971) (applying to wire, electronic digital pager, and electronic
cellular telephone communications and specifying that the protections provided for in California Penal Code§§ 632.5, 632.6, and 632.7 may not be construed so as to prohibit any peace officer from intercepting any wire,
electronic digital pager, or electronic cellular phone communications pursuant to an authorized court order, and
may not be construed so as to render inadmissible any evidence obtained pursuant to an authorized court order).
43. SENATE FLOOR, COmmrrrEE ANALYSTS OFSB 1016, at 3 (July 6, 1995); see id. (listing supporters
of SB 1016, as of July 5, 1995, as including, California Peace Officers' Association, California Police Chiefs'
Association, California District Attorneys' Association, and the Los Angeles County Sheriff, among others).
44. Id.
45. Id.; ASSEMBLYFLOOR, COMM1TrEEANALYSIS OFSB 1016, at 2 (July 29, 1995).
46. ASSEmLY FLOOR, COMITTEE ANALYSIS oFSB 1016, at 2 (July 29, 1995).
47. SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEBANALYSIS oFSB 1016, at 3 (July 6, 1995).
48. Letter from Francisco Lobaco, Legislative Director, ACLU and Valerie Small Navarro, Legislative
Advocate, ACLU to Assemblymembers, California Assembly Public Safety Committee (July 10, 1995) (copy
on file with the Pacific Law Journal).
49. Id.
50. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2522 (West 1970 & Supp. 1995) (setting forth federal wiretap law).
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intended to allow states to enact legislation in this area as long as state laws are
not more permissive than the federal scheme.51
In interpreting the provisions of title III, the United States Supreme Court has
held that "[e]xcept as expressly authorized in title I... all interceptions of wire
and oral communications are flatly prohibited." '52
Chapter 971 expands existing law by including additional crimes for which
orders may be sought to intercept communications.53 Some of the additional
crimes, solicitation to commit murder, and the commission of a crime involving
the bombing of public or private property, and conspiracy to commit those
crimes, are not expressly mentioned in the federal statute, and may therefore, face
constitutional challenges. 4
51. See State v. Thompson, 464 A.2d 799, 807 (Conn. 1983) (explaining that while the federal standard
regulating electronic surveillance establishes minimum guidelines, states may enact more restrictive legislation,
and state courts may interpret such legislation to afford its own citizens greater protection than is provided for
by federal law), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1006 (1984); Halpin v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County, 6 Cal.
3d 885, 898-99; 495 P.2d 1295, 1304; 101 Cal. Rptr. 375, 384-85 (1972) (concluding that Congress intended
to enact comprehensive legislation establishing minimum standards against which state regulations are to be
measured, and that Congress left room for the states to supplement the federal legislation, provided that state
regulations are not more permissive that federal law), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982, and overruled on other
grounds by People v. Valenzuela, 151 Cal. App. 3d 180, 198 Cal. Rptr. 469 (1984); People v. Shapiro 409
N.E.2d 897, 906 (N.Y. 1980) (explaining that a state law that exceeds the boundaries of federal law violates
the supremacy clause); People v. Stevens, 34 Cal. App. 4th 56, 61, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 92, 95 (1995) (citing
People v. Conklin, 12 Cal. App. 3d 259, 522 P.2d 1057, 114 Cal. Rptr. 241 (1974), and Halpin, 6 Cal. 3d at
898-99; 495 P.2d at 1304, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 384, and stating that the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act does not preempt states from enacting wiretap legislation, as long as state legislation is not more
permissive than the federal statutes), review denied, No. H012456, 1995 Cal. LEXIS 4603, at 1 (Cal. July 20,
1995); see also U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2 (declaring that all law made under the authority of the United States
federal government shall be the supreme law of the land).
52. Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 46 (1972).
53. CAL PENAL CODE § 629.02(a)(2) (amended by Chapter 971); id. § 629.52(a)(2) (enacted by Chapter
971); see id. § 629.02(a)(2) (amended by Chapter 971) (providing that a judge may enter an order authorizing
the interception of communications for the offenses of murder, solicitation to commit murder, the commission
of a crime involving the bombing of a public or private property, or aggravated kidnaping); id. § 629.52(a)(2)
(enacted by Chapter 971) (providing that a judge may enter an order authorizing the interception of
communications for the offenses of murder, solicitation to commit murder, the commission of a crime
involving the bombing of a public or private property, or aggravated kidnaping).
54. Compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 2516(2) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that a state court judge may enter
an order authorizing state law enforcement officials to intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications when
such interception may provide or has provided evidence of the commission of the offense of murder,
kidnapping, gambling, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic drugs, marihuana or other dangerous
drugs, or other crime dangerous to life, limb, or property, and punishable by imprisonment for more than one
year, designated in any applicable state statute authorizing such interception, or any conspiracy to commit any
of the foregoing offenses) with CAL PENAL CODE § 629.02(a) (amended by Chapter 971) (permitting a judge
to issue an order to authorize the interception of communications when there is probable cause to believe that
an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit, one of the following offenses: (1)
importation, possession for sale, transportation, manufacture, or sale of controlled substances in violation of
Health and Safety Code §§ 113151, 11351.5, 11352, 11378, 11378.5. 11379, 11379.5, 11379.6 with respect
to a substance containing heroin, cocaine, PCP, methamphetamine, or their analogs where the substance
exceeds 10 gallons by liquid volume or three pound of solid substance by weight; (2) murder, solicitation to
commit murder, the commission of a crime involving the bombing of public or private property, aggravated
kidnapping; and (3) conspiracy to commit any of the above-mentioned crimes) and id. § 629.52(a)(2) (enacted
by Chapter 971) (listing the same crimes as those listed in California Penal Code § 629.02).
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In People v. Shapiro,55 the Court of Appeals of the State of New York held
that to the extent that a New York statute was interpreted to authorize wiretapping
for the investigation of prostitution and sexual abuse where there was no evidence
of force or violence, and the crimes were not dangerous to life or limb, it con-
travened federal wiretap law.56 Since the crimes for which the order authorizing
the interception of communications in Shapiro were not specifically enumerated
in the federal statute, the court inquired as to whether the crimes were of such a
nature as to be included under the federal statute as "other crime[s] dangerous to
life [or] limb."'57
In citing legislative history, the court found that the drafters of title III
devised the list of enumerated crimes for which orders may be issued to intercept
wire communications to include offenses that are either "intrinsically serious" or
"characteristic of the operations of organized crime."58 It reasoned that the
ejusdem generis rule requires the phrase "or other crime dangerous to life [or]
limb" to be interpreted as applying to only those crimes of the same kind as those
actually enumerated in the list preceding the phrase, and the court stated that a
narrow interpretation of the federal statute "is in harmony" with the court's view
of the dangers inherent in allowing eavesdropping.59
The court concluded that the crimes of sexual abuse and the promotion of
prostitution "do not come within the intendment of the Federal statute because
they cannot be said to be 'crime[s] dangerous to life [or] limb."', The court's
conclusion is based on two lines of reasoning. First, the criminal activities for
which wiretaps in Shapiro were authorized involved only consensual conduct.
61
Legislative history evinces Congress' intent that the scope of permissible wire-
tapping should not be expanded to include consensual activities.62 Second, the
crimes did not involve the type of danger for which Congress permits orders
authorizing the interception of communications. 63 The court stated that the
standard of danger should not be expanded to include "more subtle forms of
55. 409 N.E.2d 897 (N.Y. 1980).
56. Shapiro, 409 N.E.2d at 907-08; see id. at 908 (holding that an order authorizing the interception
of wire communications, in an investigation of allegations of the promotion of prostitution and sexual abuse,
is invalid, and the evidence obtained through those interceptions should have been suppressed).
57. Id. at 907-08.
58. Id. at 907 (citing S. REP. No. 1097,90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2112, 2234); id. (explaining that the designated crimes, with the exception of gambling and bribery, "all
involve harm or the substantial threat of harm to the person").
59. Id. at 907.
60. Id.
61. Id.; see id. (noting that the facts of the case did not involve any violence or coercion).
62. Id.; see S. REP. No. 1097,90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112,2187
(indicating legislative intent to exclude consensual crimes, such as fornication and adultery).
63. Shapiro, 409 N.E.2d at 907-08.
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personal injury," such as psychological harm that minors may suffer as a result
of being involved in the crimes.('
This issue was addressed in United States v. Millstone Enterprises.6 5 In
following the reasoning of Shapiro, the court in Millstone found that Congress did
not intend for prostitution to be a crime within the reach of permissible exercises
of wiretapping, particularly where, as in Millstone, there were no indications of
violence.66
The courts in Shapiro and Millstone left open the possibility of permitting the
authorization of wiretaps in the future for the crimes of sexual abuse and
prostitution, reasoning that if "similar acts are undertaken by force" or there are
"indications of violence," wiretapping could "be authorized in conformance with
the supervening Federal standard."67
In People v. Principe,68 the New York Court of Appeals held that a state court
order authorizing the interception of communications for forgery, larceny, and
related offenses was within the boundaries of what the federal statute defined as
permissible areas for wiretapping where the facts established the existence of a
pervasive, well-organized criminal operation, involving corrupt conduct by public
employees.69 The New York Court of Appeals' reasoning in Principe departed
somewhat from its reasoning in Shapiro, decided just five years earlier. In
Principe, the court concluded that by the "use of the singular in the 'catch all'
phrase 'or other crime dangerous to life, limb, or property' Congress intended the
word 'crime' to be construed generically and did not seek to unreasonably limit
the power of the State Legislature to enact enabling legislation." 70 The Principe
court abandoned the narrow interpretation followed by the Shapiro court which
applied the ejusdem generis rule which requires general language in a statute
following a specifically enumerated list to be interpreted as applying only to those
64. Id. at 908; see id. at 907 (stating that just because state law declared that minors under the age of
17 are "incapable of consent," that "does not catapult these criminal acts into the status of 'crime[s] dangerous
to life [or] limb"); id. at 907-08 (stating that a decision of the Legislature of the State of New York declaring
the acts to be dangerous to life or limb could not override the judgement of Congress).
65. 684 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Pa. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 864 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1988).
66. See id. at 872 (holding that since state wiretap statutes "may narrow the scope of permissible state
wiretapping, but may not permit state and local authorities to intercept.., communications forbidden by
federal law," the state statute authorizing wiretapping for investigations of prostitution was invalid).
67. See Shapiro, 409 N.E.2d at 907 (noting that there were no indications of violence or force in the
facts of the case, and the conduct was consensual); Millstone, 684 F. Supp. at 872 (holding that to the extent
that the Pennsylvania statute authorized wiretap orders for nonviolent prostitution, the Pennsylvania wiretap
statute contravenes the federal wiretap statute); see also People v. Winograd 480 N.Y.S.2d 419,422-23 (N.Y.
Crim. Ct. 1984) (citing to Shapiro, 409 N.E.2d at 908, and stating that the Shapiro court found that there may
be circumstances under which sexual abuse, "could be used 'in conformance with the supervening Federal
standard,"' such as when undertaken by force), affd 494 N.Y.S.2d 593, and rev'd on other grounds, 509
N.Y.S.2d 512.
68. 478 N.E.2d 979 (N.Y. 1985).
69. Id. at 980,982.
70. Id. at 982.
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crimes of the same kind as those enumerated.7'
In People v. Winograd,72 the New York Court of Appeals, found that usury
is an offense that may be included among the crimes for which wiretaps may be
used.73 Citing Principe, the Court of Appeals held that where there is evidence
that a defendant is involved in a well-organized criminal operation and commits
offenses that are intrinsically serious and characteristic of the operations of
organized crime, the federal statute governing wiretapping enables the State to
designate usury as a crime for which law enforcement officials may obtain
authorized wiretap orders.74
Since solicitation to commit murder and the commission of crimes involving
the bombing of public or private property are not among those specifically
enumerated in the federal statute, the crimes added by Chapter 971 must be
interpreted as falling within the purview of the federal statute as "other crime[s]
dangerous to life, limb, or property," to avoid being declared invalid.!
If the courts in California follow the reasoning of Principe, and view the
federal statute as enabling legislation, the courts would inquire as to whether the
offenses added by Chapter 971 are "intrinsically serious" or "characteristic of the
operations of organized crime," in determining whether the statute is valid?6
Arguably, the offenses added by Chapter 971 are at least as intrinsically serious
as forgery, larceny, possession of stolen property, and usury, the crimes found to
be included within the meaning of other crime[s] dangerous to life, limb, or
property in the Shapiro, Principe, and Winograd decisions. 77 Additionally,
71. Compare Principe, 478 N.E.2d at 982 (interpreting the word crime in title 1 of the United States
Code § 2516(2) to be very broad) with Shapiro, 409 N.E.2d at 907 (emphasizing a n-row reading of the
statute, and utilizing the ejusdem generis rule to limit the types of crimes which could come under it).
72. 502 N.E.2d 189 (N.Y. 1986).
73. Winograd, 502 N.E.2d at 193.
74. Id. at 192-93. The trial court in Winograd focused on Congress' expressed intent to combat
organized crime, and the court held that the possession of stolen property is a crime for which an order
authorizing the interception of communications maybe obtained. Id. See id., 502 N.E.2d at 193 (justifying the
holding by reasoning that the "existence of a criminal organization" which receives stolen property "over a
considerable period of time" from "numerous sources" constitutes a crime that is dangerous to... property).
75. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
76. See Principe, 478 N.E.2d at 980, 982 (finding that forgery, larceny, and related crimes meet the test,
as they are "intrinsically serious or [are] characteristic of the operations of organized crime.," and are therefore
included within the permissible scope of eavesdropping).
77. See supra note 76 (discussing the crimes which the Principe court included within the meaning of
the federal statute); supra note 74 (finding possession of stolen property to be a crime for which wiretap orders
may be authorized); supra note 73 and accompanying text (holding that courts may authorize orders to
intercept communications for the offense of usury); see also Peter Benesh, The Booming Business of Terrorism,
PrrrBURGH PosT-GAzErre, Sept. 24, 1995, at Al (reporting that 169 people were killed and 600 people were
injured in April of 1995 when a federal building in Oklahoma City was destroyed by a bomb); id. (stating that
six people were killed and over 1000 were injured in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New
York City); id. (reporting that 270 people died in 1988 when Pan Am flight 103 was destroyed by a bomb over
Lockerbie, Scotland); id. (describing a bombing which killed 241 United States Marines that were sent to
Beirut, Lebanon in 1983); William Carley, A 7ime to Heal: Unabomber's Package Leaves Decade of Pain and
Shattered Dreams, WAuL ST. J., Oct. 17, 1995, at Al (reporting that three people have been killed, and 23
injured, as a result of the Unabomber's planting or mailing of 15 bombs over a 17 year period); Unabomber
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bombings have been associated with the operations of organized crime! 8
If the courts in California adopt the narrow interpretation of the federal statute
as applied by the Shapiro court, they would ask the same initial question, but also
require the offense to be of the same kind as those enumerated in the statute. It is
difficult to predict how a court would rule in applying the Shapiro decision. On
the one hand, conspiracy to commit solicitation to commit murder is fairly far
removed from the types of crimes listed in the federal statute. On the other hand,
in applying the lines of reasoning the court used in deciding Shapiro, the crimes
added by Chapter 971 are likely to be upheld. In Shapiro, the court refused to
allow the interception of communications for the crimes of prostitution and sexual
abuse based on the reasoning that the crimes were consensual, and therefore
outside the scope of the crimes for which Congress intended to permit wire-
tapping, and that the crimes involved only "subtle forms of personal injury," such
as possible psychological harm.79 Neither solicitation to commit murder, nor the
commission of a crime involving the bombing of public or private property are
consensual crimes. Further, the type of injury involved in such crimes will likely
be more than just psychological distress.80
Rather than following rules applied by other state courts,"' California courts
could develop their own standard based on their findings of Congressional intent.
Congress' purpose, in enacting title III, was to "protect the privacy of... com-
munications," and to delineate "on a uniform basis the circumstances and
conditions under which the interception of . . . communications may be
authorized. 82 Congressional legislative history states that title I, in protecting
privacy, prohibits surveillance unless for "the investigation or prevention of
specified types of serious crimes." (emphasis added)8 3 It is arguable that
Congress did not intend solicitation to commit murder, or conspiracy to commit
solicitation to commit murder to be included among those "specified types of
serious crimes" that constitute "other crime[s] dangerous to life, limb, or
property."' Further, in allowing states to enact legislation permitting law enforce-
ment officials to survey communications that do not clearly fall within these
Rescinds Latest Threat; 2nd Letter to Newspaper Calls L-A. Threat a Ruse, AUsTIN AM.-STATESMAN, June 29,
1995, at A1 (setting forth in detail a list of bomb threats and deaths attributed the Unabomber over a 17 year
time span).
78. See Benesh, supra note 77 (describing the startling growth of terrorist organizations from 1968
through 1993); id. (listing various bombings for which terrorist groups are responsible).
79. See supra notes 55-64 and accompanying text (discussing the court's analysis in Shapiro, 409
N.E.2d 897, 907-08).
80. See supra note 77 (describing injuries and fatalities resulting from various bomb attacks).
81. The decisions previously cited are persuasive authority only. California courts, of course, are not
bound to follow the decisions of the New York and Arizona courts.
82. See S. REP. No. 1097,90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112,2153.
83. Id.
84. These offenses are not necessarily characteristic of the operations of organized crime, and a mere
solicitation, or a mere conspiracy to commit solicitation to commit murder is not necessarily intrinsically
serious or dangerous to life, limb, or property.
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categories, it is arguable that the expressed intent of Congress "to define on a
uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which the interception of
communications maybe authorized," is frustrated.!'
Even if the crimes added by Chapter 971 are found to constitute other
crime[s] dangerous to life, limb, or property, and are therefore found to be within
the purview of the federal statute, it is not clear that the crimes added by Chapter
971 will be upheld. Even if California courts uphold the legislation on grounds
that it does not exceed the boundaries set by federal statute, the legislation could
still be challenged on the ground that it violates the Fourth Amendment.86 "[T]he
fact that ... legislation is necessary and the fact that Congress attempted to
comply with the Supreme Court's rulings does not mean that the statute is
constitutional ..... , 87
Angela M. Burdine
Criminal Procedure; identification by use of thumbprints
Penal Code §§ 853.5, 853.6 (amended); Vehicle Code §§ 40500, 40504
(amended).
AB 219 (Baca); 1995 STAT. Ch. 93
Under existing law, when a person is arrested for an infraction,' the person
may be released after providing satisfactory identification and signing a promise
85. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 801(b) (Eetting
forth the Act's legislative intent).
86. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (stating that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizure may not be violated, and that warrants may be
issued only upon probable cause).
87. United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974,980 (2d Cir. 1973). cer. denied, 421 U.S. 909 (1973); see Id.
at 979 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967), and asserting that the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment is to protect individuals from arbitrary invasions by government officials); Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170. 177 (1984) (quoting Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
361 (1967), in his explanation that the Fourth "Amendment does not piotect the merely subjective expectation
of privacy, but also those 'expectation[s] that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable'").
1. See CAL- PENAL CODE § 17(d) (West Supp. 1995) (defining an "infraction" as every other crime
or public offense that is not a felony or a misdemeanor); 1 B.E. WrraN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIWORNIA
CRlmuNAL LAW, Introduction to Crimes § 74 (2d ed. 1988) (explaining that the category of infractions was
created in 1968 to cope with petty offenses, such as minor traffic violations which are not punishable by
imprisonment); id. § 80 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1995) (specifying the differences between misdemeanors and
infractions as the following: (1) a person charged with an infraction does not have a jury trial right; (2) a
defendant charged with an infraction is not entitled to a public defender or other counsel at public expense,
unless he remains in custody after being arrested; (3) court commissioners and hearing officers may hear
infractions; however, all provisions of the law relating to misdemeanors apply to infractions, with exception
as provided by law).
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to appear Existing law also provides that when a person is arrested for a
misdemeanor,3 the person may be released after presenting a peace officer with
satisfactory identification and signing a notice signifying the individual's promise
to appear.4
Chapter 93 authorizes a peace officer to obtain a thumbprint or fingerprint on
a promise to appear, if the person arrested for the infraction does not provide
sufficient identification.5 Chapter 93 further authorizes a peace officer to obtain
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 853.5 (amended by Chapter 93); CAL. VEH. CODE § 40500(a) (amended by
Chapter 93); see CAL. VEi. CODE § 40508(a) (West Supp. 1995) (declaring that a person who willfully violates
a promise to appear is guilty of a misdemeanor regardless of the disposition of the charge upon which he or
she was originally arrested).
3. See CAL. PENALCDE § 17(b) (West Supp. 1995) (defining a "misdemeanor" as any crime or public
offense which is not an infraction or a felony).
4. Id. § 853.6(d) (amended by Chapter 93); CAL. VEi. CODE § 40504(a) (amended by Chapter 93).
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 853.5 (amended by Chapter 93); CAL. VEIl. CODE § 40500(a) (amended by
Chapter 93); see CAL. PENAL CODE § 853.5 (amended by Chapter 93) (specifying that in all cases, except as
stated in California Vehicle Code § 40302, § 40303, § 40305, and § 40305.5, in which one is arrested for an
infraction, a peace officer shall only require the person to present a driver's license or other satisfactory
identification and to sign a written promise to appear); id. (noting that if the person does not have a driver's
license or other identification in his or her possession, the officer may require that a right thumbprint, or a left
thumbprint or finger print if the person is missing or has a disfigured right thumb, be placed on the promise
to appear); CAL. VEH. CODE § 40500(a) (amended by Chapter 93) (providing that whenever a person is arrested
for any non-felony violation of the California Vehicle Code, or for a violation of any city or county traffic
offense ordinance, and he is not immediately taken before a magistrate, the officer will prepare in triplicate a
written notice to appear in court or before a person authorized to accept a bail deposit, containing the person's
name and address, his or her vehicle's license number, if any, the name and address, when available, of the
vehicle's registered owner or lessee, the charged offense, and the time and place to appear, if the person does
not have a driver's license or other satisfactory identification in his or her possession, the officer may require
that a right thumbprint, or a left thumbprint or fingerprint if the person has a missing or disfigured right thumb,
be placed on the notice to appear); see also id. § 40302 (West 1985) (stating that persons charged with
specified violations of the California Vehicle Code must make a mandatory appearance); id. § 40303 (West
Supp. 1995) (enumerating the violations of the California Vehicle Code for which an immediate appearance
before a Magistrate Judge is not required); id. § 40305.5 (West 1985) (specifying the offenses for which non-
residents may simply execute a notice containing a promise to correct the violation); Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 763-764 (1966) (holding that a person is not an involuntary witness against oneself unless he
is compelled to testify or otherwise provides the State with testimonial or communicative evidence and
specifying that, "both federal and state courts have usually held that... [the Fifth Amendment] offers no
protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to write or speak
for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture");
id. at 764 (explaining that "compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of 'real or physical
evidence' does not violate [the Fifth Amendment]"); Piquett v. United States, 81 F.2d 75, 81 (7th Cir. 1936)
(taking judicial notice and declaring as "well recognized" the fact that fingerprint identification is probably the
surest method known, and is universally used to detect criminals), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 664, (1936); cf. IDAHO
CODE § 19-4806 (1987) (specifying that the Idaho state police have the authority and duty to obtain
fingerprints, and other identification data as prescribed by the superintendent of those arrested and detained
for non-midemeanor offenses, and that they are obligated to properly transmit and file such fingerprints and
identification data as prescribed by the superintendent). See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTAhDING
CRnmIAL PROCEDURE 341-47 (1991) (discussing the privilege against self-incrimination and which types of
evidence are testimonial or communicative); M.C. Dransfield, Annotation, Fingerprints, Palm Prints, or Bare
Footprints as Evidence, 28 A.L.R. 2D 1115, 1118-19 (1953) (offering the background on fingerprinting and
the admissibility of fingerprints, and stating that identifying people through fingerprints has become widely
recognized as a relatively accurate system of establishing identity); Identification Verfication for Employment,
1995: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Affairs of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 10, 1995) (statement of Jack Scheidegger, Chief, Bureau of Criminal
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a thumbprint or fingerprint when a person has been arrested for a misdemeanor
and does not have satisfactory identification Chapter 93 also specifies that the
thumbprint or fingerprint will not be used to create a database.7
COMMENT
Chapter 93 was enacted in response to situations in which individuals have
misrepresented themselves to peace officers by giving a false name or a name of
another person.8 In such a situation, a warrant would have been issued in someone
else's name and that person would then be burdened with the task of appearing
in court several times to clear his or her name.9 Chapter 93 provides a solution to
Indentification, California Department of Justice), available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File (stating
that without a reliable means of personal identification, such as fingerprinting, perpetrators may use false and
fraudulent identification to avoid apprehension); Darryl Campagna, The View From Middletown; Burglars
Beware. Fingerprints Are Going Computerized, N.Y. Ibs, Apr. 16, 1995, at 13CN-2 (discussing a new
computerized fingerprinting system which has the capacity to search twenty million fingerprints in two hours);
Fingerprinting Criminals; Fingerprint Identification System, SECURITY MGMfr., Jan. 1995, at II (discussing
the new Advanced Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) Series 2000 which performs up to two billion
operations per second and allows police officers to know within minutes who the suspect is and if he or she
has a criminal record); Ralph Vartabedian, The Power, Peril at Our Fingertips; New Fingerprint Technology
Is Giving Crime Fighters a Boost, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1995, at Al (discussing advanced new fingerprinting
techniques, and stating that "fingerprinting systems represent the only existing technology that is both tamper-
proof and easily automated on a nationwide basis"); Mike Ward, Unresolved Issues Stall Proposal to Reform
Juvenile Justice System, AUSTIN A .-STATEsMAN, May 12, 1995, at B3 (discussing how the House of
Representatives favors allowing photographing and fingerprinting of minors only if they have committed a
serious misdemeanor or felony).
6. CAL PENAL CODE § 853.6(d) (amended by Chapter 93); CAL. VEH. CODE § 40500(a) (amended by
Chapter 93); cf. AR CODE ANN. § 12-12-1006(a) (Michie Supp. 1993) (specifying that immediately following
an arrest, the officer must obtain the fingerprints of the person if the offense is a felony or a Class A
misdemeanor); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2501(a) (Supp. 1994) (specifying that two sets of fingerprints must be
made immediately after a person is arrested if the person: (1) is wanted for a felony or believed to be a fugitive;
(2) may be in the possession at the time of arrest of property reasonably believed to have been stolen by the
person; (3) is in possession of firearms or other concealed weapons, burglary tools, high explosives, or other
items used exclusively for criminal purposes; (4) is wanted for any offense involving prohibitcd sexual conduct
or for violation of the uniform controlled substances act; or (5) is suspected of or known to be a habitual
criminal or intoxicating liquor law violator); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-502(a) (Supp. 1994) (specifying that
persons charged with a felony or a misdemeanor may be photographed and fingerprints may be obtained for
law enforcement records only when the person has been arrested or committed to a detention facility,
committed to imprisonment after conviction, or convicted of a felony); id. (stating that it is the duty of the
arresting agency to obtain fingerprints from those charged with a felony, and to forward those fingerprints to
the State Bureau of Investigation).
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 853.5 (amended by Chapter 93); id. § 853.6(d) (amended by Chapter 93);
CAL. VEH. CODE § 40500 (amended by Chapter 93); id. § 40504(a) (amended by Chapter 93).
8. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUL3EIC SAETY, COMMrr=E ANALYSIS OF AB 219, at 2 (May 2, 1995);
see John Branton, Robbers Hit Second Grocery Store in 2 Days, COLU, BIAN, Jan. 31, 1995, at A5 (reporting
that a man suspected of burglarizing mail boxes and mail shops in Portland, Oregon, gave a deputy a false
name, and offered false identification when caught); Police and Fire Report, CHI. TrRI., Mar. 30, 1995, at 3
(discussing how a 24-year-old male allegedly gave false identification to a deputy after being stopped for
allegedly driving with a suspended license).
9. ASSEmLY COMMirrEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMmY=iEr ANALYSIS OF AB 219, at 2 (May 2, 1995);
see id. (explaining that when a false name is given to a law enforcement officer, a warrant is then issued in the
other person's name and this "victim" is then arrested for failing to appear on the citation, fingerprinted, and
either booked into the county jail or given a new court date; in either case, the victim has to appear several
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this problem by granting peace officers the authority to fingerprint violators; thus,
law enforcement officials now have an easy way of apprehending the violator and
the person who was wrongly named by the perpetrator has a very simple, cost-
effective means for proving that he or she was not responsible.10
Molly J. Mrowka
Criminal Procedure; interstate jurisdiction
Harbors and Navigation Code §§ 701, 710 (amended); Penal Code §§
853.3, 853.4 (new); Vehicle Code § 1804 (amended).
SB 1224 (Mountjoy); 1995 STAT. Ch. 526
Existing law provides for an interstate compact' between California and
Arizona for concurrent criminal jurisdiction with respect to crimes which occur
between the two states on the Colorado River and any lake formed by it that is
part of the common boundary between the two states.2
times to clear his or her name).
10. Id.
1. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I § 10, ci. 3 (prohibiting states from entering into compacts with other states
without congressional consent); 4 U.S.C.A. § 112(a) (West 1985) (permitting two or more states to enter into
compacts for a cooperative effort and mutual assistance in the prevention of crime and enforcement of their
criminal laws); see also Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440 (1981) (declaring that the Framers of the
Constitution intended to prevent state interference with the free exercise of federal authority by requiring
congressional consent for interstate compacts); Cameron v. Mills, 645 F. Supp. 1119, 1126 (S.D. Iowa 1986)
(stating that an interstate compact will become federal law where Congress has authorized the agreement and
where the agreement is of an appropriate subject matter for congressional legislation). See generally Marlissa
S. Briggett, Comment, State Supremacy in the Federal Realm: The Interstate Compact, 18 B.C. ENvTL. AFF.
L. REV. 751 (1991) (discussing the development and operation of a typical interstate compact); BLACK'S LAW
DICrIONARY 281 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "compact" as a working agreement, typically between states, related
to matters of mutual concern).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 853.2 (West Supp. 1995); see id. § 853.1(a) (West Supp. 1995) (ratifying the
Colorado River Crime Enforcement Compact); 72 Op. Cal. Atty Gen. 37 (1989) (stating that the compact is
not concerned with crimes committed on the banks of the river, but only crimes committed on the water where
boundaries are difficult to determine); see also ASSEMBLY COMMrrrEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE
ANALYSIS OF SB 1224, at 3 (July 11, 1995) (reporting that the effectiveness of the Colorado River Compact
depends on the coordination and cooperation between the law enforcement personnel of California and
Arizona); SENATE FLOOR, COMMrrEE ANALYSS OFSB 1224, at 2 (May 11, 1995) (observing that most crimes
that fall within the compact consist mainly of unsafe boating practices and underage drinking); Letter from
William A. Molini, Administrator, Division of Wildlife, Nevada, to Assemblymember Richard Mountjoy (Apr.
11, 1995) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (reporting that the Colorado River Compact was very
effective in assisting law enforcement efforts and increasing public safety); cf. ARiz. REv. STAr. ANN. § 37-
620.11 (1993) (enacting the interstate compact for jurisdiction on the Colorado River). See generally CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 852-852.4 (West 1985) (adopting the Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit); id. § 852.1(c) (West
1985) (defining "fresh pursuit" to include close and hot pursuits); id. § 852.2 (West 1985) (granting foreign
officers the power to arrest and hold offenders who enter California with a foreign officer in fresh pursuit); id.
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Chapter 526 authorizes the creation of a similar compact between California
and Nevada for concurrent criminal jurisdiction with respect to crimes committed
in a county where Lake Tahoe or the Topaz Lake forms a common boundary
between the states.3
In addition, existing law defines a "yacht" or "ship broker" as a person who
engages in various transactions4 concerning yachts 5 that he or she does not own.6
Existing law requires yacht and ship brokers to be licensed and to pay a special
fee for that license.7 Under existing law it is unlawful to violate the licensing
requirements!
Chapter 526 redefines the term, "yacht" or "ship broker," to include those
persons who lease and rent yachts.9 Chapter 526 excludes those persons who
lease new yachts or yachts weighing over 300 gross tons from the definition of
§ 852.3 (West 1985) (requiring a foreign officer to appear with any offender arrested in California before a
magistrate in the county where the arrest is made).
3. CAL PENALCODE §§ 853.3, 853.4 (enacted by Chapter 526); see id. § 853.3(a) (enacted by Chapter
526) (ratifying the California-Nevada Compact for Jurisdiction on Interstate Waters); id. § 853.4(b) (enacted
by Chapter 526) (permitting either state to arrest, prosecute, and try offenders for crimes for which there is
concurrent jurisdiction); id. § 853.4(c) (enacted by Chapter 526) (providing that concurrent jurisdiction only
applies to crimes that are established in common between the two states); id. (barring either state from
prosecuting an offender for an offense that the offender has already been convicted or acquitted of by the other
state); cf NEv. REv. STAT. § 171.076 (1992) (enacting the interstate compact for jurisdiction on interstate
waters); id. § 171.077 (1992) (setting forth the text of the compact).
4. See CAL. HARE. & NAY. CODE § 701(a)(1) (amended by Chapter 526) (listing the specified
transactions to include selling or offering to sell; buying or offering to buy; soliciting or obtaining listings of;,
or negotiating the purchase, sale, or exchange of yachts).
5. See id. § 701(c) (amended by Chapter 526) (defining "yacht" to mean any vessel over 16 feet in
length and under 300 gross tons used to navigate water).
6. Id. § 701(a)(1) (amended by Chapter 526).
7. id. § 708(a) (West Supp. 1995); see id. (providing that no person may act as a broker without first
obtaining a license); id. § 717 (West Supp. 1995) (requiring a person to submit an application for a license as
a broker to the Department of Boating and Waterways, along with the broker license examination fee); id. §
721 (West Supp. 1995) (providing a list of required subject matter that an applicant must have knowledge of
before a broker's license will be issued); id. § 722 (West Supp. 1995) (providing that a broker's license is valid
for one year, and then renewable every two years thereafter); id. §§ 732, 733 (West Supp. 1995) (listing
grounds for which a broker may have his or her license suspended or revoked); id. § 736 (West Supp. 1995)
(listing fees and schedule of payment for a broker license and license examination).
8. Id. § 738 (West Supp. 1995); see id. § 738(a) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that a violation of the
licensing requirements is a misdemeanor punishable by up to a $1000 fine except where the violation is
committed willfully or knowingly in which case the violation is punishable by up to a $1000 fine and/or by
incarceration in the county jail for up to one year); id. § 738(b) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that any person
who ecquires a broker's license through fraud or a misrepresentation shall be punished by a fine of up to $1000
and/or by imprisonment in the county jail for up to one year); id. § 739 (West Supp. 1995) (providing that any
person who violates a licensing requirement shall also be civilly liable for an amount between $100 and $1500
for each violation).
9. Id. § 701(a)(2) (amended by Chapter 526); see id. (providing that this section applies to those who
rent; offer to lease or rent; place for rent; solicit listings of yachts for rent; or negotiate the sale, purchase, or
exchange of leases on yachts); cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 326.002(1) (West 1995) (defining "broker" as one who
sells or buys; offers or negotiates to buy or sell; solicits or obtains listings of; or negotiates the purchase, sale,
or exchange of, yachts); N.Y. VEH. & TmF. LAW § 2257-b (McKinney 1986) (describing a "broker" as a
person who acts as an agent for either the buyer or the seller of a yacht for a fee or a commission).
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yacht or ship broker. °
COMMENT
Chapter 526 was enacted to ratify the California-Nevada Compact for
Jurisdiction on Interstate Waters which would provide for the enforcement of
California laws with regard to criminal acts committed on Lake Tahoe or Topaz
Lake."1 Chapter 526 is intended to close the loopholes that have allowed some
offenders to go unpunished for crimes committed in places where it was difficult
to determine whether a crime was committed in one state or another.
2
In addition, Chapter 526 was enacted to give the California Department of
Boating and Waterways 3 jurisdiction over brokers involved in illegal lease
transactions for which the Department did not have prior jurisdiction.14
A. James Kachmar
10. CAL. HARB. & NAv. CODE § 710(e), (f) (amended by Chapter 526); see id. § 710(a)-(g) (amended
by Chapter 526) (listing additional circumstances in which persons will not be considered yacht or ship
brokers).
11. CAL PENAL CODE § 853.3(d) (enacted by Chapter 526); see SENATE FLOOR, COIrNrTrEE ANALYSTS
OF SB 1224, at 3 (May 11, 1995) (noting that the legislature of Nevada ratified the compact in 1987). See
generally Nevada, California Sign Interstate Probe Compact, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Aug. 27, 1994, at 2B
(reporting that California and Nevada had agreed to a compact allowing police from each state to investigate
drug and gang related crime on both sides of the border).
12. ASSEMBLYCOMMrTIEEONPIBUiCSAFMrY,COMMrrrEEANALYSIsOFSB 1224, at2 (July 11, 1995);
see CAL. PENAL CODE § 853.3(b) (enacted by Chapter 526) (setting forth the legislative finding that law
enforcement had been impaired because of the difficulty of determining where precisely a crime had been
committed); see also SENATE COMMirEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, CoMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1224, at
3 (Apr. 17, 1995) (noting that determining proper jurisdiction is difficult because an offender may cross back
and forth between boundaries in a boat during the commission of the criminal act); Letter from John R.
Bafluelos, Director, Department of Boating and Waterways, to Assemblymember Paula Boland (July 5, 1995)
(copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (stating that SB 1224 will result in more effective boating law
enforcement on Lake Tahoe and Topaz Lake). But see SENATE COMMITrEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURF
COMMrrrEE ANALYSIs OF SB 1224, at 4 (Apr. 17, 1995) (observing that it is difficult to determine how many
people will be affected by the interstate compact).
13. See CAL HARB. & NAy. CODE § 50 (West Supp. 1995) (creating the department of Boating and
Waterways and enumerating its power and duties); id. § 63.9 (West Supp. 1995) (setting forth additional
powers of the Department of Boating and Waterways).
14. SENATE CommrrEE ON CRMuNAL PROCEDURE, COMMrrTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1224, at 3 (Apr. 17,
1995); see id. (describing how licensed brokers will lease a yacht which he or she does not own and then
abscond with the money); see also Letter from John R. Bafiluelos, supra note 12 (promising that SB 1224 will
increase consumer protection for those persons buying or leasing used vessels).
Selected 1995 Legislation
Criminal Procedure
Criminal Procedure; juvenile offenders-victim's statements to the court
Welfare and Institutions Code § § 656.2, 706 (amended).
AB 889 (Rogan); 1995 STAT. Ch. 234
Existing law, in cases where a minor' has committed an act that would have
been a felony2 if committed by an adult, requires a probation officer to obtain a
statement concerning the offense, from the victim, the parent or guardian of the
victim if the victim is a minor, or the victim's next of kin in instances where the
victim has died; the probation officer must also advise those persons of the time
and place of the juvenile offender's disposition hearing.4 Existing law also
requires the probation officer to prepare a social study' concerning the minor
which includes these statements.6 Under prior law, any person who gave a
statement was allowed to be present at the minor's disposition hearing and to
express his or her views concerning the offense at the court's discretion.7
1. See CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West 1984) (providing that any person under the age of 18
who violates any law other than an ordinance establishing a curfew, comes under the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court); i. § 707.1(a) (West Supp. 1995) (authorizing the prosecuting attorney to file criminal charges against
a minor in a court of criminal jurisdiction after a hearing that determines the minor is not a proper subject to
be dealt with under juvenile court law); see also In re Manuel L., 7 Cal. 4th 229,234, 865 P.2d 718,720-21,
27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2, 4 (1994) (requiring the prosecution to present clear and convincing evidence that the minor
knows the wrongfulness of his or her conduct before the minor can come within the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court).
2. See CAL PENAL CODE § 17(a) (West Supp. 1995) (defining "felony" as any offense punishable by
death or incarceration in the state prison).
3. See CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1995) (requiring every county to appoint a
probation officer); id. § 280 (West Supp. 1995) (providing that a probation officer must prepare a social study
of a minor under his charge for the court which must include any matters relevant to a proper disposition of
the juvenile's case); id. § 281 (West 1984) (requiring the probation officer to report and make any
recommendations to the court concerning the custody, status, or welfare of a minor in his cr her charge).
4. Id. § 656.2(a) (amended by Chapter 234); see id. (requiring the probation officer to inform the
victim of the victim's right to institute a civil action against the minor and his or her parents). See generally
In re Ricardo M., 52 Cal. App. 3d 744, 749, 125 Cal. Rptr. 291, 294 (1975) (stating that juvenile court
proceedings are for the protection and benefit of the juvenile offender); Teri H. Alby, Comment, Effects of
Recent Legislation on the California Juvenile Justice System, 17 U.S.F. L. REv. 705 (1993) (examining the
development of juvenile criminal law in California up until 1982).
5. See CAL. WELlF. & INST. CODE § 358.1(a)-(d) (West Supp. 1995) (requiring the social study to
include (1) information concerning whether child protective services is a possible solution to the problem at
hand, (2) what plan for return of the child is recommended by the probation officer, (3) whether the
grandparents should be granted visitation rights, and (4) whether there should be further court action to free
the child from parental control); id. § 706.5 (West Supp. 1995) (providing that the social study shall include
the information listed in California Welfare and Institutions Code § 358.1(a), (b)); see also CAL R. CT. 1492(a)
(providing that the social study shall include any information concerning the minor's parole status and the
probation officer's recommendation for the disposition of the court); id. (requiring the probation officer to
submit the social study to the court clerk at least 48 hours before the beginning of the disposition hearing).
6. CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 656.2(a) (amended by Chapter 234); cf. N.Y. Fx,. CT. AcT § 351.1(4)
(McKinney Supp. 1995) (permitting a victim impact statement, containing the victim's version of the crime
as well as the victim's view as to the disposition of the case, to be included in an investigation report
concerning a juvenile offender when such a statement is relevant).
7. 1989 Cal. Stat. ch. 569, sec. 3, at 1875-76 (enacting CAL. NVELF. & INST. CODE § 656.2(b)).
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Chapter 234 provides that any person giving a statement as permitted above,
has the right to testify at the juvenile offender's disposition hearing.8
Existing law also requires the court, after determining that the minor is
properly within its jurisdiction, to receive into evidence 9 the social study prepared
by the probation officer, including the statements described above, and to state
that the court has considered the social study.'0 Chapter 234 requires the court to
receive any written or oral statement concerning the offense offered by persons
specified above." In addition, Chapter 234 requires the court to state that it has
considered these statements.' 2
COMMENT
Victims and their families have been able to participate and voice their views
during adult criminal proceedings. 3 Chapter 234 was enacted to expand these
rights to include criminal proceedings against minors.'4
8. CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 656.2(b) (amended by Chapter 234); cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. §
39.059(7)(b) (West Supp. 1995) (requiring the court to give the victim or the victim's representative the
opportunity to comment on the issue of sentence and any proposed rehabilitative plan at a juvenile offender's
presentencing hearing); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 57.002(5) (West Supp. 1995) (providing the victim with the
right to submit information concerning the impact of a juvenile's crime upon him or her, to the court
conducting ajuvenile's disposition hearing); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.150(3)(e) (West 1993) (allowing
the victim or the victim's representative to speak at ajuvenile offender's disposition hearing).
9. See CAL EvID. CODE § 140 (West 1966) (defining "evidence" to include testimony, writings,
material objects, or other things presented to the court to prove or disprove the existence of a fact).
10. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 706 (amended by Chapter 234); see CAL. R. Cr. 1492(b) (requiring the
court to consider the report and state that the report has been read); In re Christopher S., 10 Cal. App. 4th 1337,
1345, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 215, 219 (1992) (holding that it was not prejudicial error for a judge to read a minor's
social study before determining whether the juvenile court had jurisdiction over the minor since the defendant
did not object at the hearing and the report contained only background of the offense and some personal
information concerning the defendant); In re Eugene R., 107 Cal. App. 3d 605, 615, 166 Cal. Rptr. 219,224
(1980) (ruling that a dispositional order was reversible only if the failure to submit a social study concerning
the minor to the court before making its determination was prejudicial to the defendant); see also In re L.S.,
220 Cal. App. 3d 1100, 1105, 269 Cal. Rptr. 700, 703-04 (1990) (reversing the lower court's dispositional
order concerning a juvenile defendant where the court reviewed a 19-month old social study of the minor in
rendering its decision sirce the social study failed to provide recent personal, social, and behavioral information
concerning the juvenile offender).
11. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 706 (amended by Chapter 234); cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.059(7)(b)
(West Supp. 1995) (requiring the court to permit the victim to express his or her views at a juvenile offender's
sentencing hearing as to the issue of sentence or other rehabilitative plan); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38-4(7)
(1995) (granting the victim of a crime the right to make a written, oral, audiotaped, or videotaped statement
to the court).
12. CAL. WEUF. & INST. CODE § 706 (amended by Chapter 234).
13. ASSEMBLYCOMflTEEONPUBuCSA EY, CommrEE ANALYSTS oFAB 889, at 2 (May 9, 1995);
see also CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(a)-(g) (setting forth the "Victim's Bill of Rights" including reforming the
procedural treatment of the accused to help deter criminal behavior and to avoid serious disruptions in people's
lives). See generally Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REv. 937 (1985)
(discussing the recent impact of the victim right's movement on criminal law).
14. ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMrmrEE ANALYSIS OFAB 889, at 2 (May 18, 1995); see 1995 Cal. Legis.
Serv. ch. 234, sec. 1, at 691 (stating that giving victims a voice in juvenile offender proceedings would help
strengthen the juvenile justice system); see also Letter from Leonard P. Edwards, Chairperson, Juvenile Court
Judges of California, to Assemblymember Paula Boland (May 4. 1995) (copy on file with the Pacific Law
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Chapter 234 is intended to recognize the concerns of victims, confront
juveniles with the impact of their actions, and provide judges with a more fully
delineated context from which to render decisions. 5
A. James Kachmar
Criminal Procedure; misdemeanors-release on own recognizance
Penal Code § 1270 (amended).
AB 67 (Bowen); 1995 STAT. Ch. 51
Under existing statutory law, any person who has been arrested for, or
charged With, an offense other than a capital offense may be released on his or her
own recognizance by a court or magistrate who could release a defendant from
custody upon the defendant providing bail.2
Journal) (observing that limiting the victim to a single statement will in no way impair the judge's ability to
control the proceedings); Letter from Harriet C. Salarno, Chair, Justice for Murder Victims, to Assembly-
member James Rogan (Apr. 14, 1995) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (proposing that AB 889 will
bring greater balance to the juvenile justice system which has tended to be unresponsive to the victims of
juvenile crime); Letter from Jeannine L. English, Executive Director, Little Hoover Commission, to Assembly-
member James Rogan (Mar. 1, 1995) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (arguing that the juvenile
court system focuses on the offender while paying little attention to the concerns of the victim).
15. 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 234, sec. I, at 691; see ASsEMBLY FLOOR, COMMrrrEEANALYSIS oFAB
889, at 2 (May 18, 1995) (stating that allowing victims to testify at the hearings will help bring about a feeling
of resolution to the crime); ASSEMBLY COM=rITEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 889, at
3 (May 9, 1995) (relating an incident where a probation officer whose son had been murdered by a juvenile,
had trouble tracking the case against the offender because of the secrecy surrounding juvenile proceedings);
id (observing that the public perceives the juvenile criminal system as too lax, encouraging juvenile offenders
to continue their lawless ways); see also Letter from Gary Barrett, Executive Director, Strike Back, to
Assemblymember Paula Boland (Apr. 18, 1995) (copy on file with the Pacific Law, Journal) (recognizing that
in order to rehabilitate juvenile offenders, they must be made to realize that there are no victim-less crimes);
Mareva Brown, Youth Court Reform Urged-Appoint Crime Czar, Panel Says, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 5,
1994, at BI (reporting on the findings presented by the Little Hoover Commission after a seven-month study
including the recommendation that victims or affected family members should be permitted to testify during
the proceedings against ajuvenile offender). See generally Sandy Harrison, Early Intervention Urged Against
Violent Juvenile Crime, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 5, 1994, at N7 (reporting that there were 231,012 juvenile
arrests in 1993, including 21,549 arrests for violent crimes in 1992 and 645 homicide arrests in 1992); Dan
Walters, Juvenile Crime Turns Violent, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 5, 1994, at A3 (predicting increase in juvenile
crime in the later part of the decade as a result of the baby-boom during the 1980s).
1. See BLACK'S LAw DICTnoNARY 1271 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "recognizance" as "an obligation
entered into before a court or magistrate duly authorized for that purpose whereby the recognizer acknowledges
that be will do some act required by law which is specified therein," and further stating that it is "an obligation
undertaken by a person, generally a defendant in a criminal case, to appear in court on a particular day or to
keep the peace").
2. CAL. PENALCODE § 1270(a) (amended by Chapter 51); cf. ALA. CODE § 15-13-4 (1982) (directing
that all judges or magistrates, when authorized to grant bail or release the defendant on his or her own
recognizance, shall insure that every prisoner in jail has an opportunity to post bail in such cases where the
prisoner is so entitled); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 530.20(1) (McKinney 1995) (requiring that when a criminal
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Furthermore, under existing law, a defendant who is in custody and is
arraigned on a complaint alleging a misdemeanor offense is entitled to an own-
recognizance release unless the court determines that the release of the defendant
will not reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as required?
Chapter 51 requires that the court consider the seriousness of the offense
charged to the defendant, the previous criminal record of the defendant, and the
probability of his or her appearance at the trial or hearing of the case when setting
the bail amount or determining if the defendant should be released on his or her
own recognizance.4
Moreover, when determining if the defendant shall be entitled to a
recognizance release, Chapter 51 directs that the primary factor for the court is
whether the defendant will be a threat to public safety.5 The secondary factor for
the court to consider is whether the release of the defendant on personal
recognizance will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as required.6
Chapter 51 is made applicable to any person who is released pursuant to this
section.7
action is pending in criminal court, such cotrt, upon application by the defendant, may order recognizance or
bail when the defendant is charged, by information, simplified information, prosecutor's information or
misdemeanor complaint, with an offense or offenses not amounting to a felony).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1270(a) (amended by Chapter 51).
4. Id.; see id. § 1275 (West Supp. 1995) (listing the factors that the judge or magistrate shall take into
consideration when fixing the amount of bail).
5. Id. § 1270(a) (amended by Chapter 51); see CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(e) (requiring that the judge or
magistrate take into consideration the protection of the public, the seriousness of the offense charged, the
previous criminal record of the defendant, and the probability of his or her appearance at the trial or hearing
of the case; public safety shall be the primary consideration); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1275 (West Supp. 1995)
(setting forth the factors for the judge or magistrate to consider in setting, reducing, or denying bail as the
following: (1) "the protection of the public," (2) "the seriousness of the offense charged," (3) "the previous
criminal record of the defendant," and (4) "the probability of his or her appearing at trial or hearing of the
case"); 1d. (stating further that "in considering the seriousness of the offense charged, the judge or magistrate
shall include consideration of the alleged injury to the victim, alleged threats to the victim or a witness to the
crime charged, and the alleged use of a firearm or other deadly weapon in the commission" of the offense). But
see State v. Brown, 396 A.2d 134, 136-37 (VL 1978) (upholding the Vermont rule that a defendant cannot be
entirely denied bail on the ground that his release would constitute a danger to the public, and further stating
that to hold otherwise would render the scheme of statute meaningless; the statute is designed to release
defendants that present no danger to the community, only requiring a promise to return to court); State v. Pray,
346 A.2d 227,229 (VL 1975) (responding to a defendant whose initial conviction for first-degree murder was
later reversed and remanded for a new trial; holding that bail may not be entirely denied a defendant on grounds
that his release would constitute a danger to the public).
6. CAL PENAL CODE § 1270(a) (amended by Chapter 51); see id. (rearranging the order of the factors
for the court to consider in determining whether or not to release the defendant without bail). But cf. VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 7554(aX1), (2) (1995) (indicating that the first factor for the court to consider in determining
whether or not to allow a recognizance release is whether the release will reasonably assure the appearance of
the defendant as required, and that the second factor is the threat to public safety). See generally 4 B.E. WrrIuN
& NORMAN L. EPSTaN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Proceedings Before Trial § 2034(3) (2d ed. 1989)
(explaining the proceedings if a defendant released on his own recognizance fails to appear as promised).
7. CAL PENALCoDE § 1270(b) (amended by Chapter 51); see id. §§ 1318-1320 (West 1982 & Supp.
1995) (discussing the release agreements and the relevant staff appointed to investigate defendants who are
released on their own recognizance); id. §§ 1318-1320.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1995) (discussing the release
agreement and its requirements that enable a defendant to be released on his or her own recognizance and




Chapter 51 provides judges with the discretion to initially consider public
safety as one factor in determining whether or not to release a defendant on his
or her own recognizance.8 In assessing the threat to public safety, the judge or
magistrate will look at the threat posed to the safety of victims, witnesses, and to
the public at large.9
However, assuring the defendants' appearance is still an element for courts
to consider in either setting bail or allowing a recognizance release.'0
Perhaps the unspoken impetus behind the enactment of Chapter 51 is the
unavoidable overcrowding of jails that will result from recent legislation add-
ressing sentence enhancement. In fact, prisoners throughout the country are
being released on their own recognizance due to jail overcrowding.'2 However,
the purpose of recommending whether a defendant should be released on his or her own recognizance).
8. ASSEMBLY COMMrrEE ON PUBLIC SA ETY, CoMMITrEE ANALYSIS OFAB 67, at 1 (Apr. 18, 1995);
see CAL. PENAL CODE § 1275 (West Supp. 1995) (requiring judges or magistrates in setting, reducing, or
denying bail to consider public safety as the primary consideration). See generally Mark V. Pettine, Trends In
Own Recognizance Release: From Manhattan to California, 5 PAC. LJ. 675, 680 (1974) (discussing the
findings of experiments conducted in 1971 which revealed that the risk of someone being arrested in the same
county for a new offense is low for defendants released on their own recognizance and those defendants forced
to pay bail; more research is required to establish reliable patterns of conduct for defendants released on
personal recognizance).
9. ASSEMBLYCOMMTTEE ON PUBuC SAFETY, Co?,mmTr AN.ALYsls oFAB 67, at 2 (Apr. 18, 1995).
10. Id. at 1. See generally Pettine, supra note 8, at 683 (citing reports which concluded that releasing
individuals on their own recognizance does not significantly increase the risk of failure to appear;, further
reporting that community ties tend to ensure that defendants will appear at their court dates); Armando Acuna,
Court Must Justify Sending Drivers to AA, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1986, at I (reporting that the El Cajon
Municipal judges have been instituting a policy which sends drunk drivers to Alcoholics Anonymous meetings
to improve their appearance rates in court); Daryl Kelley, Court Costs May Offset Jailing Fee Revenue, L.A.
TmES, Sept. 23, 1990, at B1 (reporting that those defendants screened and released on their own recognizance
failed to appear in court at a rate eighteen times higher than those cited and released without going through a
screening process at the jail, and further stating that only 1.7% of those screened failed to appear while 30.5%
who were ticketed missed court dates); Matt O'Connor, Bonds Put Crime Back on Street-Study Finds Many
Rearrests, Missed Court Dates, CHm. Tam., June 4, 1992, at 1 (citing a report that showed that in major
metropolitan areas, the overall average rearrest level ranged from 20-35%, and further indicating that the
overall average of court "no-shows" ranged from 30-45% in major cities); Leslie Maitland Werner,
Overcrowding Spreads to Jails in U.S., N.Y. TmMs, Nov. 23, 1983, at A24 (noting that the overcrowding of
local jails has resulted in the release of many prisoners on their own recognizance who were held on the lowest
amount of ball). But see Jim Ross, Roofer Released Early from Jail Can't Be Found, ST. PETERSBERO TIMES,
Jan. 26, 1993, at 1 (reporting that a misdemeanant who was arrested for driving on a suspended licen&e and
possession of marijuana, and who was released on his own recognizance because of his clean criminal record
and upstanding employment record, failed to attend his court date and cannot be found).
11. ASSEMBLY COM MITEEoN PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMnrTEANALYSISoFAB971, at5 (Jan. 6, 1994);
see id. (noting the belief of opponents of sentence enhancement legislation that its provisions will be ineffective
to address the problem of recidivism but will merely overload an already burdened prison system); see also
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(a)(4) (West Supp. 1994) (imposing the sentence enhancement requirements for
specified repeat offenders). See generally Mark W. Owens, Review of Selected 1994 California Legislation,
26 PAC. LJ. 202, 442-446 (1995) (discussing the impacts of the "three strikes you're out" legislation and
critical issues raised by the enactment of the new law).
12. See Bill Kisliuk, City Says It's Found Answer to Jail Crowding, THE RECORDER, Oct. 4, 1994, at
1 (reporting that one of the elements of the plan to answer San Francisco's chronic jail overcrowding problem
is allowing municipal courts the authority to release on their own recognizance inmates who would otherwise
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despite the increasing prison populations, Chapter 51 attempts to ensure that the
safety of the public is not compromised as a result.
Tad A. Devlin
Criminal Procedure; parole
Penal Code §§ 3060.7, 14202.2 (new).
SB 856 (Thompson); 1995 STAT. Ch. 967
Existing law authorizes the Board of Prison Terms' to establish regulations
under which inmates of state prisons may be paroled.2 Existing law requires the
Board of Prison Terms to revoke the parole of any prisoner who refuses to sign
a parole agreement form, which would establish the conditions under which the
parole is granted.3 Existing law also authorizes the Attorney General4 to maintain
sit in jail awaiting trial); O'Connor, supra note 10, at 1 (indicating that as a result of jail overcrowding in Cook
County, the county jail has been releasing tens of thousands of inmates, many accused of felonies, to comply
with a federal consent decree to reduce overcrowding); Matt O'Connor & Charles Mount, $60 Million Sought
for JailAddition, Cmu. Tan., Sept. 15, 1988, at 1 (noting that officials in Cook County were given a time limit
to reduce the jail's population and that jail officials complied with the deadline by releasing defendants
awaiting trial on their own recognizance); id. (noting that the jail officials began releasing defendants who were
held on $25,000 bond and charged with robbery and residential burglary, and further stating that defendants
held on $50,000 bonds could qualify for release on their own recognizance).
1. See CAL PENAL CODE §§ 5075-5082 (West 1982 & Supp. 1995) (setting forth the powers, duties,
and authority of the Board of Prison Terms); see also id. § 3000(b)(6) (West Supp. 1995) (stating that the
Board of Prison Terms has sole authority to grant paroles); id. § 5002(e) (West Supp. 1995) (stating that the
Board of Prison Terms is vested with all the powers and duties of the following boards: (1) the Board of Prison
Terms and Paroles, (2) the Advisory Pardon Board, (3) the Adult Authority, (4) the Woman's Board of Terms
and Paroles, and (5) the Community Release Board).
2. Id. § 3040 (west 1982); see People v. Ray, 181 Cal. App. 2d 64, 69,5 Cal. Rptr. 113, 116(1960)
(holding that parole is a privilege, not a matter of right granted to each inmate); People v. Denne, 141 Cal. App.
2d 499, 508, 297 P.2d 451,457 (1956) (concluding that a grant of parole does not change a parolee's status
as a prisoner since the parolee is not discharged from the judgment entered by the state, but merely serving the
remainder of a sentence outside prison walls). See generally 3 B.E. WrrIKN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN,
CALIFORNIA CRIMAL LAW, Parole § 1734 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1995) (discussing parole of inmates);
Victoria J. Palacios, Go and Sin No More: Rationality and Release Decisions by Parole Boards, 45 S.C. L.
REV. 567, 579-84 (discussing parole guidelines in general, and various methods to increase parolee compliance
with conditional paroles).
3. CAL PENAL CODE § 3060.5 (west Supp. 1995); see id. (mandating that the prisoner sign all forms
required by the State, including forms that detail conditions for which parole was granted, forms which
acknowledge that the parolee will register with the local authorities of his new residence, and forms which call
for the prisoner to provide samples of blood or saliva; if the prisoner does not sign any of these forms, the
maximum amount of additional prison time that can be served is six months); see also id. § 3053(a) (West
Supp. 1995) (permitting the Board of Prison Terms to require any conditions it deems appropriate, to be agreed
to in writing before an inmate is allowed to leave the prison on parole); In re Schoengarth, 66 Cal. 2d 295, 301,
425 P.2d 200, 204, 57 Cal. Rptr. 600, 604 (1967) (holding that a prisoner is not required to accept a conditional
parole, but he cannot convert it into a unconditional parole by merely rejecting the conditions attached; to be
effective, a parole must be accepted as offered by the Board of Prison Terms); In re Kimler, 37 Cal. 2d 568,
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the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System, a computer system
which monitors information concerning missing persons and stolen property.5
Chapter 967 requires the Board of Prison Terms to inform any inmate in the
highest control or risk classification who is released on parole that he or she has
two days from the time he or she has been released to report to his or her assigned
parole officer.6 Chapter 967 also requires the Board of Prison Terms, within
twenty-four hours of the parolee's failure to report to his or her parole officer, to
issue a written order suspending his or her parole, and to issue a warrant7 for the
parolee's arrest.' Chapter 967 requires the Department of Corrections9 to release
575,233 P.2d 902,907 (1951) (announcing that once a prisoner has accepted a conditional parole, the parolee
is bound by the express terms of that parole); People v. Knox, 95 Cal. App. 3d 420, 427, 157 Cal. Rplr. 238,
242 (1979) (stating that a condition of parole is invalid if it (1) has no relationship to the crime which the
prisoner had been convicted of, (2) relates to conduct that is not criminal, or (3) requires or forbids conduct
that is not reasonably related to future criminal acts); cf. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-5217(a) (Supp. Pamphlet 1994)
(stating that the Secretary of Corrections may issue an arrest warrant for any violation of a condition under
which parole was granted); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-511 (1993 & Supp. 1994) (instructing that if a
condition for parole is violated, a parole revocation committee will determine if the parolee returns to prison,
or remains on parole).
4. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12510-12529.5 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995) (setting forth the powers,
duties, and authority of the Attorney General of California).
5. 14 § 15152 (West 1992); see id. (requiring the Department of Justice to maintain the California Law
Enforcement Telecommunications System); id. § 15153 (West 1992) (stating that the California Law
Enforcement Telecommunications System is under the direction of the Attorney General); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 14201 (West 1992) (mandating that the Attorney General include in the California Law Enforcement
Telecommunications System a file containing any information available concerning missing persons and
specific stolen property); cf. 49 U.S.C.A. § 33109 (West 1995) (establishing the National Stolen Passenger
Motor Vehicle Information System, as a part of the National Crime Information Center, which allows federal,
state, and local authorities access to information concerning stolen vehicles); ALASKA STAT. § 12.62.110(1)
(Supp. 1994) (establishing a comprehensive criminal justice information system); COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-33.5-
223 (1988) (establishing a state telecommunications network for law enforcement and public safety); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1508 (West 1988) (establishing a law enforcement telecommunications system for
exchanging and distributing information relating to police problems); OR. REV. STAT. § 181.730 (Supp. 1994)
(creating a law enforcement data system for storage and retrieval of criminal information).
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3060.7(a) (enacted by Chapter 967); see id. (stating that the Board of Prison
Terms may demand that a parolee report to his or her parole officer in less than two days).
7. See BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1585 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "arrest warrant" as a written order
of a court, on behalf of the state, or of the United States, that is based upon a complaint issued pursuant to
statute or court rule, and which commands law enforcement officers to arrest a person and bring that person
before a magistrate); see also Pillsbury v. State, 142 N.W.2d 187, 190 (Wis. 1966) (defining "arrest warrant"
as stated above, but also stating that after commission of a felony, no arrest warrant is necessary for placing
a criminal under arrest).
8. CAL PENAL CODE § 3060.7(a), (b) (enacted by Chapter 967); see id. (declaring that if the parolee
does not report to his or her parole officer within two days, then the inmate's parole is suspended until a
hearing before the Board of Prison Terms can be scheduled); id. § 3060.7(c) (enacted by Chapter 967) (stating
that after an arrest warrant has been issued for the parolee, the parole officer must continue to carry the parolee
on his or her regular caseload and continue to search for the parolee's whereabouts); see also Morrisey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485-89 (1972) (holding that a two stage proceeding is necessary to ensure minimum
due process requirements are met during parole revocation: First, a preliminary hearing is needed to determine
whether there is probable cause to believe that the parolee has violated parole conditions; and second, a more
formal hearing in which the question of violation is factually determined and must include the following
procedural protections; written notice of claimed violations, disclosure to the parolee of evidence, opportunity
to be heard, right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and a written statement by the fact finder
as to the evidence relied on for the decision reached); In re Prewitt, 8 Cal. 3d 470,476, 503 P.2d 1326, 1331-
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an inmate before or after his or her scheduled release date if the release date falls
on the day before a holiday or a weekend.'0
Chapter 967 also requires the Department of Justice" to cooperate with the
Department of Corrections in order to input the parolee's record and release file
onto the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System, thus pro-
viding law enforcement personnel with updated information on potentially
dangerous parolees. 2
COMMENT
Chapter 967 will ensure that surveillance and supervision of parolees begins
as soon as possible after their release from prison." Chapter 967 was introduced
in response to the slaying of a Sonoma County sheriff's deputy by a recently
paroled inmate from Pelican Bay State Prison. 4 The inmate, Robert Scully, had
a history of violence and upon his release from prison he had been told to report
to his parole officer by the next business day.' 5 Yet, since he was released on a
Friday, he had the weekend before he was supposed to report to his parole
officer. 16 He did not report on Monday, the day he was supposed to, and allegedly
killed a Sonoma County sheriff deputy on Wednesday. 7 A warrant for his arrest
32, 105 Cal. Rptr. 318, 323-24 (1972) (holding that inmates who have been granted parole, but not yet released
from custody, may have their parole rescinded if the requirements of Morrisey are satisfied, with the exception
of the preliminary hearing, which is not applicable in parole rescission proceedings). See generally CAL. CODE
REGS. tit. 15, §§ 2620-2744 (1991) (discussing regulations regarding parole revocation hearings).
9. See CAL PENAL CODE §§ 5000-5050 (West 1982 & Supp. 1995) (setting forth the powers, duties,
and authority of the California Department of Corrections).
10. Id. § 3060.7(c), (d) (enacted by Chapter 967).
11. See CAL GOV'T CODE §§ 15000-15006 (West 1992) (setting forth the powers, duties, and authority
of the California Department of Justice).
12. CAL. PENAL CODE § 14202.2 (enacted by Chapter 967); see id. (mandating the release file to be
updated every 10 days to reflect the current status of the inmates parole); Diana Sugg, Pilot Program Keeps
High-Tech Tabs on Parolees, SAcRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 13, 1992, at B1 (reporting that a pilot program similar
to the one initiated by Chapter 967 worked extremely well, with 1200 law enforcement contacts made with
parolees that parole agents would have never known about without the system); cf. COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-2-
102(9) (Supp. 1994) (establishing a telecommunications system for the purpose of providing law enforcement
agencies information concerning parolees).
13. SENATE FLOOR, CoMMITm ANALYSIS OF SB 856, at 2 (May 25, 1995); see Jamie Beckett, State
Cracking Down on Career Criminals, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 25,1995, at A13 (reporting that state law enforcement
agencies do not have the resources to focus on every violent criminal who is released from prison, yet SB 856
would call for increased attention and manpower to be spent on monitoring parolees).
14. SENATE FLOOR, Commr-rEE ANALYSIS OF SB 856, at 2 (May 25, 1995); see Legislator Proposes
Arrest Warrants for Wayward Parolees, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 7, 1995, at A23 (announcing that California State
Senator Mike Thompson reacted to the killing of the Sonoma deputy sheriff by proposing legislation which
would require the state to issue arrest warrants for inmates who fail to report to their parole officers).
15. SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYsis of SB 856, at 2 (May 25, 1995); see Glen Martin & Tyra
Mead, 2 Arrested in Slaying of Deputy; Hostages Safe in Sonoma County, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 31, 1995, at Al
(detailing Scully's criminal record, which includes robbery, grand theft, and assault).
16. SENATEFLOOR, COMMrrFEE ANALYSISOFSB 856, at2 (May 25, 1995).
17. Id.; see Donna Horowitz, Deputy's Alleged Killers Nabbed After Hostage Scene; Santa Rosa Family
OK After Held 7 Hours at Gunpoint, S.F. ExAMINER, Mar. 31, 1995, at A4 (reporting that six days after his
release from prison, Scully allegedly shot a sheriff deputy in the face with a shotgun, and then took hostages
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was issued by the Department of Corrections on Thursday for failing to report to
his parole officer, yet he had already been arrested the day before for the murder
of the sheriff's deputy.' 8
Chapter 967 is designed to ensure that parolees report to their parole officer
in a timely manner, and if they fail to report, Chapter 967 mandates that law
enforcement agencies be immediately notified. t9 Chapter 967 puts an end to
holiday and Friday parole releases which gave inmates an additional two days of
unsupervised activity, and requires them to report to their parole officers within
forty-eight hours no matter where they are situated within the state.2°
The opposition to Chapter 967 is concerned with the strict language of the
legislation, which allows for no excuses or extenuating circumstances to lengthen
the time needed for parolees to report to their parole officers?' The opposition
also points out that Chapter 967 creates a minor anomaly in that inmates who are
released on a Thursday do not have forty-eight hours to report to their parole
officer, but rather they have only twenty-four hours to report2 2 The author of
Chapter 967 believes that the Board of Prison Terms will be best able to handle
this minor anomaly, in that they will be allowed to release the inmate on a Wed-
nesday, instead of a Thursday, and thus allow the parolee the statutory time to
reach his or her parole officer.23
The fiscal impact of Chapter 967 is measured by the increased costs for
issuing warrants, for holding parole revocation hearings, and also by the increased
amount of inmates that must stay in California prisons as a result of this new
to protect himself from law enforcement officials).
18. SENATE FLOOR, COMMITEE ANALYSIS OF SB 856, at 2 (May 25, 1995).
19. Id.; see also Sugg, supra note 12 (reporting that an online computer system allows law enforcement
officials instant information concerning the type of person they are dealing with, and if any action is desired
by the parole officer to be taken against the parolee).
20. SENATE FLOOR, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 856, at 2 (May 25, 1995); see also SENATE
CO?. rrrM ON CRIMNAL PROCEDURE, CoMMrrrEE ANALYsS OF SB 856, at 2 (Apr. 25, 1995) (declaring that
there is no place in the state that someone cannot travel to within 48 hours using public transportation).
21. Telephone Interview with Happy Chastain, Legislative Consultant to Senator Mike Thompson on
SB 856 (July 10, 1995) (notes on file with the Pacific Law Journal); see id. (claiming that opponents to SB
856 believe some leeway should be given for parolee's who have problems in transportation, yet the author
of SB 856 believes these isolated incidents will be best handled by individual parole officers, and not by
enacting legislation to cover every contingency); see also SENATE COMMrrrEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 856, at 3 (Apr. 25, 1995) (stating that in opposition to SB 856, the California
Probation, Parole, and Correctional Association believes SB 856 does not allow for extenuating circumstances,
such as car or bus problems, or missed connections with public transportation); id. (asserting that if the
parolee's Imow they will be arrested if they are not present within 48 hours, they will be frightened, and most
likely to act in a dangerous way if they cannot reach their destination in time).
22. SENATE CommiTITEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, CoMmrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 856, at 4 (Apr. 25,
1995).
23. Telephone Interview with Happy Chastain, supra note 21; see id. (explaining that the Board of
Prison Terms will have the discretion to release inmates several days before their established release dates, and
that this discretion will be best suited to handle Thursday and holiday release problems).
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legislation.24 Yet the price tag for Chapter 967 is well worth the increased
protection given to both the general public and the law enforcement community.2
Ralph J. Barry
Criminal Procedure; peace officers-reserve park rangers
Penal Code § 830.6 (amended).
AB 787 (McDonald); 1995 STAT. Ch. 54
(Effective June 30, 1995)
Under existing law, specific persons deputized or appointed as reserve police
officers qualify for peace officer' status2 Existing law provides that in order for
24. See SENATE COMM rE ON APPROPRIATIONS, CoMMrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 856, at 1-2 (May 15,
1995) (stating that in 1994, roughly 4834 parolees did not report to their parole officers as required, so with
an arrest warrant at $75 per warrant, the price to issue warrants for all of these inmates is approximately
$350,000); id. (declaring that the price to hold a parole revocation hearing is $135, thus a total cost estimate
for 1994 would have been $653,000); id. (stating that it takes an average of 45 days to have a parole revocation
hearing, thus this additional time period costs the state $1833 per 45 day period, for a total of $8.9 million for
the entire paroled population waiting for parole revocation hearings).
25. See Daniel W. Weintraub, The Perils of Parole Reform; Running State's Complex System is a
Delicate Balancing Act, L.A. TIMS. Sept. 17, 1994, at Al (reporting that under the existing parole system,
public safety is a predominate concern, yet in reality none is provided; the parole system is merely pretending
to provide it). But see id. (conceding that even with proposed changes in the parole system, California sends
more parolees back to prison then all other 49 states combined).
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 830 (West Supp. 1995) (defining "peace officer" as any person meeting
those standards imposed by California Penal Code §§ 830-830.2).
2. Id. § 830.6(a)(1) (amended by Chapter 54); see id. (providing that whenever any person is deputized
or appointed by proper authority as a reserve or auxiliary city police officer, reserve or auxiliary sheriff or
deputy sheriff, reserve police officer of a regional park or transit district, reserve deputy marshall, reserve
harbor or port police officer, reserve deputy of the Department of Fish and Game, reserve special agent for the
Department of Justice, reserve officer of a community service district, school district, or police protection
district, and is assigned specific police functions by that authority, such reserve officer is a peace officer after
having qualified under California Penal Code § 832.6); see also CAL. LAB. CODE § 3362.5 (West Supp. 1995)
(establishing that any qualified person deputized or appointed as an auxiliary or reserve sheriff or city police
officer, deputy sheriff, or reserve police officer of a regional park or transit district is to be considered an
employee of that city, county, city and county, town, or district while performing peace officer functions); CAL.
PENALCODE § 830.2 (West Supp. 1995) (listing those law enforcement officers who qualify as peace officers
with state-wide authority); id. § 832.6 (West Supp. 1995) (providing that every person deputized or appointed
as described in § 832.6(a) of the California Penal Code has the powers of a peace officer if such person meets
one of the following conditions: (1) assignment to the detection and prevention of crime and the general
enforcement of California law, and completion of basic training for the applicable position, subject to an
exemption from such training requirements for reserve officers; (2) assignment to the prevention and detection
of crime and the general enforcement of California law while under the supervision of a peace officer
possessing a basic certificate, while engaged in a field training program, and having completed the required
course work and training; (3) deployment and authorization to carry out limited duties of general law
enforcement under the direct supervision of a peace officer in possession of a basic certificate, having
completed the proper training; or (4) assignment to the prevention and detection of particular crimes, or to the
detection and apprehension of a particular individual, under the supervision of a peace officer in a county
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one to use the title of ranger, park ranger, forest ranger, or similar titles, one must




The purpose of Chapter 54 is to allow reserve park rangers to attain peace
officer status. Approximately forty percent of all park rangers in the City of Long
Beach are volunteer reserve park rangers.6 This reserve park ranger program was
declared a success for Long Beach because it made the experience of local parks
more enjoyable for visitors.7 Chapter 54 merely extends to reserve park rangers
the same peace officer status afforded other reserve police officers.
Daniel L. Keller
adjacent to a state border in possession of a basic certificate, regularly employed by a state or local agency, and
having completed the proper training); id. § 13510(a), (b) (West 1992) (requiring the Commission on Peace
Officer Standards and Training to adopt or amend rules establishing minimum standards of physical, moral,
and mental fitness for recruits in order to raise the competency level of local law enforcement officers, as well
as to conduct research concerning job-related standards for education, vision, hearing, physical ability, and
emotional stability). See generally Jeffrey W. Daly, Review of Selected 1991 California Legislation, 23 PAC.
LJ. 510, 762-63 (1992) (discussing peace officer qualification requirements and training).
3. CAL. PuB. Rgs. CODE § 4022 (West Supp. 1995); see id. (providing that the titles of ranger, forest
ranger, and park ranger, or similar titles, are only applicable to peace officers, and that unqualified use of these
titles is an infraction); id. § 5008(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1995) (establishing that any officer or employee of the
state park system may be designated a peace officer to protect property included in the California recreational
trail system from damage and preserve the peace); see also 62 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 378, 378-79 (1979)
(providing that the California Department ofFish and Game reserve officers are not considered peace officers
as designated in California Penal Code § 830.6(a), but are designated peace officers as described in California
Penal Cod- § 330.3(d)(2), and in addition, they are not required to receive training as prescribed in California
Penal Coda § 832.6, but instead must fulfil the training requirements set forth by California Penal Code § 832).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 830.6(a)(2) (amended by Chapter 54); see id. (providing that reserve park
rangers deputized or appointed by proper authority and assigned certain police functions by that authority, are
considered peace officers, may carry firearms if authorized under the conditions set forth by the employing
agency, and have authority to the extent set forth in California Penal Code § 830.1); id. § 830.1 (a)(l)-(3) (West
Supp. 1995) (providing that the authority of a peace officer extends to the following situations: (1) any public
offense within the political subdivision under which the peace officer is employed, (2) any place in which the
police officer has appropriate consent, and (3) any public offense occurring in the peace officer's preence).
5. SENATE CoMMrrrEr ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 787, at 2 (June 6.
1995).
6. Id.; see id. (providing that Long Beach employs five full-tima and ten part-time park rangers, as well
as ten part-time volunteer reserve park rangers).
7. Id.; see id. (stating that park rangers not only keep parks safe, but enhance the enjoyment of visitors
by providing them with encyclopedic information about each park).
8. Id.; see id. (stating that the volunteer reserve park ranger program was dependent on obtaining
authorization to classify reserve park rangers as peace officers); see also Telephone Interview with Gary
Wenuk, Consultant to Assemblymember Juanita McDonald on AB 787 (July 17, 1995) (notes on file with the
Pacific Law Journal) (providing that Chapter 54 is merely an extension of the existing exemption afforded
reserve officers in other areas to qualify as peace officers); Steve Ryfle, Volunteers Sought To Help In
Guarding Glendale Parks, L.A. TMmEs, July 15, 1995, at B 1I (voicing concern for park safety after a student
was stabbed in an after-school fight, and the need for volunteer reserve park rangers to heed such concerns).
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Criminal Procedure; preliminary injunctions-profits from crimes
Civil Code § 2225 (amended).
SB 287 (Calderon); 1995 STAT. Ch. 262
Under existing law, California's "Son of Sam" statute prevents criminals
from gaining financially from their crimes.2 The statute provides that any
1. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victim's Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 123
(1991) [hereinafter Simon & Schuster] (holding New York's "Son of Sam" statute, which disallowed convicted
criminals from profiting from their crimes, unconstitutional as violative of the First Amendment); id. at 108
(noting that New York's "Son of Sam" statute was enacted in response to the horrifying crimes of David "Son
of Sam" Berkowitz, who terrorized New York with serial killings and then attempted to profit from his crimes
by selling the rights to his story); Robert M. Snider, Coming Soon to a Theater Near You, CAL. LAw., Apr.
1987, at 29 (commenting that in response to the decision in Simon & Schuster v. New York State Crime
Victim's Bd., 37 other states, including California, modified their statutes and maintained provisions in order
to achieve the same result of forbidding criminals to profit from their crimes). See generally ALA. CODE § 41-9-
80 (1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4.1-201 (Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9103 (Supp. 1994); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 944.512 (West Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-14-31 (1990); IDAHO CODE § 19-5301 (1987);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 346.165 (Baldwin 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1832 (West 1982); MiNN. STAT ANN.
§ 61 1A.68 (West Supp. 1995); NEn. REv. STAT. § 81-1836 (1994); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-28 (West 1986);
OIA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 17 (West 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 147.275 (1990); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 180-
7.18 (1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-59-40 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1994); S.D. CODemED LAWS ANN. § 23A-28A-1
(Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-13-202 (1980); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 7.68.200 (West 1992); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 949.165 (West Supp. 1994); Benedict J. Caiola & Esther Oz, Note, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board-"Crime Goes Hollywood"-The Striking Down of the
"Son of Sam" Statute, 14 WHiTiEl L. REV. 859, 867 (1993) (noting that in Simon & Schuster, the Supreme
Court conceded that the state does have a compelling interest in compensating the victims of crime and in
ensuring that criminals do not profit from their crimes); Kerry Casey, Note, The Virginia "Son of Sam" Law:
An Unconstitutional Approach to Victim Compensation, 2 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 495, 495 (1993)
(examining whether state legislatures may restrict a criminal's right to profit from telling the story of his crime
without violating his freedom of speech); Steven B. Lichtman, The Right to a Soapbox: A Critique of Simon
& Schuster v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board, 55 U. PrrT. L. REv. 501, 505 (1994)
(specifying that one of the dangers of the Simon & Schuster opinion is that it is now entirely plausible that
someone will commit a minor but spectacular crime for the sole purpose of hoping to eventually reap a
substantial profit by selling the story rights after serving a short sentence); Lori F. Zavack, Note. Can States
Enact Constitutional "Son of Sam" Laws after Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims
Board?, 37 ST. Loums U. LJ. 701,728 (1992) (stating that while some people contend that "Son of Sam" laws
do little to compensate victims because of the small number of cases, the law has effectively prevented many
criminals from profiting from their crimes because they have been deterred from even writing).
2. CAL CIV. CODE § 2225 (amended by Chapter 262); see Marnie I. Smith, Review of Selected 1994
California Legislation, 26 PAC. LJ. 202,488-92 (1995) (explaining how California's "Son of Sam" law differs
from New York's); Snider, supra note 1, at 29-30 (explaining that California's "Son of Sam" law is
comparatively weak compared to New York's analogous law, and noting that the most striking aspect of "Son
of Sam" laws generally is that they are often unknown and unenforced); id. (stating that criminals, agents,
publishers and producers benefit from crime stories in a way that sometimes victimizes the victims all over
again). See generally Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of "Son of Sam"
Laws Regulating or Prohibiting Distribution of Crime-Related Book, Film, or Comparable Revenues to
Criminals, 60 A.L.R. 4TH 1210, 1213-17 (1988) (discussing the background and various constitutional issues
raised by "Son of Sam" laws and giving a summary comparison of 27 different states' adaptations); State Uses
"Son of Sam" Law'for First Time, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1995, at 1 (reporting that California State Attorney
General Dan Lungren filed suit against Death Row inmate Rodney Alcala for earnings from a published book
regarding the killing of a 12-year-old Huntington Beach girl); id. (reporting that Lungren also filed suit against
former Billionaire Boys Club leader Joe Hunt, who profited from setting up a "900" telephone number which
people could call to hear him describe life in prison after he was convicted for killing a man who cheated him
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proceeds3 or profits4 received by a convicted felon5 for the sale6 of the rights to
the story or the sale of materialse that include or are based on the story' of the
convicted felon, are subject to an involuntary truste for the benefit of the
beneficiaries ° of the crime. Existing law provides that any beneficiary may
in a commodities-trading scheme).
3. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225(a)(9) (amended by Chapter 262) (defining "proceeds" as all fees,
royalties, real property, or other consideration of any and every kind or nature received by or owing to a felon
or his or her representatives for the preparation for the purpose of sale of materials, for the sale of the rights
to materials, or the sale and distribution by the convicted felon of materials whether earned, accrued, or paid
before or after the conviction); id. (stating that "proceeds" includes any interest, earnings, or accretions upon
proceeds, and any property received in exchange for proceeds); see also id. § 2225(a)(3) (amended by Chapter
262) (defining a "representative of the felon" as any person or entity receiving proceeds by designation of that
felon, or on behalf of that felon or in the stead off that felon, whether by the felon's designation or by operation
of law).
4. See id. § 2225(a)(10) (amended by Chapter 262) (defining "profits" as all income from anything
sold or transferred, including any right, the value of which is enhanced by the notoriety gained from the
commission of a felony for which a convicted felon was convicted). This income may have been accrued,
earned or paid before or after the conviction. However, voluntary donations or contributions to a defendant to
assist in the defense of criminal charges shall not be deemed to be profits, provided the donation or contribution
to that defense is not given in exchange for some material of value. Id.
5. See id. § 2225(a)(1) (amended by Chapter 262) (describing a "convicted felon" as any person
convicted of a felony, or found not guilty by reason of insanity of a felony committed in California, either by
a court of jury trial or by entry of a plea in court); id. § 2225(a)(2) (amended by Chapter 262) (clarifying that
a "felony" includes any felony defined by a California or United States statute); see also id. § 17(a) (West
Supp. 1995) (defining a "felony" as a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in a state prison).
6. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225(a)(6) (amended by Chapter 262) (defining "sale" to include lease,
license, or any other transfer or alienation taking place in California or elsewhere).
7. See id. (defining "materials" as meaning books, magazine or newspaper articles, movie, films,
videotapes, sound recordings, interviews or appearances on television and radio stations, and live presentations
of any kind).
8. See id. § 2225(a)(7) (amended by Chapter 262) (defining a "story" as a depiction, portrayal, or
reenactment of a felony and shall not be taken to mean a passing mention of the felony, as in a footnote or
bibliography).
9. See id. § 2225(b)(1) (amended by Chapter 262) (specifying that all proceeds from the preparation
for the purpose of sale, the sale of the rights to, or the sale or materials that include or are based on the story
of a felony for which a felon was convicted are subject to an involuntary trust); id. § 2225(b)(2) (amended by
Chapter 262) (specifying that the trust hall continue until five years after the time of payment of the proceeds
to the felon or five years after the date of conviction, whichever is later, if an action is filed by a beneficiary
to recover his or her interest in a trust within those time limitations, the trust character of the property shall
continue until the conclusion of the action); id. (specifying that at the end of the five-year trust period, any
profits which remain in trust that have not been claimed by a beneficiary shall be transferred to the Controller
to be allocated to the Restitution Fund for the payment of claims pursuant to California Government Code §
13969); Review of Selected 1984 California Legislation, 15 PAc. L.J. 570, 572-74 (1984) (discussing the
enactment of the involuntary trust provision).
10. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 2225(a)(4)(A) (amended by Chapter 262) (defining a "beneficiary" as a
person who, under applicable law, other than the provisions of this section, has or had a right to recover
damages from the convicted felon for physical, mental, or emotional injury, or pecuniary loss proximately
caused by the convicted felon as a result of the crime for which the felon was convicted); id. § 2225(a)(4)(B)
(amended by Chapter 262) (explaining that if the beneficiary described in California Civil Code § 2225(a) has
died, "beneficiary" also includes a person or estate entitled to recover damages pursuant to certain provision
of the California Code of Civil Procedure); id. § 2225(a)(4)(C) (amended by Chapter 262) (adding that if a
person has died and the death was proximately caused by the convicted felon as a result of the crime for which
the felon was convicted, "beneficiary" also includes a person described in California Code of Civil Procedure
§ 377.10, and any beneficiary of a will of the decedent who had a right under that will to receive more than
25% of tht value of the estate of the decedent); CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE § 377.60 (West Supp. 1995) (stating
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bring an action against a convicted felon or representative of the felon to recover
his or her interest in the trust.12 Existing law also provides that the California
Attorney General may bring an action to require the proceeds or profits received
by a convicted felon to be held in an express trust in a bank authorized to act as
a trustee. 3
Under existing law, a court must grant a preliminary injunction, upon motion
of a party, to prevent any waste of proceeds or profits if it appears that the
proceeds or profits are subject to the provisions of California Civil Code section
2225 and that they may be subject to waste. 4 Chapter 262 expands California's
"Son of Sam" law by establishing the requirement that a court, upon motion by
the California Attorney General or by victims of the crime, must grant a pre-
liminary injunction against a person against whom an indictment or information
for a felony has been filed in superior court to prevent any waste of profits or
proceeds if there is probable cause to believe that the proceeds or profits would
be subject to an involuntary trust pursuant to California Civil Code section 2225
that a cause of action for the death of a person caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another may be asserted
by any of the following persons or by the decedent's personal representative on their behalf: (1) the decedent's
surviving spouse, children, and issue of deceased children, or, if none, the persons would be entitled to the
property of the decedent by intestate succession; (2) persons who were dependant on the decedent, the putative
spouse (meaning the surviving spouse of a void or voidable marriage who is found by the court to have
believed in good faith that the marriage to the decedent was valid), children of the putative spouse,
stepchildren, or parents; and (3) a minor, if at the time of the decedent's death, the minor resided for the
previous 180 days in the decedent's household and was dependant ont he decedent for one-half or more of the
minor's support).
11. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225(b)(1), (2) (amended by Chapter 262).
12. Id. § 2225(c)(1) (amended by Chapter 262); see id. § 2225(c)(2) (amended by Chapter 262) (stating
that the action may be brought in the superior court of the county in which the beneficiary resides, or of the
county in which the convicted felon resides, or in the county in which the proceeds or profits are located); id.
§ 2225(c)(3) (amended by Chapter 262) (noting that if the court determines that a beneficiary is entitled to
proceeds or profits, the court will order the payment from proceeds or profits which have been received, and,
if that is insufficient, from proceeds or profits which may be received in the future); id. § 2225(d) (amended
by Chapter 262) (clarifying that if there are two or more beneficiaries, and if the available proceeds or profits
are insufficient to pay all beneficiaries, the proceeds or profits shall be equitably apportioned among the
beneficiaries taking into account the impact of the crime upon them); id. (noting that prior to any distribution
of any proceeds to a beneficiary, the court will determine whether the convicted felon has failed to pay any
portion of a restitution fine imposed by a court, or any restitution imposed as a condition of probation. The
court shall also determine whether the felon is obligated to reimburse a governmental entity for the costs of
his or her defense and whether a portion of the proceeds is needed to cover his or her reasonable attorney's fees
incurred in the criminal proceeding related to the felony, or any appeal or other related proceeding or in the
defense of the action brought under this section); id. (specifying that the court shall order payment of these
aforementioned obligations prior to any payment to a beneficiary, except that 60% of the proceeds or profits
shall be reserved for payment to the beneficiaries).
13. Id. § 2225(e)(1) (amended by Chapter 262); see id. § 2225(e)(2) (amended by Chapter 262)
(specifying that the Attorney General may bring an action under California Civil Code § 2225 within one year
after the receipt of profits or proceeds by a convicted felon or one year after the date of the conviction,
whichever is later); id. § 2225(e)(4) (amended by Chapter 262) (stating that if the Attorney General prevails
in an action under California Civil Code § 2225, the court will award to the Attorney General reasonable costs
and attorney's fees, to be collected from the profits or proceeds).
14. Id. § 2225(f)(1) (amended by Chapter 262).
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upon a conviction of this person, and that they may be subject to waste."5 Pre-
viously, a preliminary injunction was only available against convicted felons. 6
Chapter 262 also expands the definitions of proceeds and profits to include
income which may have been accrued, earned, or paid before or after the
conviction.'7
COMMENT
Chapter 262 was introduced in response to the need for pre-conviction
freezing of assets when an accused felon could potentially receive increased profit
earnings due to notoriety gained from the criminal act.'8 Examples of recent cases
raising the issue of profiteering from crime include the cases of Snoop Doggy
Dogg (a.k.a. Calvin Broadus) and O.J. Simpson."
15. Id. § 2225(0(2) (amended by Chapter 262); see id. § 2225(g) (amended by Chapter 262)
(establishing that any violation of an order of court will be punishable by contempt); id. § 2225(h) (amended
by Chapter 262) (specifying that the remedies provided in California Civil Code § 2225 are in addition to those
provided by law); see also id. § 2225 (amended by Chapter 262) (noting that no period of limitations, except
those provided by California Civil Code § 2225, will limit the right of recovery under California Civil Code
§ 2225).
16. Id. § 2225(f) (amended by Chapter 262).
17. Id. § 2225(a)(9), (10) (amended by Chapter 262).
18. SENATE JUDIcIARY COMMrTEE, CoMMrrEr ANALYsTs OF SB 287, at 2-3 (Mar. 21, 1995); Id.
(explaining that although Senator Calderon, the author of SB 287, was under the impression that the statute
already allowed preliminary injunctions to be granted before conviction, the Attorney General disagreed, based
on the repeated use of the term "convicted felon" throughout the statute, and the Attorney General refused to
seek pre-conviction injunctive relief unless the law was clarified).
19. ASSEMBLYJUDICIARYCOMMrTEE, COMMrITEEANALYSISOFSB 287, at 4 (June 21, 1995); Larry
King Live: Cashing In On High-Profile Cases (CNN television broadcast, Aug. 4, 1994) (transcript #1191 on
file with the Pacific Law Journal) (discussing how persons, such as OJ. Simpson, who are involved in high-
profile cases, gain profit and media attention); Jack Cheever et al., Violence Tops the Charts, L.A. TiMEs, Apr.
3, 1995, at Al (discussing the background of Snoop Doggy Dogg and noting that the negative publicity
surrounding his arrest for murder did not hurt his sales); David Grogan, Cashing In; Crime and Scandal May
Not Payfor the People Involved, But There Are Fortunes to Be Made on the Sidelines, PEOPLE, Aug. 8, 1994,
at 26 (discussing the lucrative deals that O.J. Simpson, Jefferey Dahmer and John Wayne Gacy received for
their notoriety gained from either being charged with or convicted of heinous crimes); Gregory Jaynes, Getting
a Word in Edgewise; To Bankroll His Defense, the Accused Expands the Lucrative O.J. Industry with a Self-
Justifying Book, Tiaw, Feb. 6, 1995, at 64 (discussing O.J. Simpson's $1 million book deal for his book
entitled, I Want To Tell You, in which OJ. Simpson stated that he would have "jumped in front of a bullet" for
his murdered ex-wife, Nicole Brown Simpson); David Klinghoffer, See No Evil, Failure of Media to Deal with
Crime and Violence Committed by Rap Singers, NAT. REV., Jan. 24, 1994, at 73 (noting the adverse incentives
created when criminals profit by publicizing their crimes); Shannon D. Montgomery, Teen 2 Teen: Crook
Baoks; Whenever a Heinous Crime Hits the Headlines, the Profiteers of Publicity Won't Be Far Behind, NEWS
Tp.B., May 28, 1994, at D3, (discussing how Amy Fisher, David Berkowitz (Son of Sam), Jefferey Dahmer,
the Menendez brothers, Charles Manson, Tonya Harding and Ted Bundy have been glorified and economically
enriched by their notoriety); Chris Morris, GN'R Cover of Manson Song Incites Uproar; "Son of Sam" Law
May Bar Convict's Royalties, Bni.BOARD, Dec. 11, 1993, at 5 (discussing the possibility of California's
Attorney General invoking the "Son of Sam" law to force the forfeiture of all profits made by Charles Manson
for one of his songs which was released on an album by Guns N' Roses); Lynn Rosellini, Selling a Piece of
Hinckley, U.S. NEws & WoRiL REP., Mar. 13, 1995, at 66 (discussing the news that John Hinckley, the man
who attempted to assassinate President Reagan, decided to "tell-all" and that his lawyer is hoping for a movie,
a made-for-television movie, or a book deal); CNN & Company With Mary Tillotson: Is Tonya Harding
Headingfor a Fal Perhaps Tripped up by Her Former Husband? (CNN television broadcast, Jan. 27, 1994)
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Chapter 262 serves as a mechanism to -temporarily freeze the transfer of
profits earned before a conviction.2 Without Chapter 262, a defendant could
feasibly remove these potentially enormous profits from the reach of the court.2'
Chapter 262 raises a multitude of constitutional issues.' The Sixth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution guarantees that, in all criminal pro-
ceedings, the accused has the right to the assistance of counsel for his defense.
In Caplin & Drysdale v. United Statesu and United States v. Monsanto,' the
United States Supreme Court upheld as constitutional a preliminary injunction
provision in the federal Comprehensive Forfeiture Act which is identical in
purpose and effect as the provision authorizing preliminary injunctions in Chapter
262.26 In Caplin & Drysdale, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel was not violated by an injunction issued, even though the injunction
prevented a defendant from transferring forfeitable assets to his attorney in order
to pay his legal fees.27 Chapter 262 should also be able to withstand an attack on
Sixth Amendment grounds because the injunction authorized by Chapter 262
would not prevent a defendant from paying an attorney with funds that are
unrelated to his commission of a crime.O Furthermore, Chapter 262 places less
of a burden on the right to counsel than the federal asset forfeiture law because
even if a preliminary injunction were to temporarily prevent a defendant from
transferring proceeds or profits to his attorney, ultimately, under Chapter 262, up
to 40% of all a defendant's proceeds or profits may be put out of reach of the
beneficiaries and used by the defendant to pay his legal obligations including his
(transcript #281 on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (noting that Tonya Harding might make more money
through her notoriety than from her ice skating).
20. CAL. Civ. CODE § 2225 (amended by Chapter 262); SENATE JUDICIARY COMMnTrEE, CoMM1rrE
ANALYSIS OF SB 287, at 3-4 (Mar. 21, 1995).
21. SENATE JUDIcIARY COMMTrFEE, COMMrrrEEANALYStSOFSB 287, at 3-4 (Mar. 21, 1995).
22. Id.at4-10.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.; see Caplin & Drysale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624
(1989) (explaining that "[t]he [Sixth] Amendment guarantees defendants in criminal cases the right to adequate
representation, but those who do not have the means to hire their own lawyers have no cognizable complaint
so long as they are adequately represented by an attorney appointed by the court").
24. 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
25. 491 U.S. 600 (1989); see id. at 616 (concluding that "if the Government may, post-trial, forbid the
use of forfeited assets to pay an attorney, then surely no constitutional violation occurs when, after probable
cause is adequately established, the Government obtains an order barring a defendant from frustrating that end
by dissipating his assets prior to trial").
26. Caplin, 491 U.S. at 631, Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 614.
27. Caplin, 491 U.S. at 625; see id. (stating that the statute that authorizes forfeiture to the government
of property acquired as a result of drug-law convictions, does not impermissibly burden a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel); id. at 626 (specifying that "[a] defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to spend
another person's money for services rendered by an attorney, even if those funds are the only way in which
that defendant will be able to retain the attorney of his choice").
28. SENATE JUDIcIARY COmmrEE, COrma= ANALYSiS OF SB 287, at 4 (Mar. 21, 1995); see CAL.
CIV. CODE § 2225(b) (amended by Chapter 262) (specifying that only proceeds or profits that are from the
preparation for the purpose of sale, the sale of the rights to, or the sale of materials that include or are based




Aside from the aforementioned right to counsel issue, there is an argument
that a defendant's Fifth Amendment right to a fair criminal trial would be affected
by the issuance of a pre-conviction injunction.30 However, the granting of the
injunction, pursuant to the provisions enacted by Chapter 262, would take place
in a separate civil proceeding, so as not to prejudice the defendant's innocence or
guilt.
31
Chapter 262 also raises Fifth Amendment due process concerns regarding
punishment without adjudication of guilt.3 2 The Fifth Amendment specifies that
punishing persons before they are found guilty violates due process. 33 However,
in Bell v. Wolfsh, 4 the United States Supreme Court held that subjecting pretrial
detainees to a number of restrictions, including body cavity searches after each
contact with an outside visitor, did not constitute punishment in violation of due
process.35 The restrictions in Bell were not found to violate due process because
the court found that the restrictions were not imposed for the purpose of punish-
ment, but instead were viewed as "an incident of some other legitimate govern-
ment purpose.' 36 Likewise, the purpose of Chapter 262 was to prevent a
defendant from placing assets, which might rightfully belong to the victims of the
crime, out of judicial reach.37 Since Chapter 262's injunctions serve a compelling
state interest, which is unrelated to a desire to punish the defendant, the
injunctions authorized by Chapter 262 would appear not to constitute pre-trial
punishment under Bell.
38
Chapter 262 also raises significant First Amendment concerns.39 One of the
reasons that the court in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State
29. SENAThJUDiciARYCoM TrEECoMMrTEEANALYsisOFSB287, at 5 (Mar. 21, 1995); see CAL.
CIV. CODE § 2225(d) (amended by Chapter 262) (specifying that the maximum the beneficiaries may recover
is 60% of the profits or proceeds).
30. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMrrr, COMMiTTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 287, at 5 (Mar. 21, 1995).
31. Id. (specifying that in the civil proceeding, the court would apply a balancing test, by weighing the
interests of the defendant against the interests of the potential beneficiaries of the trust funds); id. (clarifying
that the court would also take into consideration the possibility of any adverse effect on the defendant's right
to a fair trial); id. (stating that the court would also have the discretion to narrowly tailor the terms of the
injunction to protect the interests of the defendant).
32. Id. at 5-6.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
34. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
35. Bell, 441 U.S. at 560.
36. Id. at 561.; see id. (specifying that the determination as to whether or not the restrictions and
practices constituted punishment under the Constitution, was based on whether the restrictions and practices
were rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose and whether the restrictions and
practices appeared excessive in relation to the governmental purpose).
37. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMrEE, COMMnTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 287, at 6 (Mar. 21, 1995).
38. Id.; see id. at 4 (noting that the author of SB 287 expressed that "[i]f the court had to wait until after
the conviction before commencing proceedings... there would be a irremediable window during which the
wrongdoer could waste all of the proceeds and profits which would otherwise be available to the victims").
39. Id. at 7.
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Crime Victim's Bd'4 found the New York "Son of Sam" statute to be uncon-
stitutional was because the statute could apply to speech by a person not accused
or convicted of a crime.4 Similarly to New York's "Son of Sam" law, Chapter
262 expands California's statute to reach persons not convicted of crimes, thus
making California's statute more amenable to a constitutional challenge under the
Simon & Schuster analysis.4 2 However, unlike the New York "Son of Sam"
statute under which persons not accused or convicted could have their incomes
permanently taken from them, Chapter 262 only allows a temporary freezing of
assets until the person is convicted.!3
Opponents contend that Chapter 262 also raises a concern about "prior
restraint."44 On the contrary, it is unclear whether an injunction under Chapter 262
would be a "prior restraint," because injunctions pursuant to Chapter 262 would
not prohibit a defendant from engaging in expressive behavior, or from being paid
for expressive behavior.45 The preliminary injunction only prohibits the defen-
dant's use of the payments received from expressive activity for a limited time.'
For all of the above mentioned reasons, the survival of Chapter 262 against
40. 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
41. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 121; see id. (stating that one of the flaws in New York's "Son of
Sam" law was that it was overinclusive; it enabled the New York Crime Victims Board to, "escrow the income
of any author who admits in his work to having committed a crime, whether or not the author was actually
accused or convicted"); id. (specifying that "[h]ad [New York's] Son of Sam law been in effect at the time and
place of publication, it would have escrowed payment for such works as The Autobiography of Malcom X,
which describes crimes committed by the civil rights leader before he became a public figure; Civil
Disobedience, in which [Henry David] Thoreau acknowledges his refusal to pay taxes and recalls his
experience in jail; and even the Confessions of Saint Augustine, in which the author laments 'my past foulness
an the carnal corruptions of my soul,' one instance of which involved the theft of pears from a neighboring
vineyard"); id. at 122 (noting that other people who would have been subjected to New York's "Son of Sam"
law would have included, "Sir Walter Raleigh, who was convicted of treason after a dubiously conducted 1603
trial; Jesse Jackson, who was arrested in 1963 for trespass and resisting arrest after attempting to be served at
a lunch counter in North Carolina; and Bertrand Russell, who was jailed for seven days at the age of 89 for
participating in a sit-down protest against nuclear weapons").
42. SENATE JUDICIARY CoMMrrrEE, COMMITEE ANALYSIS OF SB 287, at 8 (Mar. 21, 1995). See
generally, Mark Conrad, The Demise of New York's 'Son of Sam' Law-The Supreme Court Upholds Convicts'
Rights to Sell Their Stories, 64 N.Y. ST. BAR J. 28, 32 (MarJApr. 1992) (stating that in order to withstand
constitutional scrutiny, a revised "Son of Sam" law can not possibly include people who have merely been
accused of a crime because, "[i]f our criminal justice stands for anything, it is that one is innocent until proven
guilty"). The mention of one "accused of a crime requiring to turn over monies turns this notion on its head."
Id. See generally Zavack, supra note 1, at 719 (stating that one of the essential criteria of a constitutional "Son
of Sam" law is that it does not apply to those whom are accused, but limited to those who are actually
convicted).
43. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225(b) (amended by Chapter 262).
44. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMIrEE, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 287, at 8 (Mar. 21, 1995); see id.
(specifying that under Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, there is a possibility that a court could find that a
preliminary injunction, as it applies to speech-related activities, would violate the First Amendment); see also
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976) (affirming that "the guarantees of freedom of
expression are not an absolute prohibition under all circumstances, but the barriers to prior restraint remain high
and the presumption against its use continues intact").
45. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITrE, CoMMIrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 287, at 8 (Mar. 21, 1995).
46. Id.; see CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225(b) (amended by Chapter 262) (specifying that the involuntary trust
will continue until five years after the time of payment of the proceeds or profits to the felon, or five years after
the date of conviction).
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constitutional scrutiny is uncertain.47 Because of the expansive nature of Chapter
262, the addition of the pre-conviction preliminary injunction quite plausibly
increases the chance that California's "Son of Sam" statute could be found
unconstitutional.
Molly J. Mrowka
Criminal Procedure; presentence custody credits
Penal Code § 1237.1 (new); § 1237 (amended).
AB 354 (Rogan); 1995 STAT. Ch. 18
Existing law permits a defendant to appeal a final judgment of conviction.t
However, under existing law, a defendant who either entered a plea of guilty2 or
nolo contendere3 or had probation revoked following an admission of violation,
is permitted to appeal only if specified conditions are satisfied.4
Chapter 18 creates an additional exception to the general right to appeal 5
47. SENATEJUDIcARYCOMMTrrrEECOMMrrrEEANALYSISOFSB 287, at 8-9 (Mar. 21, 1995).
48. Id. at 8.
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1237(a) (amended by Chapter 18); see id. (granting a defendant the right to
appeal a sentence, an order granting probation, or a commitment on the basis of insanity or as a mentally
disordered sex offender or for controlled substance addiction); id. (providing that California Penal Code §§
1237.1 and 1237.5 are exceptions to California Penal Code § 1237); People v. Vargas, 13 Cal. App. 4th 1653,
1658-59, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 445,448 (1993) (noting that the right to appeal a criminal conviction lies in statutory,
not constitutional, law).
2. See BLACK'S LAW DICrONARY 708 (6th ed. 1990) (defining a "guilty plea" as a formal admission
in court, made voluntarily and with the requisite scienter of having committed the criminal act that is being
charged); see also CAL PENALCODE § 1016 (West 1985) (isting the plea of guilty as one of six possible pleas
to an indictment); People v. Robertson, 11 Cal. App. 4th 835, 840, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 572, 575 (1992) (holding
that prior to an acceptance of a plea of guilty, the defendant must be advised that such plea constitutes a waiver
of the right to trial, cross-examination, and the privilege against self-iiicrimination).
3. See BLACK'S LAw DicrIoNARY 1048 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "nolo contendere" by its Latin
meaning, "I will not contest if"); see also CAL PENAL CODE § 1016(3) (West 1985) (defining "nolo contendro"
as one of six available pleas to an indictment which has the same effect as a guilty plea in felony cases;
however, in non-felony cases, the plea may not be used in any civil suit derived from the criminal prosecution);
People v. Stewart 145 Cal. App. 3d 967, 975-76, 193 Cal. Rptr. 799, 803 (1983) (finding that an instruction
to the jury which defined "no contest" as the same as a guilty plea was precise and accurate).
4. CAL PENAL CODE § 1237.5 (West Supp. 1995); see id. § 1237.5(a) (West Supp. 1995) (mandating
that a defendant file a written report, under oath, showing reasonable grounds for appeal which concern the
legality of the proceedings); id. 1237.5(b) (West Supp. 1995) (requiring the trial court to issue and file with
the county clerk a certificate of probable cause for the appeal); see also Id. § 1203.3 (West Supp. 1995) (stating
that the court has the authority to revoke probation so long as enumerated notice and due process concerns are
addressed).
5. CAL PENAL CODE § 1237(a) (amended by Chapter 18); see id. (listing California Penal Code §§
1237.1 and 1237.5 as two exceptions to the general right to appeal a final judgement of conviction); id. §
1237.5 (West Supp. 1995) (granting a defendant who either pled guilty or nolo contendere or had probation
revoked to appeal a judgment of conviction only upon the following: (1) the defendant's filing a written
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Under Chapter 18, waiver of a defendant's right to appeal a conviction based
solely on the grounds of a calculation error in presentence custody credits, is
presumed unless the error was raised at the time of sentencing.6 Also, an appeal
based upon errors discovered after sentencing is waived unless the defendant first
makes a motion for correction of the trial record.7
A defendant is entitled, under existing law, to receive six days of credit for
each four days spent in custody while awaiting trial or sentencing.8
COMMENT
In People v. Fares,9 a California Court of Appeal expressed concern over the
use of the appellate process to correct errors in credit for presentence custody,
suggested that such issues would be appropriately addressed by correction in trial
courts, and noted that only upon a trial court's failure to correct the error was the
appellate process appropriate. 0
Subsequently, other California Courts of Appeal, relying on Fares, either
dismissed appeals or remanded to trial court, cases where the sole issue on appeal
statement, under oath, showing reasonable grounds for appeal; and, (2) the trial court's filing with the county
clerk a certificate of probable cause for such appeal).
6. Id. § 1237.1 (enacted by Chapter 18).
7. Id.
8. Id& § 4019(0 (West Supp. 1995); see Id. (declaring that it is the Legislature's intent to provide those
prisoners who receive work performance and good time credits with six days of credit for every four days spent
in actual custody); see also id. § 2900.5(a) (West Supp. 1995) (proViding that if a defendant serves time in a
jail, camp, work furlough facility, halfway house, rehabilitation facility, hospital, prison, juvenile detention
facility, similar residential institution, or home detention program, prior to sentencing, it is the court's duty to
calculate credit to be applied towards the sentence for days served in presentence custody); People v. Montalvo,
128 Cal. App. 3d 57, 62, 183 Cal. Rptr. 242, 244 (1982) (holding that it is the trial court's responsibility to
calculate credits for presentence confinement based upon information provided by the confining entity); In re
Gordon Banks, 88 Cal. App. 3d 864, 866, 152 Cal. Rptr. 111, 113 (1979) (declaring that under the principles
of equal protection and due process, credit must be given for confinement prior to sentencing). But cf IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-50-6-3 (West 1986 & Supp. 1994) (stating that persons assigned as Class I earn one day of
credit for each day imprisoned, persons designated as Class II earn one day of credit time for every two days
imprisoned and those assigned to Class I earn no credit time); id. § 35-50-6-4 (West 1986 & Supp. 1994)
(declaring that a person who is either imprisoned or who is awaiting trial is initially considered Class I, but may
be reassigned Class II or 1m upon violation of either department of correction or penal facility rules); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 99-19-23 (1994) (establishing that a defendant is entitled to credit for time spent in incarceration
prior to trial on a criminal charge or while awaiting appeal to any sentence issued); OR. REv. STAT. §
137.320(4) (1990) (stating that a defendant who is imprisoned prior to sentencing will receive credit for the
time served). See generally People v. Lathrop, 13 Cal. App. 4th 1401, 1404, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 830, 832 (1993)
(declaring that giving credit for time served in custody prior to sentencing serves to equalize time spent in
custody by defendants convicted of the same offense); Wade R. Habeeb, Annotation, Right to Credit for Time
Spent in Custody Prior to Trial or Sentence, 77 A.L.R. 3D 182 (1977 & Supp. 1995) (discussing the right to
credit for pretrial or presentence custody).
9. 16 Cal. App. 4th 954, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 314 (1993).
10. Fares, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 958.20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 316-17. See generally 3 B.E. WUrIN & NORMAN
L. Epsmq, CA.RNo A CRIMINAL LAW, Punishment for Crime § 1540 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1995) (discussing
Fares and its progeny).
Selected 1995 Legislation
Criminal Procedure
was the calculation of presentence credit.
Chapter 18 was enacted in response to judicial calling and codified recent
court holdings.12 Prohibiting an appeal by a defendant based solely on an error in
the calculation of presentence custody agreements, unless the defendant either
raised the issue at the time of sentencing or made a motion for correction of the
record in the trial court, will result in increased judicial economy by preventing




Penal Code § 2933 (amended).
SB 215 (Leonard); 1995 STAT. Ch. 557
Under existing law, the Department of Corrections' may reduce a prisoner's
11. See People v. Salazar, 29 Cal. App. 4th 1550, 1557, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 221,225 (1994) (remanding
to the trial court for determination of calculation of presentence custody); People v. Robinson, 25 Cal. App.
4th 1256, 1258, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 445,447 (1994) (recognizing that the inherent power to correct ministerial
issues lies with the trial court by dismissing a prisoner's appeal based solely on presentence custody credit);
People v. Scott, 17 Cal. App. 4th 1383, 1388, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46, 49 (1993) (declining to address the issue
of presentence custody credits as a basis of appeal as the issue is more appropriately addressed at the trial court
level, and remanding to the trial court for determination). But cf People v. Guillen, 25 Cal. App. 4th 756, 764,
31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 653, 658 (1994) (distinguishing Fares by finding that where the error is merely mathematical,
it is far more economical to resolve it at the appellate level; this is particularly true where credit for presentence
credit is one of many issues on appeal); People v. Heard, 18 Cal. App. 4th 1025, 1031, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 684,
687 (1993) (modifying the level of presentence credit at the appellate level); People v. Little, 19 Cal. App. 4th
449, 452, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 394, 395-96 (1993) (correcting an error in presentence custody credit while noting
concern with the rising use of the appellate process to resolve appeals based solely on miscalculation of
presentence custody credits); SENATE COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB
354, at 3 (May 16, 1995) (stating that courts have been reluctant to dismiss appeals based solely on miscal-
culation of presentence credit). See generally ASSEMBLY COMM[TTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMITrTEE
ANALYSIS OF AB 354, at 1 (Apr. 25, 1995) (recognizing that California appellate court decisions reflect the
confusion regarding presentence custody credits).
12. ASSEmBLYCOMMrrEoENPUBLICSAETY, COMMrrIEEANALYSS iOF AB 354, at 1 (Apr. 25,1995).
13. SENATECOMMITTEEONCRIMINALPROCEDURE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OFAB 354, at 2 (May 16,
1995); see id. (declaring the purpose of AB 354 to be twofold: (1) to codify developing case law, and (2) to
grant judges additional leeway in finding prisoner's claims frivolous); see also ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON
PUBLBC SAFETY, COMMrrFEEANALYSTS oFAB 354, at 2 (Apr. 25, 1995) (listing a reduction in frivolous suits
by inmates as a potential effect of AB 354).
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 5001 (West Supp. 1995) (stating that the Director of Corrections and the
Prison Industry Authority comprise the Department of Corrections); see also id. § 5000 (West Supp. 1995)
(providing that the Department of Corrections is included within the Youth and Adult Correctional Agency);
id. § 5002 (West Supp. 1995) (setting forth the powers and duties of the Department of Corrections).
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term of imprisonment by awarding goodtime allowances, 2 as well as work-time
credits3 for a prisoner's performance in work, training, or educational programs
created by the Director' of Corrections Existing law also sets forth the pro
2. See BLAcK's LAw DicrioNARY 694 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "goodtime allowance" as credit
awarded for a prisoner's good conduct which reduces the period of time that the prisoner must serve in prison,
though it does not reduce the length of the prisoner's sentence).
3. See CAL PENAL CODE § 2933(b) (amended by Chapter 557) (declaring that work-time credit is a
not a right, but a privilege).
4. See id. § 5050 (West 1982) (creating the office of Director of Corrections); id. § 5051 (West Supp.
1995) (declaring that the Director of Corrections must be appointed by the Governor with the Senate's
consent); id. § 5051.2 (West 1982) (requiring the Director of Corrections to have substantial experience in
administrating adult and youth correctional programs); id. § 5053 (West 1982) (stating that the Director of
Corrections will be the chief administrative officer of the Department); id. § 5054 (West 1982) (holding the
Director of Corrections responsible for the supervision, management, control, and treatment of the state
prisons, as well as the persons incarcerated within them); Ua. §§ 5055-5070 (West 1982 & Supp. 1995) (setting
forth the powers and duties of the Director of Corrections).
5. Id. § 2931(a) (West Supp. 1995); id. § 2933(a) (amended by Chapter 557); see id. § 1170.12(a)(5)
(West Supp. 1995) (providing that an inmate who has been convicted of one or more prior felonies, may not
be awarded credits which exceed 20% of the inmate's total sentence); id. § 2900.1 (West 1982) (requiring that
the time a prisoner has served for a judgment which is subsequently ruled invalid, be credited to any sentence
later imposed for the same criminal act(s)); id. § 2900.5(a) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that the time a
prisoner serves in custody prior to the imposition of his or her sentence, shall be credited to that sentence); id.
§ 2930(a) (West Supp. 1995) (requiring the Department of Corrections to inform every inmate about the
availability of credit within 14 days of that inmate entering a state prison); id. § 2931(b) (West Supp. 1995)
(permitting good-behavior credits to reduce an inmate's sentence by four months for every eight months served
in prison, or at the same rate for any lesser period of time); id. (requiring that three of the eight months served
by the prisoner must be served without any act for which the inmate could be charged with a felony or a
misdemeanor in a court of law); id. § 293 1(c) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that one month of a four-month
reduction must be based purely on the inmate's participation in work, educational, vocational, or other prison
activities); id. § 2933(a) (amended by Chapter 557) (permitting a prisoner to receive work-time credits for
performance in work assignments or educational programs); id. (allowing an inmate to receive a six-month
reduction in his or her sentence for every six-months of full-time participation in a credit qualifying program);
id. § 2933.1(a) (West Supp. 1995) (preventing any inmate convicted of a violent felony from accruing work-
time credit in excess of 15% of that inmate's total sentence); id. § 2933.5(a), (b) (West Supp. 1995) (listing
various offenses which will preclude a person convicted of one of these infractions from receiving credit); id.
§ 2933.6(a) (West Supp. 1995) (declaring that any inmate confined to a Security Housing Unit or an
Administration Segregation Unit for misconduct is ineligible to receive any credit during the period the inmate
is confined in these units); id. § 2934 (West Supp. 1995) (allowing an inmate to waive the right to receive
credits for good-behavior while retaining the right to acquire work-time credits); id. § 2935 (West Supp. 1995)
(authorizing the Director of Corrections to grant up to an additional 12 months of credit time to any inmate who
performs a heroic act or provides exceptional assistance in maintaining the security of the prison); id. § 4019(d)
(West Supp. 1995) (providing that an inmate's sentence may be reduced one day for every six days served in
a city or county jail, industrial farm, or a road camp for the satisfactory performance of labor); see also In re
Dayan, 231 Cal. App. 3d 184, 187, 282 Cal. Rptr. 269, 271 (1991) (finding that prisoners who receive a
determinate sentence are eligible for conduct credits); In re Carter, 199 Cal. App. 3d 271,276, 244 Cal. Rptr.
648, 651 (1988) (holding that petitioner was entitled to receive work-time credits for a work program he was
assigned to, but was prevented from participating for four weeks because of delays on the part of the prison's
authorities); In re Jackson, 182 Cal. App. 3d 439, 443, 227 Cal. Rptr. 303, 306 (1986) (ruling that the petitioner
was entitled to receive good-time credit to reduce his sentence even though he had only been sentenced to a
10-day jail term to be served on weekends); People v. Cruz, 165 Cal. App. 3d 648, 652,211 Cal. Rptr. 512,
514 (1985) (stating that a mentally disordered sex offender was entitled to good-time credits for the period of
time the petitioner spent in a hospital facility); People v. Valladares, 162 Cal. App. 3d 312, 321,208 Cal. Rptr.
604, 609 (1985) (holding that the statutory provisions allowing inmates in the state prisons to earn six months
of credit for six months of work did not violate the equal protection rights of those detainees who were
ineligible to participate in these work programs); People v. Caruso, 161 Cal. App. 3d 13, 19, 207 Cal. Rptr.
221,226 (1984) (declaring that work-time credits are employed as a means of rehabilitating prisoners); People
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cedures under which a prisoner may forfeit work-time credits or have forfeited
credits restored.6
v. Salvidar, 154 Cal. App. 3d 111, 115,201 Cal. Rptr. 60,62(1984) (ruling that ajuvenile sent to a state prison
following an unsuccessful commitment to the Youth Authority is not entitled to good-time credits; but a
juvenile sent to a state prison following a 90-day diagnostic evaluation at the Youth Authority was entitled to
credit); 70 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 49 (1987) (concluding that prisoners who are serving life terms are not eligible
to receive work-time credits which are available under California Penal Code § 2933); cf. ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 41-1604.07(A) (Supp. 1994) (allowing an inmate to earn one day of release credit for every six days
served); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 900.33(2) (West Supp. 1995) (permitting an inmate to receive more credit
days per month the longer the inmate is incarcerated); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-30-105(1) (1993) (setting forth
the monthly good-time credits which may be awarded to the various classifications of prisoners); N.Y.
CORR. r. LAW § 230(4) (MKinney 1987) (preventing an inmate from accumulating more than two months
of credit for each year of the inmate's maximum sentence, or from accumulating enough credit to reduce the
time actually served by the inmate to a period less than the imposed minimum sentence). See generally James
B. Jacobs, Sentencing by Prison Personnel: Good Time, 30 UCLA L. REV. 217 (1982) (examining whether
the policy of awarding inmates good-time credits is necessary); Victor S. Sze, Comment, A Tale of Three
Strikes: Slogan Triumphs Over Substance as Our Bumper-Sticker Mentality Comes Home to Roost, 28 LoY.
L.A. L. REV. 1047, 1090-91 (1995) (examining whether California's Three-Strike law violates a prisoner's
rights guaranteed by the California Constitution by denying them the opportunity to acquire good-time credits);
Daniel M. Weintraub, Wilson Approves Limits on Inmates Earning Early Release, L.A. TwIEs, Sept. 22, 1994,
at A18 (discussing how California Governor Pete Wilson signed legislation prohibiting inmates convicted of
a violent felony from reducing their sentence by more than 15% through good-behavior credits).
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2932(a) (West Supp. 1995); id. § 2933(c) (amended by Chapter 557); see id.
§ 2932(a)(1) (West Supp. 1995) (listing violent activities which will result in an inmate forfeiting up to one
year of credit); id. § 2932(aX2) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that any misconduct punishable as a felony, other
than those acts listed in California Penal Code § 2932(a)(1), may result in up to 180 days of credit being
forfeited by the inmate regardless of whether the inmate is prosecuted for the infraction); id. § 2932(aX3) (West
Supp. 1995) (specifying that a prisoner may forfeit up to 90 days of credit for any act which is punishable a,
a misdemeanor); id. § 2932(a)(4) (West Supp. 1995) (stating that a prisoner may forfeit up to 30 days of credit
for any serious disciplinary infraction); id. (permitting an inmate to be denied a credit qualifying assignment
for up to six months if the Director finds that the inmate poses a dangerous risk to staff or other inmates); Id
§ 2932(c)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1995) (requiring the Department of Corrections to provide an inmate with a
written notice within 15 days of discovering information of an act by the inmate which can result in the
forfeiture of all or any of the inmate's credits); id. (providing that a hearing concerning the prisoner's loss of
credit must occur within 30 days of the written notice); id. § 2932(c)(l)(B) (West Supp. 1995) (listing factor,
which will allow the Department of Corrections to delay the written notice to the inmate beyond the 15-day
period); id. § 2932(e) (West Supp. 1995) (requiring every prisoner to be notified as to how much credit the
inmate may earn as well as the inmate's expected time-credit release date); id. § 2933(c) (amended by Chapter
557) (requiring a period of up to one year to pass, during which the prisoner does not commit an additional
infraction, before forfeited credits may be restored); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3043.2(c) (1995) (providing
that an inmate shall not be denied or have to forfeit any work credit for failure to participate in a work program
because of certain circumstances beyond the inmate's control); see also People v. Johnson, 120 Cal. App. 3d
808, 815, 175 Cal. Rptr. 59, 63 (1981) (declaring that the sheriff or the prosecution bore the burden of proving
that a defendant, who had escaped, was not entitled to work-time credits in determining his sentence); cf. AREI.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1604.07(C) (Supp. 1994) (stating that a prisoner will forfeit any or all of his or her
earned release credits for violating a prison rule or showing a continuous unwillingness to participate in work,
educational, treatment, or training programs); id. § 41-1604.07(G) (Supp. 1994) (setting forth various activities
which will result in a prisoner forfeiting five days of release credit); MicH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 800.33(6)
(West Supp. 1995) (providing that a prisoner will not be awarded any good time credits for any month during
which the prisoner has committed a major misconduct); Miss. CODE ANN. § 47-5-138(2) (1993) (declaring that
an inmate may forfeit all or a part of any earned time credits for committing a serious rules violation); id. § 47-
5-139(3) (1993) (allowing an inmate's credits, which have been forfeited a result of an escape by the inmate,
to be restored if the inmate voluntarily, and without expense to the state, returns to the institution without
having committed a felonious crime while a fugitive); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-30-105(2) (1993) (stating that
a prisoner who escapes or attempts to escape, may forfeit all or a part of good-time credits that the prisoner has
accumulated); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-189(A) (Michie Supp. 1994) (providing that an inmate may forfeit all
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In addition, existing law states that under certain circumstances, the Depart-
ment of Corrections may not restore forfeited work-time credits beyond a
specified amount, and is prevented from restoring work-time credits which have
been forfeited as a result of a serious disciplinary infraction by the prisoner where
the victim dies or is permanently disabled?
Chapter 557 provides that where work-time credits have been forfeited for a
serious disciplinary infraction punishable by the forfeiture of more than ninety
days of credit, the Director of Corrections may restore the forfeited credits at his
or her discretion.
COMMENT
The policy of reducing prison sentences by awarding good-behavior or work-
time credits serves two goals: First, it encourages prisoners to behave in a
cooperative fashion in return for a reduced sentence, and second, by allowing for
the early release of inmates, the problems of prison overcrowding are
significantly reduced
However, proponents of Chapter 557 were concerned that prisoners, knowing
that any credits forfeited could be easily restored under the prior law, would have
or a part of his or her accumulated good conduct credits as a result of violating any written prison rule or
regulation).
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2933(c) (amended by Chapter 557); see id. (providing that the Department of
Corrections is prevented from restoring up to 180 forfeited credit days of an inmate who had committed an act
which could be prosecuted as a felony); id. (preventing the Department of Corrections from restoring up to 90
days of credit forfeited by an inmate for conspiring or attempting to commit acts which could be prosecuted
as felonies).
8. Id. § 2933(c) (amended by Chapter 557); cf. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-1604.07(C) (Supp. 1994)
(permitting the Director of Corrections, at his or her discretion, to restore any release credits which have been
forfeited by an inmate); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 800.33(10) (West Supp. 1995) (authorizing a warden to
restore any credits which have been forfeited by a prisoner as a reward for the inmate's subsequent good
conduct); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-189(C) (Michie Supp. 1994) (providing that only the Director of Corrections
is authorized to restore any good conduct credits which have been forfeited by an inmate).
9. SENATE COMMITTEE ON CRIMIAL PROCEDURE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 215, at 3 (Apr. 4,
1995); see ASSEBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 215, at 2 (July 11, 1995)
(noting that correctional officers have traditionally felt that a credit mechanism is imperative for maintaining
order within the prison system as well as keeping the prison population at a manageable level). See generally
Andy Furillo, Plan to Pack Prisons Raises Fears of Riots, Wilson May Add 20,244 to Cramped Facilities,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 20, 1995, at Al (quoting a Department of Corrections official as estimating that
California's prison system was operating at 180% of capacity); Peter Hecht, Nonviolent '3rd Strike'Adds Heat
to the Debate: 25-to-Life Too Harsh, Initiative Critics Say, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 26, 1994, at Al
(predicting that the California prison population, 126,000 in 1994, will increase to 232,000 by the year 2000).
But see ASSEMBLY COMMrrrEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMrrEE ANALYsIS OF SB 215, at 2 (July 11, 1995)
(observing that there is a large group of citizens who believe that good-behavior/work credit is a fraud
perpetrated on the public since prisoners rarely serve their sentences in full thanks to early release through the
credit program); SENATE COMMrrrEE ON CRIMrNAL PROCEDURE, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 215, at 3 (Apr.
4, 1995) (stating that supporters of SB 215 believe that the credit mechanism loses its effectiveness in
maintaining order if forfeited credits are easily restored); Jacobs, supra note 5, at 258-59 (arguing that
alternative methods, such as segregating prisoners who have violated rules, are more effective in controlling
prisoner discipline than awarding good-time credits).
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less incentive to obey prison regulations since they could still be awarded an early
release despite disciplinary infractions."t
Chapter 557 is intended to ensure that the forfeiture of any good-behavior or
work-time credit will deter prisoner misconduct within the prison system by
making the restoration of forfeited credits discretionary rather than automatic."
A. James Kachmar
Criminal Procedure; prisoners-notice of release
Penal Code § 3058.7 (new).
SB 561 (Mountjoy); 1995 STAT. Ch. 936
Existing law requires the Board of Prison Terms' or the Department of
Corrections to provide written notice of the release of a prisoner convicted of aviolent felony3 to the sheriff or the chief of police having jurisdiction over the
10. ASSEmBLYFLOOR, COMmrIrrEEANALYsIs OFSB 215, at 2 (July 31, 1995); see SENATE CoMMIrTEE
ONAPPROPRiATIONS,CoMrEEANALYSISOFSB 215, at 1 (May 25, 1995) (reporting that in 1994, inmates
forfeited about 2.6 million days of credit, of which 1.3 million were subsequently restored); SENATE
CoMMTrrE ON APPROPRiATIONS, CoMMrrnEE ANALYSIS oFSB 215, at 2 (May 8, 1995) (noting that inmates
in 1994, lost 962,804 days of credit as a result of felony offenses of which 278,494 days were reinstated);
SENATE COMMITITEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 215, at 2 (Apr. 4, 1995)
(observing that infractions for which prisoners were disciplined included attempted murder, arson, attempted
escape, and extortion).
11. SENATE RuLEs CoMmrrrm, COr ffrmrm ANALYSIS oFSB 215, at 2 (June 1, 1995). But see SENATE
ComMITE oN APPROPRiAIONS, COMMrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 215, at 2 (May 1, 1995) (estimating that the
278,494 credit days restored in 1994 for felony offenses, saved the state about $16 million); SENATE
COMMITTEE ON CRINMINAL PROCEDURE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 215, at 3 (Apr. 4, 1995) (observing that
opponents of SB 215 were concerned that precluding restoration of credits would result in greater disciplinary
problems and exacerbate prison overcrowding by delaying prisoner releases); id. at 4 (predicting that by
reducing the amount of credits granted, a fiscal burden will be imposed on California which the state is in no
position to endure); id. (arguing that the correctional policy pursued by SB 215 is counterproductive since
reducing the amount of credits granted will increase prison terms, already lengthier than those of comparable
jurisdictions, which will not justify the increased financial obligations); see also Mary L. Vellinga, Guards Hit
Jackpot with Overtime Pay: Many Nearly Double Their Incomes by Gaining Hours, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr.
23, 1995, at A15 (reporting that the state's annual prison budget has increased 1141% from $300 million in
1980 to a projected $3.7 billion in 1995-6). See generally Jacobs, supra note 5, at 270 (stating that although
the policy of awarding good-time credits should be abolished, it is important to limit the types of violations
for which credits may be forfeited as well as the amount of credits which may be forfeited if the system is to
be retained and be effective).
1. See CAL PENAL CODE § 5075 (West Supp. 1995) (defining the composition of the Board to include
nine conuissioners); see also id. § 5077 (West Supp. 1995) (describing the duties of the Board of Prison
Terms as setting parole length and conditions and reviewing a request for reconsideration of good-time credit).
2. See id. § 5000 (West 1982 & Supp. 1995) (creating the Department of Corrections).
3. See id. § 667.5(c) (West Supp. 1994) (defining "violent felonies" as including, but not limited to,
murder, any felony which inflicts great bodily harm, kidnaping, rape, and other sex offenses).
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community in which the felon is scheduled to be released Existing law also
requires the Board of Prison Terms and the Department of Corrections to notify
each witness5 and victim,6 or next of kin, who has requested a notice of the
felon's pending release!
Chapter 936 authorizes the sheriff or chief of police to notify any person
deemed appropriate by the sheriff or chief of police of the release of a violent
felon.8 Chapter 936 further provides that the law enforcement official providing
notification, and the public agency or entity employing the law enforcement
official, will not be liable for providing or failing to provide such notice?
COMMENT
The purpose of Chapter 936 is to provide the sheriff or the chief of police
4. Id. § 3058.6 (West Supp. 1995); see id. (requiring notification of a felon's release to the District
Attorney having jurisdiction over the community in which the inmate is scheduled to be released).
5. See id. § 1878 (West 1983) (defining "witness" as a person whose testimony is received as
evidence); see also iL § 136(2) (West 1988) (describing a witness as a person possessing information regarding
a crime, whose testimony under oath is received as evidence, who reported the crime, or who has been
subpoenaed by the court).
6. See i. § 136(1) (West 1988) (defining "victim" as a person with respect to whom a crime has been
perpetrated or attempted to be perpetrated).
7. Id. § 3058.8 (West Supp. 1995); see id. (requiring that notification to the witness, victim(s), or the
victim's next of kin be provided pursuant to California Penal Code § 679.03); see also id. § 679.03 (West
Supp. 1995) (requiring the county district attorney, probation department, and the victim witness coordinator
to confer and establish a policy on which agency will inform a witness, victim, or victim's next of kin of the
right to obtain information regarding the violent felon's release).
8. Id. § 3058.7(a) (enacted by Chapter 936); cf. id. § 646.9(k)(1) (West Supp. 1995) (requiring the
Department of Corrections, county sheriff, or director of the local department of correction to provide notice
of a stalker's pending release to a victim or witness). See generally Mark E. Bellamy, Review of Selected 1994
California Legislation, 26 PAC. L.J., 202, 248 (1995) (discussing the requirements for the Department of
Corrections or county sheriff to notify victims, family members of such victim, or a witness to the crime);
Pamela Keeler & Mark Myers, Child Protection Act of 1994: Child Molester Identification Line, VicTiMs
NEWS & VIEws (1995) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (discussing public notification of a released
sex offender under New Jersey law, and the 900 number to which the public can call to determine if a person
is a registered sex offender in California).
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3058.7(b) (enacted by Chapter 936); see CAL. GOV'T CODE § 820.4 (West
1980) (immunizing a public employee from liability arising from acts or omissions in the exercise or
enforcement of any law, except for false arrest or imprisonment); id. § 845 (West Supp. 1995) (providing that
a public entity or employee is not liable for failing to provide sufficient protective service); see also Thompson
v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741,756-57, 614 P.2d 728, 737, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70, 79 (1980) (holding that
a county agency releasing an individual that threatened to kill a child in his neighborhood, but not indicating
a specific child, is not liable for failing to notify the neighborhood of releasing the individual). But see Wallace
v. City of Los Angeles, 12 Cal. App. 4th 1385, 1397, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 113, 121 (1993) (ruling that the police
department owed a duty to a witness of the danger that the defendant posed to the witness because of the peril
of the witness and because the police requested the witness' assistance; thus, the police were not immune from
liability to the witness); Carpenter v. City of Los Angeles, 230 Cal. App. 3d 923, 931, 281 Cal. Rptr. 500, 503
(1991) (finding that the city, through its police department, owes a duty to warn a witness that the defendant
has threatened the witness' life, and that the city did not enjoy any statutory immunity). See generally
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) (holding that the state is
not required to provide its citizens with an affirmative right to police protection); Raucci v. Town of Rotterdam,
902 F.2d 1050, 1056-58 (2d Cir. 1990) (concluding that the police department established a special relationship
with the victims and therefore owed them a duty of protection from their abuser).
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with authority to notify anyone deemed necessary of the pending release of a
violent felon.10 Thus, Chapter 936 provides the community the opportunity to be
notified of the pending release of a violent felon or sex offender." Therefore,
Chapter 936 attempts to achieve the goal of providing public safety.' 2 However,
there is concern that public notification will lead to vigilantism.
13
In addition, Chapter 936 raises concerns regarding its ability to withstand
constitutional scrutiny.' 4
Ex POST FACTO CLAUSE
First, Chapter 936 may be subject to legal challenges based on the prohibition
10. ASSEMBLYCOMMTrEEONPUBLICSAFEry,COMMIT'EEANALYSISOFSB 561,at2 (July 11, 1995);
see id, (noting that current law does not provide legal authority to notify elected officials or their communities
when violent felons are released into their communities on parole, even though murderers, child molesters,
rapists and others with violent tendencies are regularly released into unsuspecting neighborhoods); see also
CAL. PENAL CODE § 3058.8 (West Supp. 1995) (requiring the Board of Prison Terms to provide the shcriff and
the chief of police information with respect to the pending release of a violent felon in their community).
Existing law does not provide, however, express authority to the sheriff or the chief of police to notify victims,
witnesses, or others deemed appropriate of the pending release of the violent felon. Id.
11. SENATE CoMMrrrEE ON CR M NAL PROCEDURE, COMMrtE ANALYSIS ON SB 561, at 3 (Apr. 25,
1995); see id. (stating that the originally proposed bill, which required notification by the ,heriff or chief of
police to the local legislature, was in response to inconsistent notice to the community of a pending release of
a violent felon by the California Department of Corrections); ASSENMILY CoMMrrrTE ON PU3LIC SAFE'TY,
COMMrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 561, at 2 (July 1I, 1995) (noting that SB 561 allows a police chief to notify
schools and day care centers about child molesters being released into the community). See generally Michelle
P. Jerusalem, Note, A Framework for Post-Sentence Sex Offender Legislation: Perspective on Prevention,
Registration, and the Public's "Right" to Know, 48 VAND. L. REV. 219,231-32 (1995) (commenting that the
policy goal of criminal legislation is to prevent repeat offenses and to protect society from harm, and discussing
state statutes regarding these goals); Jenny A. Montana, Note, An Ineffective Weapon in the Fight Against Child
Sexual Abuse: New Jersey's Megan's Law, 3 J.L. & POL'Y 569, 569-74 (1995) (discussing public demand
leading to Washington's and New Jersey's law regarding public notification of the release of a sex offender
into a community in order to protect the general public from the released offender).
12. See Jerusalem, supra note 11, at 230 (stating that public notification statutes are not intended to be
scarlet letter provisions so as to punish by public humiliation, but to provide public protection); see also Julia
A. Houston, Note, Sex Offenders Registration Acts: An Added Dimension to the War on Crime, 28 GA. L. REV.
729, 745 (1994) (asserting that public notification provisions allow a community to be aware of a dangerous
offender's presence and adjust its activities accordingly). But see Montana, supra note 1I, at 574 (contending
that public notification of a convicted sex offender will not prevent offenders from reoffending); id. (claiming
that public notification of sex offenders only provides a false sense of security because most offenses are
committed by a family member or acquaintance).
13. Montana, supra note 11, at 575-78; see id. at 575-76 (noting that even the most level-headed of
citizens will have difficulty remaining calm when they discover that a convicted sex offender is living within
their neighborhood); see also Houston, supra note 12, at 745 (commenting that public notification provisions
create the possibility that communities will use social pressures to ostracize and exclude people who already
have served their time for their crimes).
14. SENATE Commrnr-EE ON CRNMNAL PROcEDURE. COMMrrrTE ANALYsIs OF SB 132, at 5-6 (Apr. 25,
1995); see id. (indicating that there could be claims of unconstitutionality regarding ex post facto and bill of
attainder); Jerusalem, supra note 11, at 241 (noting that arguments can be made that public notification statutes
are unconstitutional); Recent Legislation: Criminal Law-Sex Offender Statute Notification, 108 HARV. L. REV.
787, 791 (1995) (suggesting that several commentators raise constitutional objections to notification statutes
on behalf of convicted offenders). See generally Keeler & Myers, supra note 8 (discussing the constitutionality
of public notification and the use of a 900 number in California to identify registered sex offenders).
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against ex post facto laws.' 5 In Calder v. Bull,16 the United States Supreme Court
held that the ex post facto clause prohibited certain categories of law from being
applied.' 7 Under federal case law, the pertinent Calder-category for evaluation is
that category which prohibits laws that alter punishment for a certain offense by
inflicting greater punishment than was originally attached to the crime when it
was initially committed. 8
Once the legislative act is determined to fall within one of the categories
prohibited by the ex post facto clause, a determination needs to be made whether
the legislative aim was to punish that individual for past activities, or if the
restriction comes about as a relevant incident to a regulation of a present
situation.19 If there is uncertainty regarding whether a statute is punitive or
regulatory, a court must apply the factors set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez0 to determine if the statute violates the prohibitions of ex post facto
laws.2'
To date, there have only been a few challenges to public notification
statutes.2 In Artway v. Attorney Generalrs the district court held that the public
15. SENATE COMM rON CRIMINAL PROcDURE, COMM EE ANALYSIS OF SB 561, at 5-6 (Apr. 25,
1995); see id. (questioning whether public notification would be unconstitutional in its retroactive application);
see also U.S. CoNsT. art 1, § 9, cl. 3, § 10, cl. 1 (prohibiting the application of ex post facto laws); CAL. CONST.
art. 1, § 9 (mandating that ex post facto law will not be applied).
16. 3 U.S. 386 (1798).
17. Calder, 3 U.S. at 390; see id. (setting forth the categories of law prohibited by the ex post facto
clause as every law that: (1) makes action committed before the passing of the law, and which was innocent
when committed, criminal, and punishes such action; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it a greater crime than
it was when committed; (3) changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than attached to the
crime when committed; and (4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different testimony than
the law required at the time the offense was committed in order to convict the criminal); see also Collins v.
Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 46-52 (1990) (overruling cases subsequent to Calder that expanded the categories
of ex post facto laws, and reinstating the holding of Calder as the meaning of the ex post facto clause).
18. Artway v. Attorney General, 876 F. Supp. 666, 672 (D.NJ. 1995); see id. (declaring that this
category is the only category relevant for analysis in determining whether New Jersey's sex offender
registration and possible public notification provision violates the ex post facto clause); Houston, supra note
12, at 758 (asserting that this category of Calder is applicable to sex offender registration acts).
19. Artway. 876 F. Supp. at 672; see id. (quoting De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960), in
which the court held that if the legislation has a clear punitive purpose the court should apply the ex post facto
analysis); see also United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980) (holding that if the statute does not have
a clear punitive purpose, then the court must determine if the statute or its scheme is punitive by nature, even
though the legislature declared the legislation regulatory in purpose).
20. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
21. Houston, supra note 12, at 758-59; see Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 673 (holding that the court must
focus on the practical purpose and effect of the statute and reach an independent conclusion as to the statute's
true nature); see also Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69 (setting forth a non-exclusive list of factors for determining
if legislation is punitive or regulatory, including an assessment of whether the sanction (1) involves an
affirmative disability or restraint, (2) historically has been regarded as a punishment, (3) comes into play only
on a finding of scienter, (4) promotes the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence, (5) is
already a crime, (6) whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable, and
(7) appears excessive in relation to the alternative program); id. (noting that the factors are relevant, but that
they are not to be construed as a strict checklist).
22. Jerusalem, supra note 11, at 241 n.146; see id. (noting that only recently have Washington and
Louisiana heard challenges to public notification statutes).
23. 876 F. Supp. 666 (D.NJ. 1995).
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notification requirements under New Jersey law violated constitutional ex post
facto laws.' In State v. Babin,'z the Louisiana appellate court held that the statute
violated ex post facto provisions of both state and federal law. 2However, in State
v. IVard,27 the Washington Supreme Court held that the statute did not constitute
punishment and thus did not violate ex post facto laws.
Whether Chapter 936 withstands an ex post facto challenge rests on whether
it is deemed a punishment.29 In In re Reed,30 the California Supreme Court held
that requiring sex offender registration alone imposed a punishment.3' l Therefore,
there is an indication that Chapter 936 will be deemed a punishment and thus
would be unconstitutional.32 However, there is the possibility that the California
Supreme Court will follow Ward and determine that Chapter 936 furthers a
regulatory function rather than a punitive function?'
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
Chapter 936 may also be constitutionally violative if it is determined to be
cruel and unusual punishment.? In assessing whether a statute imposes a cruel
and unusual punishment, the court must first determine if the statute is cate-
24. Artway, 876 F. Supp. 692; see id. (finding that in application of the Kennedy factors to public
notification concerning the release of a sex offender, the act is an excessive intrusion into the realm of
punishment because its effect, if not its purpose, is punitive); id. (indicating that the Kennedy factors determine
that the statute being punitive outweighs the stated legislative intent of public protection and facilitating law
enforcement investigation of sex crimes).
25. 637 So. 2d 814 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
26. Rabin, 637 So. 2d at 824; see id. (holding that because the criminal acts occurred from January of
1989 through February 1992, and the statute was enacted August 21. 1992, the defendant could not be found
to have offended the special conditions).
27. 869 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1994).
28. Ward, 869 P.2d at 1072-74; see id. (indicating that appropriate dissemination of relevant and
necessary information does not constitute punishment for purposes of ex post facto analysis, and that public
stigma does not arise out of public notification concerning a conviction because any stigma that may exist
arises from private reactions to crime by members of the general public).
29. Houston, supra note 12, at 758; see De Veau, 363 U.S. at 160 (holding that the question in each ex
post facto analysis is whether the legislative aim was to punish the individual for prior conduct); Ward, 869
P.2d at 1068 (indicating that ex post facto prohibitions apply only to laws inflicting criminal punishment).
30. 33 Cal. 3d 914,663 P.2d 216, 191 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1983).
31. Reed, 33 Cal. 3d at 922,663 P.2d at 220, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 662.
32. See Houston, supra note 12, at 751 n.133 (suggesting that if registration alone constitutes
punishment, then registration combined with public notification is an even greater punishment); see also People
v. Adams, 581 N.E.2d 637, 641 (I11. 1991) (indicating that public notification provisions are more intrusive
than mere registration).
33. See Ward, 869 P.2d at 1072-74 (indicating that the appropriate dissemination of relevant and
necessary information does not constitute punishment for purposes of ex post facto analysis, and that public
stigma does not arise out of public notification concerning a conviction because any stigma that may exist
arises from private reactions to crime by members of the general public).
34. See Jerusalem, supra note 11, at 241-42 (asserting that cruel and unusual punishment arguments
against public notification statutes will be more effective than the arguments against registration statutes); see
also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (mandating that cruel and unusual punishment shall not be inflicted); CAL.
CONsT. art. 1, § 17 (declaring that no cruel and unusual punishment may be inflicted or excessive fine
imposed).
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gorized as punishment.35 Unlike, the determination of punishment or regulation
under ex post facto, courts have utilized various tests under the cruel and unusual
punishment analysis.36 Some courts utilized the Kennedy factors to determine if
the statute was a punishment.37 Other courts utilize the "punishment" test of Trop
v. Dulles 8 to determine if the law was penal.39
Once the court has determined the statute is a punishment, the court must
decide if the punishment is cruel and unusual.0 State courts relied on the pro-
portionality test of Solem v. Helm4 t to determine if a punishment was cruel and
unusual.42 However, in Harmelin v. Michigan, 43he Supreme Court voted to
overrule the proportionality test even though the Court lacked a majority opinion
in the application of a new test.L"
35. Houston, supra note 12, at 748; see Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 678 (indicating that the court must
focus on whether the registration act passed by the New Jersey Legislature may be deemed punishment).
36. Houston, supra note 12, at 748.
37. Id.; see Reed, 33 Cal. 3d at 920-22, 663 P.2d at 218-20, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 660-62 (applying the
Kennedy test, and concluding that the Sex Offender Registration Act imposed a punishment); see also
Jerusalem, supra note 11, at 243 n.154 (asserting that arguments can be made for public notification as was
made in In re Reed about sex offender registration laws being a punishment, and that notification appears to
be excessive in relation to its intended goal of public safety).
38. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
39. Houston, supra note 12, at 749-50; see People v. Adams, 555 N.E.2d 761, 764-65 (111. App. CL
1990), affd, 581 N.E.2d 607 (I1. 1991) (rejecting the Kennedy test in favor of the Trop test because the
punishment was invoked after an adjudication of guilt, and thus raises a cruel and unusual punishment issue
under Trop, rather than a due process issue under Kennedy); id. at 765 (holding that the purpose of the statute
was to aid law enforcement officials in protecting children from sex offenses, which made it regulatory rather
than penal, and would fundamentally outweigh any punitive effect). But see Jerusalem, supra note 11, at 242-
43 n.153 (noting the Trap court's assertion that the Eighth Amendment draws its meaning from an evolving
standard of decency that marks the progress of a maturing society, and commenting that the standard of
decency has changed so that public humiliation is considered decent). See generally Trop, 356 U.S. at 96
(holding that the court should look to the purpose behind the statute, and if the statute imposes a disability for
the purposes of punishment, it is penal, but if it imposes a disability for some other legitimate governmental
purpose, it is nonpenal); id. at 100 (stating that the concept underlying the prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment concerns nothing less than a person's dignity).
40. Houston, supra note 12, at 752.
41. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
42. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 290-92 (establishing a three-prong test to determine if the punishment is
proportional to the offense to include: (1) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (2) the
sentence imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (3) the sentences imposed for the same
commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions); see also Reed, 33 Cal. 3d at 923-26, 663 P.2d at 220-22,
119 Cal. Rptr. at 662-65 (applying a proportionality test similar to Solem and holding that a statute requiring
registration for lewd or dissolute conduct imposed cruel and unusual punishment); id. at 924-25, 663 P.2d at
220-21, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 662 (basing the California Supreme Court's decision on the fact that the misdemeanor
offender posed no danger to society-this type of action victimized no one in the criminal sense-and that
more serious sex-related misdemeanors did not require registration); Adams, 581 N.E.2d at 641 (holding that
registration statutes are constitutional under the three-prong test of Solem because the acts were not punishment
under cruel and unusual punishment, and even if a punishment, it would not be cruel and unusual); id.
(indicating that if registration was a public record, then the offender might bear a greater burden and possibly
cause a different result).
43. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
44. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 965 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion); see id. (holding that Solem was wrongly
decided because the Eighth Amendment does not guarantee proportionality); id. at 1001 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (finding that the Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime
sentences, but forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime). But see id. at
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As indicated above under ex post facto, the courts may determine that
Chapter 936 imposes a punishment.'45 The dilemma that occurs, though, is in
determining which cruel and unusual punishment analysis is appropriate. 6 Under
the Solem test, Chapter 936 could be found unconstitutional.47 Under the
Harmelin analysis, however, a finding of unconstitutionality is highly unlikely.48
Thus, the validity of Chapter 936 will most likely depend upon which test is
applied.
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Chapter 936 could further face a challenge invoking the constitutional right
to privacy.49 In Griswold v. Connecticut,50 the Supreme Court held that several
guarantees of the Bill of Rights protect privacy interests, creating a "penumbra"
or "zone" of privacy.51 The Supreme Court subsequently expanded this funda-
mental right to privacy in cases of abortion and contraceptives.2 In Whalen v.
1021, 1027-28 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Solem decision should be upheld because there is no
justification for overruling); d. at 1027 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Justice White, but maintaining
further that capital punishment should always be unconstitutional); id. at 1028 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(concurring with Justice White, but adding an additional comment because the sentence imposed here-life
in prison for the third offense of writing a fraudulent check-was too capricious).
45. See Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 692 (holding that the application of the Kennedy factors indicate that
the sex offender registration and public notification statute is punitive and that the factors outweigh the
Legislature's stated intent of being regulatory). But see Ward, 869 P.2d at 1072 (holding that the dissemination
of relevant and necessary information does not constitute punishment).
46. Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 678; see id. (indicating that what is clear from Harmelin is that clarity is
now lacking as to which application of Eighth Amendment scrutiny appropriately applies to this leg,,lation).
47. See Houston, supra note 12, at 755-56 (asserting that under the Adams rationale, a statute that
provides for public release of registration information would stigmatize the defendant and possibly make the
statute unconstitutional); see also Adams, 581 N.E.2d at 641 (finding that if the registration was public record,
then there would be a greater burden on the offender and a stigma attached, and possibly a different result
would occur).
48. See Houston, supra note 12, at 755-56 (asserting that a statute providing for public release of
registration information might be deemed as stigmatizing the defendant, but such a ruling is unlikely under the
Harmelin test, except for possibly under a capital punishment case); see also Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 999-1001
(holding that outside capital punishment cases, successful challenges to the proportionality of sentences are
exceedingly rare because courts should grant substantial deference to the authority of legislators to determine
punishments).
49. See Jerusalem, supra note 11, at 244 (indicating that a registration of sex offender statutes could
face a constitutional challenge with respect to the right to privacy).
50. 381 U.S. 479(1965).
51. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483-85; see i. at 484 (finding the constitutional guarantees to privacy under
the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments have a penumbra, formed by emanations of those
guarantees that help give them life and substance).
52. Jerusalem, supra note 11, at 244; see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (indicating the
areas of personal autonomy that deserve constitutional protection under the right to privacy as activities relating
to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 447-55 (1972) (holding that an unmarried couple can gain access to contraceptive devices
because it is the right of the individual to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusions into matters
fundamentally affective a person). See generally Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-56 (holding that right to privacy protects
a woman's decision whether to abort a fetus, and that privacy can only be impaired by the statutes that are
narrowly drawn and justified by a compelling state interest).
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Roe,53 the Supreme Court acknowledged that the right of privacy may include an
interest to avoid disclosure of personal matters and to independently make certain
kinds of important decisionsM
If a claim is made asserting that Chapter 936 denies a violent felon privacy
rights that other convicted felons enjoy, a broad reading of Paul v. Davis5 sug-
gests the claim would be unsuccessful. 6 In addition, Chapter 936 may withstand
a constitutional challenge regarding privacy because of the enormous state
interest in protecting the public, but there is a possibility that Chapter 936 is not
drawn narrowly enough to overcome the individual's right to privacy.
57
BILL OF ATITAINDER
Finally, Chapter 936 could constitute a bill of attainder.5" To determine if a
statute is punitive within the context of the bill of attainder doctrine, the Supreme
Court has set forth three relevant tests.59 However, the second, or functional test,
is the relevant test necessary to determine punitive effect regarding public
53. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
54. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598-600. But see id. at 598-604 (holding that a state interest in gathering data
on persons using prescription drugs outweighed the individual's privacy interest); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,
701-14 (1976) (holding that a person does not have a constitutional right of protecting one's reputation and
that the right of privacy does not prevent a state from publicizing a record of an official act like an arrest).
55. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
56. Houston, supra note 12, at 764. But see People v. Hove, 7 Cal. App. 4th 1003, 1006-07 n.7, 9 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 295, 297 n.7 (1992) (rejecting a privacy claim of a convicted drug possessor who was required to a
register with local police, but noting that registration was designed to minimize the intrusion into an
individual's privacy in that the information was not open to the public).
57. See Jerusalem, supra note 11, at 244-45 (asserting that the courts will probably accept public safety
as a compelling interest, but that it is less likely that the courts will find that the statute is drawn narrowly
enough to accomplish the goal of public safety because of the compelling argument that notification does not
add to public safety); see also National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 677 (1989)
(recognizing the state's compelling interest in public safety over privacy interests in administering drug tests
for certain government employees).
58. SENATE COMMITrEE ON CRMINAL PROCEDURE, COMMITTE ANALYSIS OF SB 561, at 6 (Apr. 25,
1995); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, § 10 (declaring that no bill of attainder shall be passed); CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 9 (prohibiting passage of a bill of attainder); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 165 (6th ed. 1990)
(defining "bill of attainder" as legislative acts that apply to an individual or an ascertainable group in such a
way as to inflict punishment without ajudicial trial). See generally Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 137-38 (1810)
(explaining that the bill of attainder and ex post facto clauses were enacted because the Framers of the
Constitution viewed with apprehension the violent acts which might grow out of the feelings of the moment,
and they, as a precautionary measure, enacted these clauses in order to protect themselves and their property
from the effect of those sudden and strong passions).
59. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425,475-78 (1977); see id. (setting forth the tests
for determining punitive effect under the bill of attainder analysis as: (1) the historical test concerning whether
the punishment was traditionally judged to be prohibited by the bill of attainder clause; (2) the functional test,
which analyzes whether the law under challenge, viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed,
reasonably can be said to further non-punitive legislative purposes; and (3) the motivational test, which
examines whether the legislature intended the statute to be punitive).
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notification statutes. 6° In New Jersey, a federal district court held that the Bill of
Attainder Clause does not invalidate the provisions regarding sex offender
registration and public notification.6'
Therefore, the constitutionality of Chapter 936 depends on the judicial deter-
mination of whether the statute is punitive under the Bill of Attainder Clause.62
As determined by Artway, the historical test is inapplicable because laws
traditionally banned by the test do not have any of the effects, potential or actual,
that public notification poses.63 However, the California courts will probably find
that the Legislature intended Chapter 936 to be punitive in effect. 4 Under the
motivational test, the California courts could follow Artway and find that Chapter
936 can reasonably further a non-punitive legislative purpose of furthering law
enforcement interests and protecting society.65 However, California may deter-
mine that public notification does not further the non-punitive purpose of societal
protection."
CONCLUSION
Chapter 936 may encounter constitutional challenges, but the burden is upon
the challenger to establish its unconstitutionality. 67 However, the constitutionality
of Chapter 936 is uncertain since there is no clear precedent from the United
States Supreme Court, the inconsistent holdings from other jurisdictions, and the
60. Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 684; see id. (stating that the court must look at the functional test in cases
of sex offender registration and public notification statutes because the historical test ha3 no application
traditionally and the third test will have already been litigated under the ex post facto and cruel and unusual
punishment challenges).
61. Id., see id. (recognizing that although the statute does appear detrimental to a specific group, sex
offender registrants, the Supreme Court, in Nixon, 433 U.S. at 469-72, held that some detrimental effect is
tolerable as long as the limited scope of a law is connected to and explained by the problem the Legislature
seeks to address); id. (finding the fact that the Legislature enacted the law in response to public outrage over
a brutal killing of a child is not fatal to the act because it is not aimed at one group and further law
enforcement's interest and the protection of society).
62. See In re McMullen, 989 F.2d 603, 617 (2nd Cir. 1993) (noting that the toughest determination is
whether the act is punitive rather than whether the act affects specific individuals or is conducted without a
judicial trial).
63. Artway, 869 F. Supp. at 684.
64. See Houston, supra note 12, at 751 n.133 (asserting that if the California Supreme Court found that
sex offender registration imposed a stigma on the defendant, then the registration combined with public
notification would certainly create a greater stigma).
65. See Artway, 869 F. Supp. at 684 (finding that the apparent purpose of the statute was to further law
enforcement interests and protect society through the reduction of recidivism by informed policing, heightened
public awareness, and vigilance, and thus the counterbalances of the Bill of Attainder Clause do not invalidate
the statute).
66. See Montana, supra note 11, at 574-75 (contending that public notification of a convicted sex
offender will not prevent offenders from reoffending); see also id. at 591-94 (claiming that public notification
of a sex offender will not prevent offenders from reoffending and only provides the public a false sense of
security because most offenses are committed by a family member or acquaintance).
67. See Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 685 (recognizing the broad powers of the legislature in protecting the
public, but indicating the Court must not lose sight of its function to protect the constitutional rights of the
minority or individual).
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lack of a clear indication of the proper application of Eighth Amendment scrutiny.
There is an indication that California will find Chapter 936 punitive under ex post
facto analysis. However, there is probably no cruel and usual punishment vio-
lation given the holding of Harmelin.8 In addition, there might not be a violation
of privacy since the state's interest in protecting the public and facilitating law
enforcement's interest will outweigh the individual's privacy interest, but there
might be concern regarding whether Chapter 936 is drawn narrowly enough.
Chad D. Bernard
Criminal Procedure; probation costs-determination of defendant's ability
to pay
Penal Code § 1203. 1b (amended).
AB 594 (Boland); 1995 STAT. Ch. 36
Under prior law, a probation officer' could only make a recommendation to
the court as to the defendant's ability to pay2 all or part of the costs3 of activities
such as probation4 supervision, conducting certain investigations and preparing
reports,5 and processing requests for interstate compact supervision, which the
68. Houston, supra note 12, at 755-56; see Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 999-1001 (holding that, other than
capital punishment cases, challenges to the proportionality of sentences will typically be unsuccessful because
courts should give substantial deference to legislators to determine punishments).
1. See CAL PENAL CODE § 830.5 (West Supp. 1995) (setting forth the powers and duties of probation
officers); it § 1203.5 (West Supp. 1995) (creating the offices of adult probation officer, assistant and deputy
probation officers); see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 131.4 (West 1982) (allowing the probation officer to
designate a deputy probation officer to perform his or her duties).
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.lb(e) (amended by Chapter 36) (defining "ability to pay" as the
defendant's overall capability of repaying the costs associated with the defendant's probation); id. §
1203.lb(e)(1)-(4) (amended by Chapter 36) (listing some factors the courts may consider in determining the
defendant's ability to pay, such as the present financial position of the defendant, his or her reasonably
discernible future financial position, the likelihood the defendant will be employed, and any other factors
bearing on the defendant's ability to pay).
3. See id. § 1203.lb(a) (amended by Chapter 36) (providing that the costs will entail the reasonable
costs of probation supervision not to exceed the average costs for these services).
4. See id. § 1203(a) (West Supp. 1995) (defining "probation" to mean the suspension of a defendant's
sentence and a conditional and revocable release); People v. Main, 152 Cal. App. 3d 686, 693, 199 Cal. Rptr.
683, 686 (1984) (stating that probation is a privilege and not a right). See generally Jon A. Brilliant, Note, The
Modem Day Scarlet Letter: A Critical Analysis of Modem Probation Conditions, 1989 DuKE L.J. 1357
(providing an overview of the utility and goals of probation).
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203(b)(1) (West Supp. 1995) (requiring the probation officer to make a
report to the court, before the sentencing of the defendant, concerning the circumstances surrounding the crime,
as well as the defendant's prior history and record); id. § 1203(b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1995) (mandating that
probation officers include a recommendation as to whether the defendant should be granted or denied probation
in the report); id. § 1203(b)(2)(C)(i), (ii) (West Supp. 1995) (requiring probation officers to recommend
whether a defendant should be ordered to pay restitution); id. § 1203(b)(2)(D) (West Supp. 1995) (providing
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court could accept if the defendant agreed with the reconunendation.6 Prior law
also provided that the defendant was entitled to a hearing before the court if the
defendant did not agree with the probation officer's recommendation!
Chapter 36 grants the probation officer8 the authority to make a determination
as to the defendant's ability to pay the costs associated with probation.9 Chapter
36 also requires the probation officer to inform the defendant that the defendant
may agree to a court hearing, which includes the right to counsel, 0 to determine
that the probation officer must make the report available to the prosecuting and defending attorneys at least
five days before the hearing); see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 131.5 (West 1982) (providing that the court
shall not sentence a defendant until a copy of the probation report has been given to the court); 24 Op. Cal.
Att'y Gen. 219, 221 (1954) (stating that the report concerning a defendant prepared by the probation officer
does not become part of the public record until it is filed with the court clerk).
6. 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 502, sec. 1, at 2191-92 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.1b(a)); see
CA. Crv. PROC. CODE § 131.3 (West 1982) (providing that a probation officer will conduct an inquiry into the
background of a defendant when so ordered by the court and must report the findings to the court); CAL PENAL
CODE §§ 11175-11177.2 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995) (authorizing the court to permit a defendant to serve the
conditions of the defendant's probation outside of the state); see also id. § 1203.lb(f) (amended by Chapter
36) (providing that the defendant may petition the court during the probationary period to modify or vacate the
court's determination as to the defendant's ability to pay); id. § 1203.lb(g) (amended by Chapter 36)
(allocating all sums paid by the defendant for the operating expenses of the county probation department);
People v. Phillips, 25 Cal. App. 4th 62, 70, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 321, 325 (1994) (concluding that although the
court may hold a separate hearing in order to determine the defendant's ability to pay the costs of probation,
a separate hearing is not required); People v. Montano, 6 Cal. App. 4th 118, 123, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 136, 139
(1992) (holding that a court cannot order a defendant to pay the costs of preparing probation reports where the
defendant is denied probation); People v. Adams, 224 Cal. App. 3d 705, 712, 274 Cal. Rptr. 94, 99 (1990)
(ruling that the court could not impose probation fees on a defendant until a hearing had been held to determine
the defendant's ability to pay); People v. Wilson, 130 Cal. App. 3d 264, 268, 181 Cal. Rptr. 658, 660(1982)
(holding that a court may make the determination as to the defendant's ability to pay only after probation has
been granted). See generally 22 CAL. Jut. 3D Criminal Law § 3448 (1985 & Supp. 1995) (providing an
overview of the process by which a court can order a defendant to pay for the costs of probation).
7. 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 502, sec. 1, at 2191-92 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.1b(b)); see
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.1b(b)(4) (amended by Chapter 36) (requiring the court to state on the record its
reasons for any determination of the defendant's ability to pay that differs from the probation officer's
determination).
8. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.lb(a) (amended by Chapter 36) (providing that the probation officer
may authorize a representative to make the determination as to the defendant's ability to pay).
9. Id.; see id. (authorizing the probation department to establish a payment schedule for the
reimbursement of preplea or presentence investigations); cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.09(7) (West Supp, 1995)
(authorizing the Department of Corrections to establish a payment schedule for parolees of all court-ordered
costs but requiring that any victim restitution payment take precedence over the other fees); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 439.315(6)(a), (b) (Baldwin 1994) (allowing the Department of Corrections to petition the releasing
authority to waive the parole supervision fee of any offender who is a student or has an employment disability);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1374(c) (Supp. 1994) (permitting a parole commission to exempt a parolee from
paying a monthly parole supervision fee if the commission determines that the fee would constitute a severe
economic burden to the parolee); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-80 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994) (requiring the
Department of Corrections to determine a parolee's ability to pay a parole supervision fee); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 40-28-201(a)(2) (1990) (requiring the Board of Paroles to make an investigation into a parolee's financial
circumstances).
10. See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 15 (granting defendants in a criminal trial the right to have the assistance
of counsel); CAL. PENAL CODE § 686(2) (West 1985) (entitling defendants in criminal actions to defend in
person and with counsel); see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,464 (1938) (concluding that in order for
a waiver of counsel to be effective, there must be "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege"); People v. Spencer, 153 Cal. App. 3d 931, 940,200 Cal. Rptr. 693, 698 (1984) (holding
that a defendant's waiver of the right to counsel must be made voluntarily and knowingly with a sufficient
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the defendant's ability to pay." In addition, Chapter 36 provides that the
defendant may waive the right to a determination by the court by a knowing and
intelligent waiver.
12
Under existing law, the defendant's reasonably discernible future financial
position is to be considered in determining the defendant's ability to pay. 3 Prior
law prohibited the court from considering a period of more than six months when
determining the defendant's future financial position.'4 Chapter 36 allows the
court to consider a period of up to one year from the date of the hearing for the
purpose of determining the defendant's future financial position.'5
Prior law also allowed a county's board of supervisors to charge a fee, 6
payable in installments, not to exceed thirty-five dollars for the processing of
installment payments to the probation department.' 7 Chapter 36 raises the maxi-
mum chargeable amount to fifty dollars.'8
awareness as to the probable consequences of the waiver); People v. Paradise, 108 Cal. App. 3d 364,369, 166
Cal. Rptr. 484, 487 (1980) (ruling that a defendant bears the burden of proving that a waiver of the right to
counsel was not made knowingly and voluntarily with an awareness of the risks involved).
11. CAL PENAL CODE § 1203.lb(a) (amended by Chapter 36); see id. § 1203.1b(b)(l) (amended by
Chapter 36) (stating that the defendant has the right to present and confront witnesses and evidence during the
hearing to determine the defendant's ability to pay); id. § 1203.lb(b)(3) (amended by Chapter 36) (requiring
the court to consider any fine or restitution imposed on the defendant in determining the defendant's ability
to pay); see also People v. Poindexter, 210 Cal. App. 3d 803, 810, 258 Cal. Rptr. 680, 684 (1989) (finding that
the trial court's failure to allow the defendant to call and confront witnesses at the hearing was an additional
ground for striking the order requiring the defendant to pay the costs of his probation reports and attorney fees);
People v. Ryan, 203 Cal. App. 3d 189, 198-99, 249 Cal. Rptr. 750, 756 (1988) (holding that the trial court did
not err in determining the defendant's ability to pay restitution as a probation condition without holding a
hearing since the defendant conceded that he had the ability to pay).
12. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.lb(a) (amended by Chapter 36); see id. § 1203.lb(b) (amended by
Chapter 36) (providing that the court will determine the defendant's repayment schedule if the defendant fails
to waive the right of having the court determine the defendant's ability to pay); see also People v. Vargas, 13
Cal. App. 4th 1653, 1662, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 445, 450 (1993) (finding that the determination as to whether a
waiver of a right is valid depends upon the circumstances surrounding a particular case, including the defen-
dant's background, experience, and conduct); People v. Longwith, 125 Cal. App. 3d 400, 413, 178 Cal. Rptr.
136, 143 (1981) (interpreting the intelligence requirement for a valid waiver to mean whether the defendant
was aware of the consequences of the waiver, not whether the waiver was intelligent in relation to an exper-
ienced attorney's trial tactic). See generally 5 B.E. WUN &NORMAN L. EpTEnmN, CALNiA CRImINALLAW,
Trial § 2803 (2d ed. 1989) (stating the general rule is that a waiver will be good if the defendant understands
the nature of the act).
13. CAL. PENALCODE § 1203.lb(e)(2) (amended by Chapter 36).
14. 1980 Cal. Stat ch. 555, sec. 1, at 1538, 1539 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.lb(b)(2)).
15. CAL PENAL CODE § 1203.lb(e)(2) (amended by Chapter 36); cf. id. § 987.8(g)(2) (West Supp.
1995) (preventing a court from considering a period of more than six months from the date of a hearing in
determining a defendant's ability to pay the full costs of legal assistance); i § 1209(b) (West 1982) (providing
that a court, in determining a defendant's ability to pay the costs for the administration of a work furlough
program, may not consider a period beyond six months from the date of the hearing); CAL. VEH. CODE §
42003(d)(2) (West Supp. 1995) (specifying that a court may only consider a six-month period from the date
of the hearing to determine a person's ability to pay traffic fines, restitution, and any probation costs).
16. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.1b(h) (amended by Chapter 36) (providing that the processing fee
cannot exceed the administrative and clerical costs associated with receiving the payments).
17. 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 158, sec. 19, at 1203-04 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203. lb(e)).
18. CAL. PENALCODE § 1203.lb(h) (amended by Chapter 36); c FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.09(lXa)(2)(o)
(West Supp. 1995) (requiring a person placed on misdemeanor probation to pay at least $40 a month to provide




Chapter 36 was enacted to help relieve the courts' workload in setting the
costs of a parolee's probation by streamlining the process.' 9 The increase in the
monthly fees that can be charged to cover the costs of a defendant's probation
was also needed to help deal with the increasing costs of probation supervision.' 0
Chapter 36 also helps to reduce the chance that a defendant may receive a
windfall at the probation department's expense by lengthening the period the
court may consider in determining the defendant's ability to pay.2'
A. James Kachmar
for the probation of a person convicted of a felony will be $10 per month but no more than $2500, and the fees
for a misdemeanor will be $10 to $500 a month); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-80 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994)
(requiring a parolee pay a monthly parole supervision fee of $20 to $100); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-28-
201(a)(l), (2) (1990) (providing that parolees must contribute $5 a month towards the costs of probation and
may be required to pay up to $30 a month to a victim's compensation fund); TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art.
42.18(8)j) (West Supp. 1995) (requiring a parolee to pay a supervision fee of $10 a month while on probation).
19. ASSEMBLYCOMMITTEEONPUBUCSAFEIY,COMMYTFEEANALYSISOFAB594, at2 (Apr. 25, 1995);
see Ut (reporting that understaffed probation departments are overworked and court dockets are jammed); Fact
Sheet on the Proposed Juvenile/Adult Offenders Accountability Act of 1996, from the office of
Assemblymember Paula Boland (Aug. 2, 1995) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (indicating that
probation departments are unable to assess a parolee's fees because back-logged courts are incapable of
scheduling ability-to-pay hearings); Letter from Alan L. Clarke, Legislative Advocate, Chief Probation Officers
of California, to Governor Pete Wilson (June 27, 1995) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (advocating
for the enactment of AB 594 in order to expedite the process of determining a defendant's ability to pay the
costs of the probation officer's investigations, reports, and supervision); Letter from Susan B. Cohen,
Executive Director, California Probation, Parole and Correctional Association, to Assemblymember Paula
Boland (Nar. 21, 1995) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (stating that passage of AB 594 is vital
to help relieve the court congestion that is expected to worsen as a result of the Three-Strikes law); Letter from
Carolyn McIntyre, Legislative Representative, California State Association of Counties, to Assemblymember
Paula Boland (Mar. 14, 1995) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (asserting that AB 594 is needed
to help lessen the financial burden to counties of increasing court workloads by transferring some of this work
to probation officers); see also Carla Rivera, Plan Would Avert $40 Million Probation Agency Cut, L.A. TMES,
June 8, 1994, at B4 (observing that even with a $20 million infusion, the Los Angeles County Probation
Department would remain seriously understaffed); Ted Rohrlich, Study Sees 'Gamble' in Wider Proballon for
Felons in State, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1985, at B1 (reporting that probation officers have average caseloads
ranging from 150 to 300 offenders in some California counties).
20. ASSEMBLYCOMMrITEEONPUBUCSAFETY,COMMrTEEANALYSISOFAB594, at 2 (May 2, 1995);
see id. (stating that the cost of inflation has made some fees obsolete); see also Kate Taylor, Marin County
Criminals May Pay Probation Fees, Savings Could Amount to $100,000 Per Year, S.F. CHRoN., Mar. 2, 1994,
at A15 (reporting how Manin County planned to charge criminals $445 to cover the cost of probationary
services and help recover the $100,000 spent annually on such services).
21. ASSEMBLYCOMMrIrEEONPUBLCSAF ,COMMITtEEANALYSiSOFAB 594, at 2 (May 2,1995);
see idU (hypothesizing a scenario where a defendant-student receiving an allowance from his or her parents Is
expected to graduate college in seven months-thereby escaping the imposition of probation fees). But see
Letter from Katherine Sher, Legislative Advocate, California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, to
Assemblymember Paula Boland (Apr. 20, 1995) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (arguing that
increasing the period that a court may consider in determining a defendant's future financial position will result
in erroneous speculations, which may render a defendant incapable of meeting the payment schedule).
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Criminal Procedure; statutory limitation for the prosecution of select crimes
Penal Code § 801.5 (amended).
SB 734 (Marks); 1995 STAT. Ch. 704
Existing law provides general time limitations in which a criminal case must
be prosecuted.' In conjunction with these limitations, prior law mandated that
prosecution for certain specified crimes concerning false or fraudulent insurance
claims must be commenced within three years after the discovery of the com-
mission of the offense.
2
Chapter 704 requires that these crimes now be prosecuted within four years
after the discovery of the commission of the offense or within four years after the
offense has been completed, whichever is the longest period of time.3 However,
this limitation only pertains to these crimes when the offense is punishable by a
prison term in the state prison and a material element of the crime is fraud,
4
I. CAL PENAL CODE § 801 (West 1985); see id. (requiring prosecution for an offense that can carry
a prison term in the state prison to be brought within three years after the occurrence of the offense except as
provided in California Penal Code §§ 799 and 800); see also id. § 799 (West Supp. 1995) (permitting
prosecution at any time of crimes that can be punished by death, a life imprisonment term without parole, or
crimes concerning the embezzlement of public money); id. § 800 (West 1985) (mandating prosecution of a
crime that can be punished by eight years or more in the state prison, within six years after the commission of
the offense, except as set forth in California Penal Code § 799).
2. 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1031, sec. 3, at 5218-19 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 801.5); see id.
(stating that prosecutions for California Penal Code § 550, former California Insurance Code § 1871.1, or
California Insurance Code § 1871.4, must be initiated within three years after the discovery of the commission
of the offense); see also CAL INS. CODE § 1871.4 (West Supp. 1995) (providing a detailed list of unlawful acts
concerning false and fraudulent claims); CAL. PENAL CODE § 550 (West Supp. 1995) (setting forth a long list
of unlawful acts related to insurance claims); 1991 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1008, sec. 2, at 4088-89 (amending
CAL INs. CODE § 1871.1) (setting forth a similar list to that found in California Penal Code § 550, which is the
prior section to the current one now codified as California Penal Code § 1871.1).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 801.5 (amended by Chapter 704).
4. See CAL Civ. CODE § 1572 (West 1982) (declaring that "actual fraud" is considered as any of the
following acts done by a party to a contract or with his or her consent, with the purpose to deceive another
party, or to induce that other party to enter into the contract: (1) a statement, as a fact, which is not true, by a
person who does not believe that it is true; (2) a positive assertion, in a manner without adequate grounds by
the knowledge of the person making it, of that which is false, though he or she believes the statement to be true;
(3) the concealment of something which is true by the person who has the knowledge of such fact; (4) a
promise made disregarding any intent to honor it; or (5) any other act that is committed to deceive another);
Hale v. Wolfsen, 276 Cal. App. 2d 285, 291, 81 Cal. Rptr. 23. 28 (1969) (announcing that a fraudulent
representation can be either expressly or impliedly made and can arise from silence or nondisclosure); Ach v.
Finkelstein, 264 Cal. App. 2d 667, 674, 70 Cal. Rptr. 472, 477 (1968) (determining that the elements of
actionable fraud are (1) an untrue representation, that is actual or implied, or the hiding of a matter of fact that
is crucial to the transaction that is made falsely; (2) the individual making the representation is aware of the
falsity or a representation is made that is so reckless that knowledge of its falsity can be inferred; (3) the intent
to induce another person into relying upon the representation; (4) reliance by one who should naturally rely
upon the representation; and (5) damage results); Pearson v. Norton, 230 Cal. App. 2d 1, 7, 40 Cal. Rptr. 634,
638 (1964) (stating that the concept of fraud in its broad and general sense encompasses anything which has
a purpose to deceive, which includes all statements, acts, omissions, and concealments that involve a breach




breach of a fiduciary duty,5 or the crime is based upon misconduct by a public
employee,6 officer,7 or appointee8 while in office? What follows is a list of
crimes, though not all encompassing, specifically affected by Chapter 704."0
CRIMES AT COMMON LAW
Chapter 704 affects grand theft" of any kind, forgery, 2 falsification of public
5. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545,546 (N.Y. 1928) (discussing the definition of "fiduciary
duty," and determining that a fiduciary duty is something that goes beyond every day relations, and that normal
standards of conduct would be considered unacceptable in a fiduciary relationship); id. (stating that not honesty
alone, but a scrupulous adherence to honor, is the standard in a fiduciary relationship, and that uncompromising
rigidity is the attitude held by courts when called upon to attack this standard); see also Rippey v. Denver U.
S. Nat'l Bank, 273 F. Supp. 718,737 (D. Colo. 1967) (holding that a trustee in a fiduciary relationship owes
his allegiance to the beneficiaries first, and thus, all other options are secondary and noting the accepted
standard as defined in Meinhard); BLACK'S LAW DICToNARY 625 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "fiduciary duty"
as the obligation to act for the benefit of another, while placing one's own interests behind those of the other
person, and stating that it is the strictest duty of care that can be implied by the law); Daniel B. Bogart, Llabili,
of Directors of Chapter 11 Debtors in Possession: "Don't Look Bacl.-Something May Be Gaining On You,"
68 AM. BANKR. L. 155, 209 (1994) (asserting that a non-willful breach of a fiduciary duty is a simple
negligent action); Deborah A. Demott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1989 DuKE
LJ. 879,882 (believing that the fiduciary's duties do not consist only of acting honest and fair, but additionally
require that the fiduciary act in furtherance of the beneficiary's interest).
6. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 811.A (West 1980) (defining a "public employee" as an employee of a
public entity).
7. See id. § 24000 (West Supp. 1995) (enumerating a long list of county officers).
8. See Caldwell v. Bruning, 64 Cal. 2d 111, 118, 410 P.2d 353, 357,48 Cal. Rptr. 849, 853 (1966)
(noting that California Government Code § 71180 fails to exactly define the term "appointee")
9. CAL PENALCODE § 801.5 (amended by Chapter 704); see id. (directing one's attention to California
Penal Code § 803(c) which limits the scope of Chapter 704 since California Penal Code § 803(c) only applies
to the crimes it enumerates); see also CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3000 (West 1980) (stating that any public officer
or employee loses his or her position upon conviction of any crime specified in the California Constitution or
the laws of California); id. § 71180(a) (West Supp. 1995) (discussing the appointment of judges); cf. ALA.
CODE § 15-3-3 (1982) (stating that a prosecution for conversion of the state or county revenue must begin
within six years after the conversion); id. § 15-3-5(aX6)-(7) (Supp. 1994) (providing that the crimes of forgery
and counterfeiting have no statute of limitation); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-109(c)(1) (Michie 1993) (declaring
that even though the general statute of limitation has expired, prosecution can still commence within one year
after an offense concerning either fraud or breach of a fiduciary obligation is discovered or should reasonably
have been discovered); id. § 5-1-109(c)(2) (Michie 1993) (increasing the statute of limitations by up to ten
years for any offense that is concealed concerning felonious conduct in office by a public servant); GA. CODE
ANN. § 17-3-2(3)-(4) (Michie 1990) (excluding the crimes of conversion of public property by a public officer
or employee and conversion of property by a trustee from a beneficiary, from Georgia's general statute of
limitations law); MIss. CODE ANN. § 99-1-5 (1994) (excluding a list of enumerated crimes, including forgery,
counterfeiting, larceny, embezzlement, and obtaining money or property under false pretenses, from any period
of limitation); N.Y. CRtm. PRoc. LAW § 30.10(3)(a) (McKinney 1992) (allowing for a prosecution for larceny
committed by a person in violation of a fiduciary duty to be commenced within one year after discovery of the
offense, or within one year after the offense should have been reasonably discovered); id. § 30.10(3)(b)
(McKinney 1992) (permitting prosecution to commence against a public official involving misconduct in office
during anytime that person is in office, and allowing a maximum five year extension of the general statute of
limitations, after the person leaves office).
10. CAL. PENAL CODE § 801.5 (amended by Chapter 704); see id. (stating that California Penal Code
§ 801.5 affects those crimes set forth within California Penal Code § 803(c)).
11. See id. § 487 (West Supp. 1995) (setting forth instances when grand theft is considered to be
committed); People v. Felsman, 257 Cal. App. 2d 437,442,64 Cal. Rptr. 870,873 (1967) (stating that larceny
amounting to grand theft can be committed by "trick" or "device"); People v. Schwenkner, 191 Cal. App. 2d
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records,13 and the acceptance of any type of bribe14 by a public official or
employee."s
CRIMES RELATED TO LmGATION AND PROSECUTION
Chapter 704 affects the presentation of false claims,16 the crime of perjury, 7
the falsification of one's affidavit, 8 the offering of false evidence into trial or any
similar proceeding,' 9 and the preparation of false evidence?
46, 50, 12 Cal. Rptr. 408, 410 (1961) (providing that "grand theft" includes the crimes of embezzlement,
larceny, larceny by device and trick, and acquiring property under false pretenses).
12. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 470(a) (West Supp. 1995) (defining a "forger" as any person who, with
the purpose to defraud, signs the name of another individual, or a person who does not exist, with the
knowledge that he or she does not have the power to do so, or falsely alters, forges, counterfeits, or makes any
item listed in California Penal Code § 470); People v. Battle, 188 Cal. App. 2d 627, 631, 10 Cal. Rptr. 525,
528 (1961) (stating that the elements of forgery are (1) the passing of a counterfeit and forged item, knowing
that it was such; (2) the person's name that is allegedly forged is a real person; (3) his or her name as signed
to the item was not his or her signature; and (4) that signature was placed upon the document without that
person's permission); see also People v. Cooper, 83 Cal. App. 3d 121, 127, 147 Cal. Rptr. 705, 707 (1978)
(stating that to constitute forgery pursuant to California Penal Code § 470, the following factors must be
present: (1) The item must be attempted to be passed on as a real and genuine document; (2) it must be within
the knowledge of the individual passing the item off that he or she is passing on a forged, altered, counterfeited,
or false item; and (3) it must be passed on with the purpose of prejudicing, damaging, or defrauding another
individual); People v. Neder, 16 Cal. App. 3d 846, 852-53, 94 Cal. Rptr. 364, 367 (1971) (stating that the crime
of forgery is concerned with the means of the act and not the ends).
13. See CAL PENAL CODE § 115(a) (West 1988) (making a crime of any forged document, known to
be forged by the person passing it on, being filed or recorded under any law of the state of California).
14. See id. § 7(6) (West 1988) (defining the term "bribe" as meaning anything of value or advantage
that exists or will exist, or any type of promise or undertaking to be given away, asked, or accepted, with an
unlawful purpose to influence the individual to whom it is given, in his or her opinion, vote, or action, in any
type of public or official capacity); id. § 68 (West 1988) (making it a crime for any public employee or officer
to ask or receive any type of bribe); see also People v, Silver, 75 Cal. App. 2d 1, 4, 170 P.2d 80, 81 (1946)
(stating that California Penal Code § 7(6) should be read in conjunction with California Penal Code § 68 when
that provision is invoked).
15. CAL. PENAL CODE § 801.5 (amended by Chapter 704); id. § 803(c)(1) (West Supp. 1995).
16. See id. § 72 (West 1988) (making a crime the presentation of any type of false claim, bill, voucher,
account, or writing, with the intent to defraud any county, city, or district board or officer). See generally I
B.E. WnaN & NORMAN L FsTrEN, CAMORNtA CRIANAL LAW, Defenses § 374 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1995)
(discussing California Penal Code § 72 in the context of a statute of limitations); 2 B.E. WITrN & NORMAN
L. EPsTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Crimes Against Property § 723 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1995)
(providing an explanation of California Penal Code § 72).
17. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 118(a) (West Supp. 1995) (defining "perjury" as any false statement, that
is a material matter, made by a person which that person knows is false, under oath in any instance when such
an oath may be administered by the law of the state of California); People v. Smith, 248 Cal. App. 2d 134, 136,
56 Cal. Rptr. 258, 259 (1967) (stating that California Penal Code § 118 is the general perjury statute and is
simply a reflection of the common law offense that makes it a felony to intentionally state under oath as true
statements known by the presenter to be false).
18. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 118a (West 1988) (establishing the crime of pejury for any person who
in any affidavit taken before an individual authorized to record such, states as true any type of material matter
which he or she knows to be false); People v. Teixeira, 59 Cal. App. 598, 602, 211 P. 470, 472 (1922) (finding
that before a person can be convicted of perjury in creating a false affidavit, that person must either use the
affidavit for a goal contemplated by California Penal Code § 118, or present it to another for such use).
19. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 132 (West 1988) (making it a crime to offer into evidence anything that
is false); People v. Pereira, 207 Cal. App. 3d 1057, 1068, 255 Cal. Rptr. 285, 292 (1989) (concluding that




Chapter 704 affects willful and fraudulent violations of the California
Corporations Code."
CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT CODE
Chapter 704 covers situations in which public officials or employees become
financially interested in a contract that is made by them in their official capacity,
or by any public organization of which they are a part.2' Also, Chapter 704 affects
instances when a person purchases or acts upon any transaction that concerns an
estate that is dispensed by any public administrator.3
WELFARE FRAUD
Chapter 704 applies to situations in which a person obtains aid for a child
who in fact is not entitled to such aid.' Further, Chapter 704 applies to situations
action).
20. CAL. PENAL CODE § 801.5 (amended by Chapter 704); id. § 803(c)(2) (West Supp. 1995); see Id.
§ 134 (West 1988) (making it a crime for an individual to prepare false evidence); People v. Horowitz, 70 Cal.
App. 2d 675, 702, 161 P.2d 833, 848 (1945) (stating that California Penal Code § 134 requires the finding of
a specific intent); see also People v. Blaydon, 154 Cal. App. 2d 817, 823, 317 P.2d 24, 29 (1957) (stating that
the corpus delicti of preparing false evidence was met by evidence that the body of will was in the accused's
handwriting, that witnesses' signature was forged, that the accused gave the instrument to a lawyer for probate,
and that the defendant filed the will with the county clerk for probate).
21. CAL. PENALCODE § 801.5 (amended by Chapter 704); id. § 803(c)(3) (West Supp. 1995); see CAL.
CORP. CODE § 25540 (West Supp. 1995) (making it a crime to willfully violate any provision of the California
Corporations Code); id. § 25541 (West Supp. 1995) (making it a crime for any person to fraudulently use
directly or indirectly, any device, scheme, or tool to defraud any person in connection with any offer, purchase,
or sale of any security). See generally 2 B.E. WrixIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIwORNIA CRIMINAL LAW,
Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare §§ 1029, 1030 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1995) (discussing the
applications of California Corporations Code §§ 25540, 25441).
22. CAL. PENAL CODE § 801.5 (amended by Chapter 704); id. § 803(c)(4) (West Supp. 1995); see CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 1090 (West 1980) (mandating that no public official shall be interested in any contract made
by them in their official capacity); Thomson v. Call, 38 Cal. 3d 633, 648, 699 P.2d 316, 325, 214 Cal. Rptr.
139, 148 (1985) (stating that the purpose of § 1090 of the California Government Code is to avoid tempting
public officers or employees into entering contracts for their personal benefit and to assure the public that
employees or officials are giving their undivided attention to public work); id. at 646 n.15, 699 P.2d at 323
n.15, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 146 n.15 (noting that a contract in which a public officer or employee is interested in
is not merely voidable, but is absolutely void).
23. CAL. PENALCODE § 801.5 (amended by Chapter 704); id § 803(c)(4) (West Supp. 1995); see CAL.
GOV'TCODE § 27443 (West 1988) (discussing the crime of misconduct in office). See generally I B.E. WrrKiN
& NORMAN L. EpsTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMwNAL LAW, Defenses § 374 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing California
Government Code § 27443 in the context of statutes of limitations).
24. CAL. PENAL CODE § 801.5 (amended by Chapter 704); id. § 803(c)(5) (West Supp. 1995); see CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 11483 (West 1991) (discussing the crime of obtaining aid by fraud); see also People
v. Williams, 106 Cal. App. 3d 15, 21, 164 Cal. Rptr. 767, 770-71 (1980) (stating that California Welfare and
Institutions Code § 11483 was created to ensure that a case-by-case determination is made as to whether the
state's interest can be adequately served by acquiring restitution or by also instituting a criminal prosecution,
and to protect the accused by allowing that person a chance to make restitution in instances where there exists
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in which a person fraudulently presents information to obtain services or mer-
chandise to which he or she is not entitled?6
FRAUDS AND MEDICAL RECORDS
Chapter 704 covers instances where an individual fraudulently sells, uses, or
falsifies any document that concerns a license, diploma, or certificate entitling a
person to practice medicine in the state of California!'
FALSIFICATION OF DOCUMENTS
Chapter 704 applies to the procurement, selling, or sale of deceptive identi-
fication documents.2 7 Finally, Chapter 704 affects instances where a person
procures or sells a false certificate of birth or baptism?
COMMENT
The California Senate Criminal Procedure Committee recently conducted
hearings concerning white collar crime and recognized that investigations into
these crimes require more time as compared to other crimes?9 The one year
mitigating circumstances); People v. Faubus, 48 Cal. App. 3d 1, 5, 121 Cal. Rptr. 167, 169 (1975) (holding
that an intent to defraud in the sense of an intent to induce the victim, by an untrue representation, to part with
a valuable knowing that the person would not do so but for the untrue representation, is an element of the
offense described in California Welfare and Institutions Code § 11483).
25. CAL. PENAL CODE § 801.5 (amended by Chapter 704); id. § 803(c)(5) (West Supp. 1995); see CAL.
WEIF. & INST. CODE § 14107 (West 1991) (discussing the crime of fraudulently obtaining services or
merchandise); People v. Gregory, 217 Cal. App. 3d 665, 676 n.5, 266 Cal. Rptr. 527, 533 n.5 (1990) (noting
that although California Welfare and Institutions Code § 14107 provides three ways that the statute may be
violated, it creates only one criminal offense, not many different crimes), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1014 (1990).
26. CAL. PENALCODE § 801.5 (amended by Chapter 704); id. § 803(c)(7) (West Supp. 1995); see CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 580-584 (West 1990) (discussing various crimes concerning falsification and forgery
of documents); see also People v. Reddick, 176 Cal. App. 2d 806, 816, 1 Cal Rptr. 767, 773 (1959) (stating
that the term "certificate" as used in California Business and Professions Code § 580 is synonymous with the
term license), appeal dismissed, 364 U.S. 445 (1959).
27. CAL PENALCODE § 801.5 (amended by Chapter 704); id. § 803(c)(10) (West Supp. 1995); see CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 22430 (West 1988) (making it a crime to create a deceptive identification document).
See generally I B.E. WrrcN & NORMAN L. EpmIN, LoRNiA CRwMNALLAw, Defenses § 374 (2d ed. 1988)
(discussing California Business and Professions Code § 22430 in the context of statutes of limitations); 2 B.E.
WmN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Crimes Against Property § 757 (2d ed. 1988 &
Supp. 1995) (discussing deceptive identification documents).
28. CAL. PENAL CODE § 801.5 (amended by Chapter 704); id. § 803(c)(10) (West Supp. 1995); see id.
§ 529a (West 1988) (making it a crime to manufacture or sell false certificates of birth or baptism). See
generally 1 B.E. WmOKiN & NoRMAN L. EPsTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Defenses § 374 (2d ed. 1988)
(discussing California Penal Code § 529a in the context of statutes of limitations); 2 B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN
L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Crimes Against Property § 757 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the crime
of manufacturing or selling of false certificates of birth or baptism).
29. SENATE COMMrrTEE ON CRIMNAL PROCEDURE, COMMarrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 734, at 2 (May 9,
1995); Mark D. Harmon, Suite Justice? Not When It Involves Really Big White-Collar Crimes, ARiz. REPUBLIC,
June 22, 1995, at B5 (stating that the problem of white collar crime is huge and that in 1993, the FBI was
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statute of limitations extension is narrowly crafted by Chapter 704 so that only
specific white collar crimes will be affected-thus leaving all other crimes
unchanged. °
The sponsor of Chapter 704 believes that the complexity of white collar crime
does not arise simply from the numerous amounts of documents that must be
examined in a case, but rather from the fact that many of these crimes are
committed in such a way that they are foil proof.3' Considering this, more time
is needed to prosecute these crimes, while the fear of these cases losing their
timeliness is minimal 2
Matthew E. Farmer
investigating about 5000 cases involving savings and loan fraud and health care scams); id. (stating that white
collar crime is the top priority in 38 of the FBI's 56 field offices and requires the effort of 2100 agents); id.
(citing one mid-1980's calculation as giving the figure of $313 million lost in one year from all robberies while
all white collar crimes combined totaled over $640 million); see also Crime in the Suites, AM. BANKR. INST.
J., Mar., 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File (stating that white collar crime increases
business costs each year by $52 billion); id. (stating that white collar crimes are not as visible as crimes of
burglary, robbery, and larceny, but their economic impact is much larger as evidenced by FBI statistics which
show that total gross losses in 1989 from burglary, robbery, and larceny totaled about $50 million while the
crimes of fraud and embezzlement alone accounted for $1.3 billion).
30. SENATE COMMrEE ON CRMINAL PROCEDtE, CoMMnrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 734, at 2 (May 9,
1995); see CAL. PENAL CODE § 801.5 (amended by Chapter 704) (applying its provision only to those crimes
listed in § 803 of the California Penal Code).
31. SENATE COMMrrrEE ON CRINIAL PROCEDURE, CoMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 734, at 2 (May 9,
1995); see id. (explaining that a caijacker on the one hand hopes he or she does not get caught, while a white
collar criminal, on the other hand, knows that he or she will inevitably get caught, and thus, creates a clever
defense to offer to a jury before the crime is even completed); Insurance Fraud: The New Frontier In
Bankruptcy, AM. BANKP. INST. J., Oct. 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (stating that
white collar crime has been recognized in the United States since the early 1970's with the common
denominator being sophisticated criminals, complex plans, and a general hesitance to convict the perpetrators);
Dick Marlowe, We Need Lower Opinion of Crime in High Places, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 25, 1995. at HI
(asserting that white collar crime is rampant; the means of pulling off such crimes get bolder each day); Id.
(arguing that white collar criminals are punished lightly and are not losing much in personal character); Dean
Narciso, Book on Law Profession Takes a Turn Away from the Tedium, COLUMBUs DISPATCH, June 26, 1995,
at 8 (Bus.) (reporting that only 15% of white collar crime is detected, of which only 75% reach conviction).
32. SENATE COMMrrrEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Cotmrrnm ANALYSIS OF SB 734, at 2 (May 9,
1995); see id. at 4 (recognizing that the limitation provided in SB 734 may be arbitrary, but believing that it
imposes an outside limit in recognition ofthe staleness problem); id. (suggesting that crimes of fraud or breach
of fiduciary duty rarely rely upon the memory of human witnesses, but rather rely upon documentary proof,
and thus, the threat of loss and misidentification of evidence is minimal in white collar crime cases); id. (stating
that should a case arise where staleness is a factor, a defendant's constitutional rights to due process and a
speedy trial remain).
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Criminal Procedure; white collar crimes-preservation of property or assets
Penal Code § 186.11 (new).
SB 950 (Killea); 1995 STAT. Ch. 794
Existing law provides that it is illegal for any person to engage in unfair
business practices.' Existing law subjects any person conducting unfair business
practices to a civil penalty and requires him or her to render restitution? to the
victim
Chapter 794 provides that if any person who commits two or more related
1. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West Supp. 1995); see id. (defining "unfair competition" as
including any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice, and unfair deceptive, untrue, or
misleading advertising); see also Samura v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 17 Cal. App. 4th 1284, 1292, 22 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 20, 24 (1993) (quoting People v. McHale, 25 Cal. 3d 626, 632, 602 P.2d 731, 159 Cal. Rptr. 811
(1975), in defining an "unlawful business activity" as including anything that can properly be called a business
practice and is forbidden by law). See generally Sean P. Murphy, As Economy Falls, Fraud Reports Rise,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 16, 1991, at 29P (noting that once the economy faulters, people will offer deals to
desperate people, and thus the rise in white-collar crime).
2. See BLACK'S LAW DIcnONARY 1313 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "restitution" as an equitable remedy
under which a victim is returned to his or her original position prior to the loss or injury). See generally Robert
T. Manicke, A Tax Deduction for Restitutionary Payments?, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 593, 609-11 (1992)
(discussing the purposes and policies of restitution and the different philosophies of restitution with respect
to whether it is more properly a victim compensation or a punishment).
3. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17203 (West Supp. 1995); see id. (providing that any person who
engages, has engaged, or proposes to engage in unfair competition may be enjoined in any court of competent
jurisdiction, and authorizing the judge to make any necessary orders or judgments to restore to any person in
interest any money or real or personal property which may have been acquired by means of such unfair
competition); see also CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28(b) (indicating that victims of crime have a right to restitution
from the persons convicted of the crime); CAL GOv'r CODE § 13959 (West 1992) (declaring that it is in the
public interest to assist victims to obtain restitution for losses resulting from criminal acts); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1203.1(b) (West Supp. 1995) (allowing the court to consider restitution as a condition of probation); cf. 18
U.S.C.A. § 3663(a), (b), (d), (e) (West 1985 & Supp. 1995) (allowing the court to order restitution for certain
crimes that result in property loss or damage, unless the complication or prolongation of the sentence outweighs
the need for restitution, and the victim receives or will receive compensation elsewhere); NEV. REV. STAT. §
4.375 (1994) (permitting the court to order amounts for restitution to the owner of property embezzled); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 31-17-1(A), (B) (Michie Special Pamphlet 1994) (announcing the intent of the New Mexico
Legislature to make violators provide restitution to their victims and requiring the court to order restitution as
a condition of probation or parole). See generally People v. Tucker, 37 Cal. App. 4th 1, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1
(holding that a criminal defendant may be ordered to pay restitution to the victim in the amount of appreciation
of the assets the defendant embezzled); Allied Grape Growers v. Bronco WNine Co., 203 Cal. App. 3d 432,453,
249 Cal. Rptr. 872, 885 (1988) (recognizing the authority of the court to prohibit unfair practices, including
imposition of injunctions and restitution); Gregory Crouch, Orange County: 1990: The Year in Review, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 23, 1990, at Dl (noting the criminal charges against Charles H. Keating Jr. for allegedly
misleading investors to buy more than $200 million in bonds that became worthless, and which are expected
to cost taxpayers two billion dollars); Michael Flagg, Steven Wymer Given 14%-Year Prison Term, L.A. TIMES,
May 12, 1993, at Al (discussing the criminal history of a convicted white collar criminal who embezzled $29
million from clients and spent the money on items including $635,000 in property in La Quinta, California,
to Florida, and $400,000 in luxury and classic cars).
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felonies,4 of which a material element is fraud5 or embezzlement, 'involving a
pattern of related felonious conduct and the taking of $500,000, the person is,
upon the conviction of two or more felonies in a single criminal proceeding,
subject to two, three, or five additional years in the state prison.7 In addition,
Chapter 794 imposes a fine not exceeding $500,000 or double the value of the
taking, whichever is greater, and liablility for restitution to any victim.8
Chapter 794 also establishes a procedure for the preservation of the property
or assets of any person alleged to be subject to the punishment enhancement, and
the levy upon that property or assets upon the conviction of the person, in order
to assure the victim receives restitution and the county that prosecuted the person
receives the fines imposed.9
4. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(a) (West Supp. 1995) (defining "felony" as a crime punishable with
death or by imprisonment in the state prison).
5. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1572 (West 1982) (defining "actual fraud" as consisting of acts committed
by or in connivance with a party to the contract, with intent to deceive another party thereto, or to induce him
to enter into the contract by means of false assertion, omission, or any other deceitful act).
6. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 503 (West 1988) (defining "embezzlement" as the fraudulent appropriation
of property by a person to whom it has been entrusted).
7. Id. § 186.11(a), (d) (enacted by Chapter 794).
8. Id. § 186.11(c) (enacted by Chapter 794).
9. Id. § 186.1 l(e)(1)-(7), (g)(l)-(10), (h), (i)(I)-(3), (j)(l)-(5), (k) (enacted by Chapter 794); see Id.
§ 186.1 1(e)(1) (enacted by Chapter 794) (providing that if a person is alleged to have committed two or more
felonies and the white collar crime enhancement is also charged, any assets or property in the defendant's
control or transferred, except to a bona fide purchaser, even if out of state, may be preserved by the Superior
Court in order to pay restitution); iU § 186.1 l(e)(2) (enacted by Chapter 794) (permitting the prosecutor to file
a petition seeking a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, the appointment of a receiver, or any
other protective relief necessary, to preserve the assets of the accused); id. § 186.1 l(e)(3), (4) (enacted by
Chapter 794) (requiring a notice to be sent by personal service or registered mail to every person having an
interest in the property, a publication for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper generally circulated in the
county, and the prosecutor to record a lis pendens in the county where the real property sits); id. § 186.11 (eX5)
(enacted by Chapter 794) (permitting the prosecutor to obtain an order for a financial institution to disclose the
account numbers and value); id. § 186.1 l(e)(6) (enacted by Chapter 794) (requiring a person with an interest
in the property to respond within 30 days from the first publication or receipt of actual notice); Id. §
186.1l(g)(1), (2) (enacted by Chapter 794) (allowing a temporary restraining order to be issued by a court, ex
parte, which may be based on the sworn declaration of a peace officer that establishes probable cause, and
allowing a defendant or an interested party to have a hearing within 10 days to show cause for the restraining
order to stay in effect); id § 186.1 l(gX3)-(10) (enacted by Chapter 794) (providing that the court must consider
the degree of certainty of the outcome on the merits and the consequences to the parties, the protection of
innocent third parties, ordering an interlocutory sale of property liable to perish, to waste, or subject to
reduction in value); ld § 186.11(h) (enacted by the Chapter 794) (requiring the dissolution of property subject
to the injunction, or the court may continue the order if the jury does not reach a unanimous verdict); id. §
186.1 l(iX1) (enacted by Chapter 794) (stating that the court will continue the order for freezing assets until
the sentencing hearing determines what portion of the property will be used for restitution); id. § 186.11(j)
(enacted by Chapter 794) (mandating an appointee to liquidate all property in a specified order for expenses
of a sale, the lien holder, the victim, and any fines); id. § 186.1 l(k) (enacted by Chapter 794) (declaring that
if the proceeds of the sale is insufficient, then 70% of the proceeds after payment for expenses of a sale and
for liens must go to the victim for restitution); see also Henry J. Amoroso, Organizational Ethos and Corporate
Criminal Liability, 17 CAMPBELL L. REv. 47, 60 (1995) (noting a study which concluded that if expected
penalties equaled social costs of white collar criminal behavior, then the criminal offender may be induced to
comply with the law); id. at 60-61 (indicating that corporate offenders only pay a portion of the costs to the
total harm done as a result of the white collar criminal activity); cf. 1995 Ariz. Legis. Serv. ch. 188, see. 2, at
1362 (West) (amending ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-804(A)) (permitting a court to enter an order of restitution
and to create a restitution lien in favor of the state for restitution, fine surcharges and fees, or in the victim for
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COMMENT
The purpose of Chapter 794 is to preserve the property or assets of persons
alleged to have engaged in a pattern of fraudulent or unlawful activity in order to
obtain restitution for the victims and recover fines ordered by the court.10 Thus,
Chapter 794 prevents white collar crime defendants from dissipating, hiding, or
transferring out of the jurisdiction of the court funds stolen from their victims and
enjoying the benefits of their crimes, even if a term of incarceration is imposed. "
In addition, Chapter 794 provides prosecutors the ability to preserve assets
more easily through the use of hearsay and other reliable sources when seeking
a grant of a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order for freezing
assets.12 Furthermore, proponents of Chapter 794 believe that because the asset
forfeiture is dependent upon a criminal conviction, Chapter 794 avoids the
double-jeopardy 3 challenges faced by other forfeiture legislation. 4
restitution). But see State v. Maniccia, 343 N.W.2d 834, 835 (Iowa 1984) (holding that the court may not issue
an injunction to prevent the defendant from disposing of property that might be used to reimburse the victims
or county).
10. ASSEMBLY CoMmITrEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITIEE ANALYSIS OF SB 950, at 2-3 (June 20,
1995); see id. at 3 (providing the example of a Southern California doctor who was convicted of fraud for
charging services not rendered, as well as overcharging, and noting that the doctor was quoted as saying that
he was not worried about a criminal investigation because he expected to only serve a one year jail term and
thus would keep his $8 million in assets); id. (indicating that at the doctor's sentencing, he claimed to be
impoverished and thus could not pay the $500,000 in restitution fees, even though he had $3 million in assets
at time of arrest); see also SENATE COMMrlTEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, COMMrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 950,
at 4 (Apr. 18, 1995) (noting that victims of crime are manipulated by sophisticated criminals, but public
prosecutors do not have the tools necessary to obtain restitution for these victims whose lives, retirement, or
careers could be in a state of ruin).
11. ASSEMBLYCOMMfIEEONPUBLICSAFETY, COMMITEEANALYSISOFSB 950, at2 (June 20, 1995);
see id. at 4 (noting that current law allows major fraud defendants to be sentenced to serve state prison
sentences, which are usually short in duration, without losing the proceeds of their crimes); id. (indicating that
by preventing the defendant from accessing the money embezzled or swindled from his or her victim, the
defendant would be denied the ability to use the money to maintain an ostentatious lifestyle, from hiring a
"dream team" of attorneys or posting bail with the victim's money); see also Crouch, supra note 3 (reporting
that a man accused of a "pyramid scheme" transferred $11 million to a mysterious offshore bank account
before his arrest); id. (describing another case where a person defaulted on $100 million in loans, yet told
Congress he was broke, even though he still lived in grand style; thus, he will spend much time defending
himself against charges that he hid assets through his wife); Myron Levin & Jocelyn Y. Stewart, Van Nuys Man
Leaves Trail of Heartbreak and Lawsuits, LA. TIMES, May 28, 1995, at Al (discussing how a person accused
of white-collar crime has frustrated prosecutors' efforts to foreclose on his property by arranging a transfer of
one of the properties to a fictitious name).
12. ASSEMBLY COMMrr=E ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMrITEE ANALYSIS oFSB 950, at 4 (June 20, 1995).
13. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (mandating that no person be subject for the same offense, so as to be
put in jeopardy of life or limb for a second time); CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 15 (declaring that persons may not be
put in jeopardy for the same offense twice); id. § 24 (providing that a defendant in a criminal case is not to be
put in jeopardy twice for the same offense, and that the courts of the state must construe the issue consistent
with the Constitution of the United States).
14. ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMIT'E' ANALYSIS OF SB 950, at 3 (Sept, 1, 1995); see United States v.
$405,089.23, 33 F.3d 1210, 1222 (9th. Cir. 1994) (holding that a civil forfeiture proceeding, if serving as a
punishment, is subject to the doublejeopardy clause, and thus both the criminal prosecution and forfeiture must
be brought in the same proceeding). But see Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388, 391 (1975) (holding
that a defendant cannot be put at jeopardy until he or she is put before the trier of fact); People v. $31,500, 32
Cal. App. 4th 1442, 1455-56, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 836, 843-44 (1995) (finding that a forfeiture of assets after the
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Opposition to Chapter 794 expresses concern about possible false accusations
of criminal conduct which would cause the defendant's assets to be frozen before
the defendant had an opportunity to respond to the accusation. 5 In addition, the
opponents feel that it is not just for a defendant to maintain the burden of proof
in showing a need for the funds in order to gain access to his or her own money
when that defendant has not been convicted of any crime. 6
Chad D. Bernard
defendant was arrested for drug trafficking was not subjected to double jeopardy because he had not been
brought to trial).
15. ASSEMBLYCOMMrIIBON PUBLICSAFETYCOMMrrrEEANALYSISOFSB 950, at 4 (June 20, 1995);
see id. (providing the California Manufacturers Association's (CMA) assertion that the defendant's assets could
be subject to spoilage or great diminution in value, depending on the circumstances); id. (setting forth the
CMA's assertion that a defendant may not have an opportunity to speak to a judge who issued the e- parte
order for 10 days).
16. SENATE RuLEs CommrrrI , CoMMrnEE ANALYSIS OF SB 950, at 5 (May 11, 1995); see State v.
Maniccia, 343 N.W.2d 834, 836 (Iowa 1984) (indicating the assets which are frozen might lawfully belong to
the defendant and might be used for his or her defense); id. (declaring that defendants are presumed innocent,
but the possible injustices to the defendants are outweighed by the possible advantage to the county).
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